More important than the results of the Lebanese elections are the lessons that the Lebanese should learn about their country and its capabilities. The elections were placed in the context of the confrontation between the two camps of moderation and defiance in the region and between two international projects, based on the role which Lebanon has become addicted to playing – both voluntarily and coerced – since its independence, exceeding its own capabilities. Indeed, Lebanon is a regional battlefield and mailbox, a pawn in a cosmic chess game and an arena for competing intelligence agencies, inter alia. The Lebanese have been divided over these attributes and have fought each other with unparalleled fierceness, increasing their disputes over explaining the meaning of their country, for themselves before others. Yet what has been neglected during the past decades is the simple question of what the citizens think of what is taking place on their soil. The citizens of this country have been surprised to find themselves participating in wars and settlings of accounts, the prominent figures of which compete in exploiting the difference of opinion among the Lebanese over their vision for their country, as well as the rush of the leaders of Lebanese groups to win over the influential forces in their country. There is no use denying the tremendous loss that Lebanon's political system suffers from, which renews the struggles and motives of past civil strife. Yet this does not negate the fact that the system complained of still offers every four years the opportunity for voters to have a say about their future. It is true, as it has been noted, that legislative elections differ from a referendum over major national choices, and that the function of the parliament can be summed up in drafting nationally agreed-upon policies, setting down laws and monitoring their implementation. Yet the Lebanese “State of Exception” (in the sense coined by Agamben) requires suspending the traditional functions of general political life in Lebanon and turning to resolving issues which, paired with deciding on fate and linked to life and death, become matters of daily management. And it is not strange, as is the case, for the questions put forth before the Lebanese to become difficulties. Indeed, for a divided society to be asked to redefine on a daily basis its stance on war and peace in the region, and for the programs presented to them by candidates to include choosing between two opposed – and in fact contradictory – political identities, is a taxing matter in itself, without taking into consideration economic and social crises, which have retreated to the margins and secondary details in the programs of candidates. Returning to the question of the right of the Lebanese to express their opinion (at least) regarding their fate, one can only acknowledge that they have, in the current campaign, been subjected to no less than blunt blackmail concerning their Arab identity and the conflict with Israel. Perhaps the Maronite Patriarch, in his insistence on the importance of responding to the challenges that face “our Arab identity” (a stance which is coherent, at the end of the day, with what was issued by the Synod held by the Maronite Church a few years ago about the identity of Lebanon and the church), sought to lift the blackmail to which a large part of the Lebanese are subjected, not all of them necessarily Christians. What is important is that answering the put forth question requires clinging to the notion that the drafting of policies takes place within state institutions that represent the Lebanese – whether they support or oppose the Resistance, and whether they commit to the requirements of the post-civil war constitution or have reservations in this respect. Perhaps such a question is among what should be pondered starting from this morning. As for questions that address renewing elites and moving forward towards a modern society, they lie for the most part beyond the horizon.
