Aggressiveness is not a characteristic of the foreign policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and hastiness is not one of its habits. Its policy is usually based on keeping crises silent, avoiding condemnations and accusations, attempting to contain conflicts behind closed doors, and overly adopting silence, patience, and openness. Nothing entices the GCC countries to seek a pretext for escalating the conflict with Iran, and they are aware that the conflict with Tehran leads to negative repercussions on stability in this sensitive region. It may even be said that these countries exerted continuous efforts to prevent public tensions despite their reservations towards Iran's rhetoric at times and its inauspicious practices at others. When a country like Kuwait is forced to announce the presence of “Iranian networks” on its territory, pronounce judgments, and take measures, then this indicates the existence of a genuine problem. The same applies when Bahrain accuses Iran of interfering in its domestic affairs. We are faced with an extremely serious crisis. The GCC countries accuse Iran of “threatening its national security, spreading dissent and sectarian conflict among its citizens, violating the good neighborhood principles, international laws, the UN Charter, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. These are no simple accusations, as the GCC countries consider that they act in defense of their sovereignty, the unity of their peoples, and the safety of their land. Obviously, these countries were observing during the past years what they consider to be an attempt by Iran to establish itself as a religious and political reference for Arab Shiites. Such fears were heightened with the Iraqi and Lebanese events. Indeed, experience proved the impossibility of forming a government in Baghdad without Iranian approval, and the same can be said about the government formation in Lebanon. It was difficult for the GCC countries to acknowledge such a right for Iran in Manama or Kuwait, even if the Shiite minorities had rightful demands. It is in this context that it is possible to understand the intervention of the Peninsula Shield Force in Bahrain, upon its authorities' request. It is a message that confirms that the fates of the GCC countries are linked, and that they refuse for some of the demands to constitute an opportunity for Iran to infiltrate the national fabric here and there and turn into a player that owns cards within these countries that enable it to influence their domestic and foreign policies and decisions. This message also indicates that the GCC countries are ready to go to extremes to keep Iran outside any domestic equations. While facing such accusations, the Iranian authorities resorted to a series of unconvincing responses, some of which uttered by President Ahmadinejad. Indeed, the Iranian President accused the GCC countries of yielding to US pressure, and considered that Washington was behind the intervention of the Peninsula Shield Force in Bahrain. Anyone following these developments knows full well that Washington was not aware of the decision to interfere, and that in any case it did not welcome it. The debate on the events in Bahrain uncovered the confusion currently experienced by Iranian politics. Iran is attempting in vain to give the impression that the Iranian revolution inspired the uprisings witnessed in the region. Any follower of these revolutions or uprisings is aware that they are derived from another lexicon, which is closer to the Green Movement that is prevented from the right to protest by the Iranian authorities. It also attempts in vain to portray any objection to its policies as being a part of a conspiracy masterminded by the Great Satan. Iran is mistaken if it persists on dealing with the GCC accusations in the manner it has used for the past three decades. It is also mistaken if it misestimates the weight that the GCC countries have on the Arab, Islamic, and international levels. It would have been better for it to note that Qatar is fully committed to the GCC's decisions regarding this crisis, and is a partner in drafting them. It is mistaken if it does not take into account Syria's stance on the events in Bahrain. Also, it is certainly mistaken if it does not wonder about what makes the Turkish role played in the region's fires accepted or demanded. While Ahmadinejad was responding to a serious crisis with unconvincing words, Recep Tayyip Erdogan was visiting the capital of Kurdistan, after his visit to Baghdad and his meeting with Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Husayni al-Sistani. Even more, some observers consider that Iran's persistence to hold on to its current approach will push a country like Syria to feel that an alliance with Tehran could become a burden, while listening to Turkey would help it swim and be rescued. Great roles are built through conviction and not submission. Hence, Iran seems to be in need of making another reading and adopting the policy of entering countries through their legitimate doors, based on mutual respect and interests. In this context, it may resort to the expert in the region's affairs and preoccupations, Ahmet Davutoglu, who entered yesterday President Bashar al-Assad's office for the forty-sixth time.
