There are many similarities among the Arab protests from Tunisia to Yemen, in the presence of a stagnant economy, a high unemployment rate, restricted freedoms and incomplete reforms. Still, the transfer of the events to Bahrain almost constitutes a new Arab concern, since the sectarian dimension – following the Wefaq bloc's resignation from the Bahraini parliament – is raising fears that are not limited to Bahrain or the Gulf states. In the meantime, the perplexity which affected wide factions of oppositionists and political activists in the Arab Levant stems from this very sensitivity, raising questions about the ways to achieve a democratic change that would handle the socio-economic issues, the monopolization of power and the suppression of the freedom of expression, without falling in the trap of sectarian infighting. However, Bahrain is not the only model of sectarian terror. Indeed, in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, sectarian divisions are deterring any democratic action despite its necessity. In Algeria and Libya, the margins of maneuver seem to be wider, despite the tribal and ethnic divisions. As for the Coptic-Islamic tensions which prevailed on the eve of the Egyptian revolution, they cannot constitute an archetype for the ability to overcome the factional contradictions, due to the limited role played by the Coptic sect in Egyptian public life and is in line with its demographic weight. The situation is very different at the level of the sects of the Levant that are holding on – with their minorities and majorities – to political and economic power and the conflicting relationship that characterize their history and relations. One might say that the Levant is the “beating heart” or the core of the Arab exception which was often spoken about between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of Ben Ali's regime, and which is structurally opposed to democracy. One might also say that the regimes' ability to ascribe the contradictions in their communities to attributes related to the roles of sects-entities that are not subject to change, can thwart the efforts of any societal bloc calling for citizenship and the civil state. In other words, civil (sectarian-racial-partisan) division is thwarting national alignment. It is totally understandable to see the talk about “hostility toward Israel” being enough to protect this or that regime, or about the governments that are prone to fall exclusively being the ones allied with the United States becoming the object of political debate and contributing to voiding it of any substance through the ascription of the Arab protests and the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions to reasons which did not seem to be of great interest to the youth who led the toppling of Ben Ali and Mubarak. Still, this does not deny the interest of a number of regimes and forces supporting them in promoting these ideas, although this debate does not seem to be carrying any cognitive or political content, apart from the wish of its promoters to distance the suspicions of corruption, oppression and tyranny, while focusing on their roles in “resisting the American-Israeli project,” which is their own business. On the other hand, the importance of the actions in countries such as Bahrain and Yemen (taking into consideration the differences in sizes and weights) that enjoy clear diversity emerged, especially since the repercussions of the Saada wars that carried sectarian meanings have not yet dissipated. As for the way the protest movements will end in the two aforementioned countries, it will be highly important to the other countries in the Levant. Indeed, the success of the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia in achieving some of their demands (so far), while insisting on their peacefulness and their refusal to respond to the authority's violence with violence, gives the impression that there could be a peaceful end to the demonstrations, despite the victims that fell in Manama yesterday. Therefore, the test is not for the authorities alone, considering that the latter always failed in exerting self-restraint. It is also a test for the ability of the oppositionists to suppress the vindictive wishes, to move on toward new stages of action and draw up goals going in line with their national specificities.
