The “Arab Spring,” which is still bloody in some states of the region, led the two regional powers Turkey and Iran to assume two roles. Indeed, the first is puzzled, distributing pieces of advice and offering shy mediations, while the second is troubled and distributing commandments that look closer to attempts to salvage the cards of a “tutor” which always thought that the tickling of the feelings on the Arab street would be enough to open all the doors of the region before the “savior” lurking on the eastern bank of the Gulf. In Manama, Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu appeared to be oscillating between two languages. In the first, he stressed the necessity not to interfere in Bahraini affairs, in a clear message to the Iranian side which claimed to be more concerned about the Bahrainis than their own command – saying that this was the reason why the people were hostile toward this command - and opened a confrontation with the Gulf Cooperation Council states for having dispatched forces to enhance stability in the country. In the second however, the Turkish foreign minister confirmed the willingness to mediate between Tehran and the Gulf states, without making any serious offers, based on the Iranian command's selection of the platform of aggression toward all the states, and its accusation of the GCC of succumbing to America's wishes. And while Davutoğlu's trip to Manama witnessed the prevalence of slogans in which he preached about the advantages of religious-confessional coexistence and as he preferred to head to Damascus instead of Tehran, the Gulf leaders for their part did not expect him to proclaim war on Iran in the context of the conflict over power, to condemn President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's attack against all the GCC policies, or turn the Gulf populations against their commands. Before the minister's trip to Damascus, the question on the table was the following: Does his insistence on confessional coexistence justify Turkey's concern over Bahraini stability? Or is the main issue at the level of the “Arab Spring” related to the confirmation of Ankara's role and its readiness to accompany the earthquake of change to preempt the erosion of its roles? As for Davutoğlu's offer to help Damascus implement the reform programs, it definitely points to its seriousness in changing the prevailing anger and lack of trust between the authority and the citizens. However, it brings back to mind the fate of all the Turkish initiatives in the region, starting with the mediation between Syria and Israel and ending with the interference to ensure calm in Lebanon and the action on the war arena in Libya. Some compare the Turkish commotion whenever the crises of the region expand to a “sound bomb” that shocks but does not deter. They are relying on the realities of the Turkish and Iranian roles, as the former has been deteriorating since the setback of the media confrontation with Israel (following the attack on the Freedom Flotilla) and the failure to promote Hamas's possible “rehabilitation” as a side in the negotiations, while the latter is closer to a fission bomb from whose fragments only Israel is spared, although Ahmadinejad promised us to wipe it off the map imminently. Following a period of puzzlement which followed the Egyptian January 25 revolution that had a major impact in Ankara, the Turks are gaining momentum. Meanwhile, the Justice and Development Party, which is working hard to fill the Egyptian vacuum in the region, will not remain at ease as Cairo is quickly trying to restore the pillars of its foreign policy. The paradox is that the new Egypt is taking the Iranian “cards” by surprise through its attempts to normalize the relations with Tehran, at a time when the Gulf-Iranian conflict is growing more imminent. Certainly, this normalization will not be to the liking of Khamenei who remembers that Egypt does not want “another Khomeini” and that its revolution does not require a certificate of patriotism. Today in the Gulf, the Iranian command is fueling the conflict policy with the GCC States by injecting additional doubts in regard to Tehran's intentions, which were maybe obstructed by the entry of the Peninsula Shield Force to Bahrain. Moreover, what is highly alarming is the pace of Iranian escalation which was joined by the Hawza 'Ilmiyya in Qom, without any regard for the consequences of the “sectarian tensions” or the GCC states' move toward a stage of confrontation of the facts and crises with one voice, without any neglect or confusion. Following the “Iranian infiltration” in Bahrain and Kuwait and the Gulf condemnation of the attempts to instigate “strife,” what interest is there for Tehran behind the escalation and the intensification of its campaign against Saudi Arabia? What point is there behind its rejectionism toward the American “projects,” while it is merely hitting Washington with slogans and the Gulf population with the arms of accusations questioning their patriotism and doctrine?
