The fact that the Syrian regime has been forced to discuss the near canceling of the emergency state, which has been operational for 48 years, in addition to the adoption of other reforms, constitutes a direct admission of the failure of the theory stating that external politics can provide internal stability. Dr. Bashar al-Assad had stressed on this theory during his latest interview with the Wall Street Journal at the beginning of the last month, where he considered that his country is protected from the events of Tunisia and Egypt thanks to the homogeneity between the ruling system and the Syrian people in regard to the Lebanese and Palestinian Resistance, the confrontation of Israel and the caution against the USA. Indeed, the relationship with the external world, be it positive or negative, has constituted - ever since the access of the Baath party to power some five decades ago - the image of the ruling system in Syria and the way it presents itself. It has also been connected to its regional role and to the justifications of its positions vis-à-vis the domestic political, economic, and social issues to the extent that the domestic arena ceased to exist except through the dealing with the internal arena. Therefore, it was only “natural” that the Syrian officials would direct their accusations at external sides for standing behind the popular demands and the demonstrations that reigned over several cities; and that they would make a connection between these demands and the targeting of Syria's regional role while indicating that foreign sides are implicated in the confrontations of Deraa, Latakia, Damascus, and some regions with a Kurdish majority. And although the theory did succeed for a long time in disguising the domestic contradictions, and although they have been used as a pretext for rejecting reforms and for oppressing the freedom of the Syrian people; the Syrian leadership should have been aware of the fact that the relationship with the external world is a two way road and that change in one of these ways must reflect on the other. It should have also been aware of the fact that the success of the revolution in Egypt, Tunisia, and other places, would definitely open up the eyes of the Syrians to their own situation, and would encourage them to follow the same example. And even if we do look into the external cards, which are believed to constitute a guarantee of stability for Damascus, we will find that these cards have been worn out with time and that they have turned into burdens weighing Damascus down. Let us consider for instance the relationship with Hezbollah and the Hamas movement in the framework of the “axis of resistance:” during the time of late President Hafez al-Assad, the relationship with Iran and Hezbollah was subjected to a minute balance that took into consideration the Syrian interests and the Arab sensitivities. Today however, Iran has become the strongest side in this relationship, and the Lebanese party has – practically – turned into a partner of Syria, which lost some of its power over the party. The possibility that the party is ready to try and help its Syrian partner is subjected to complicated calculations that are settled in the silent Tehran alone. These calculations are mainly related to preserving “a way back” in the event that Syria and the power balances in Lebanon undergo a change, especially in light of the unprecedented sectarian mobilization. As for Hamas, which originally leans towards Egypt, Damascus was nothing but an alternative for the unreachable Cairo. However, the change in Egypt reshuffled the cards. Clearly, Gaza is presently readier to discuss reconciliation with the Ramallah Authority, and more inclined to obtain an international recognition, to which Damascus is certainly not the gate. The relationship with Turkey – which had played a major role in driving Damascus out of its seclusion – is going through a silent crisis over what Ankara deems as the Syrian political mistakes in Lebanon. The proofs [to the deteriorating Syrian-Turkish relationships] include the fact that two Iranian planes heading to Damascus were forced to land on the Turkish lands in order to be searched for weapons, which were allegedly found in one of the planes. Other proofs also include the successive statements of the Turkish officials that are inciting Al-Assad at responding to his people's demands. And with regard to the difficult relationship with the West in general and with the USA in particular, Damascus has misinterpreted the signs coming from Washington regarding Washington's desire to reconnect with Syria. Indeed, the Obama Administration - which realized that the Iraqi card has been lost to Iran due to the ill judgment and bad performance of the Bush Administration – was aspiring at opening up to Syria in order to encourage it at forming a barrier to the direct communication between Iraq on the one hand and Lebanon and the Palestinians on the other hand. In other words, Washington wanted Damascus to control the armament of Hezbollah rather than break the balance on the southern Lebanese front by providing Hezbollah with long range missiles, according to the American accusation. And even if Al-Assad does succeed in containing the current wave of protests using different methods, the situation in the country will definitely not go back to what it was; and he will be forced to deal with the Syrian demands on the domestic level after the “foreign level” depleted its role.
