The Egyptians are going about their daily lives, while the others in the region and around the world will stay up late and fight with each other. They have to reconsider their calculations and rearrange their cards, as well as the map of their relations and strategic interests. Since the Tahrir Square generated a purely Egyptian revolution, anything attributed to it from abroad will not change its course, just like it is the case of all the interference attempts and the descriptions given to it. In the meantime, it would be too early to talk about a new foreign policy adopted by Cairo, just as it would be too early to talk about the direction of the relations with the United States and Israel or a new Islamic Middle East which will be adhered to by the revolution. Because it is a purely Egyptian revolution, the outgoing Supreme Council for the Armed Forces issued reassurances in regard to Egypt's international commitments and pacts, and assured before this that it will not be a substitute for the legitimate authority that is wanted by the people. This is the most important thing today. The revolution will not be busy with sideline battles, whether with Israel or with anyone else, and is not about to announce its bias in favor of the “rejectionist banner,” without it nonetheless meaning that it will return to the American space. It might not need random advice from this or that side, as much as it will need help. It has a lot of reforms to implement on the domestic arena - during the transitory phase - before turning toward the outside. Because it is a purely Egyptian revolution, it will remain as such for a long period of time and will certainly not remain distant from what is happening in the region and around the world. Because it is a purely Egyptian revolution, the fear from the army and from seeing it hijacking the revolution to reproduce the old regime should not be blown out of proportion, considering that if the army had wished to do so, it would not have remained neutral as it did since day one. Ever since Ahmed Orabi's revolution in 1881, the military institution was the headline of patriotism and the search for freedom and independence. It remained that way until the July 23, 1952 revolution, and proved during the last two weeks it was part of this overall feeling of patriotism. Indeed, it did not hesitate to side with it at the expense of the regime, the authority of President Mubarak and the authority of the ruling party through its businessmen, its security elements and its figures of corruption, as well as its relations both domestically and abroad. And since it enjoyed its own economy in terms of institutions, plants, farms and hospitals, it was far from the “economy” and corruption of the regime, and close to the people and the poor who called for its interference since the beginning and invited it to play its role by spreading stability and establishing balance with the authority's power, thugs and cavalry. For its part, the army acted as the protector of the state and not that of the authority and sided with the revolution, just like the people sided with it when it led their previous revolutions. Caution is necessary vis-à-vis the military men's love of power. However, the historical circumstances that rendered them the source of power no longer exist. These times were subjected to conditions and facts that are no longer relevant, and prevailed during the days of the confrontation of colonialism, the Cold War, the wars from 1956 to 1967, the War of Attrition and the 1973 war. They are irrelevant during the days of the information revolution and the modern telecommunications means which spread the principles of human rights throughout the world, and prompted the unarmed individuals to communicate and create a power much stronger than that of the ruling authority that called on them like cattle - from time to time - to renew its legitimacy in elections which were falsified in advance! It is normal following the collapse of the regime for the military council to manage the country during the transitory phase. The crowds called on it because their revolution was spontaneous and without a command. Therefore, some are demanding today that the young people who participated in it be given some time before heading to early parliamentary elections, so that they can organize their ranks and form their forces and parties. The latter cannot be enticed by the old slogans, seeing how they rebelled because the traditional parties were unable to induce change. They did not raise the slogans of pan-Arabism since these slogans were used in the face of colonialism, while the newborn national states in middle of last century needed to assert themselves and break away from the past of occupation. They also did not raise the slogans of political Islam, since these slogans were used in the 1980s to present the fundamentalist movements as an alternative for the failure of the military regimes, the coups and the ruling and traditional parties. Today, the pan-Arab and the Islamists are not alone on the arena, as they were joined by the youth. Some like to compare the role of the military in the new Egypt, to its role in Turkey. This is true, but only to a certain extent. The conditions which allowed Turkey's military to last that long no longer exist. Had it not been for the military, nothing would have been maintained from the Ottoman Empire following the major defeat in World War I, since it was the only one capable of gathering the remains of modern Turkey. Moreover, the historical circumstances are different, just like Turkish Islam which is coexisting side by side with the secular crowds, in an archetypical democracy attracting the attention of the Arab communities. There is no doubt that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt knows it is not the one that detonated the revolution, although it joined it in terms of organization and all sorts of supplies. This is why it did not raise its own slogans and joined the others in calling for liberties, dignity and social justice, while awaiting the next stage – i.e. the electoral stage – for the people to speak freely. Still, it must introduce drastic changes to its ideology and methods, since it cannot ignore this mosaic that was seen on Tahrir Square. Will pluralism and the Muslim Brotherhood's participation alongside the secular, the liberals and all the ideological and cultural directions in the revolution not prompt it to recognize the possibility of coexistence between the secular and the Islamists? Does Turkey's experience not tempt it? Was it not preceded by the leader of the Tunisian Hizb Ennahda, Rashid al-Ghannushi, who admires the Turkish model? The slogan of the youth of the revolution was dignity, justice, freedom and democracy. They proceeded behind these simple words peacefully and without resorting to violence. Still, they were enough to produce an impact, thus allowing them to regain their wasted dignity. However, the building of justice, freedom and democracy requires time – amounting to years and maybe even decades. The same can be said about the building of democratic institutions which will face difficulties, obstacles and setbacks. But was this not the same experience which was endured by the states that gained their independence from amid the rubble of the Soviet Union? Because Egypt's revolution is that of the entire Middle East – which was sparked by Tunisia that never presented itself as being a major state leading the Arab project or the regional system – it was overwhelmingly welcomed and celebrated on the popular Arab level. This was an expression of hope toward the biggest Arab country's regaining of its role which was long absent from all the files, from the Palestinian issue to Arab national security, Gulf and Middle East security and the security of all of Africa. Sooner or later, this will require Egypt to have its say in regard to what is happening around it. It is bound to meet its Arab audience and reconcile with it, just as it is bound to return to its African environment at a time when Sudan, its twin and backyard, is going through a historical turning point which might lead to its division into mini-states, with all that such a development might entail in terms of repercussions on Egypt and its political, water and economic security. The popular Arab joy toward the revolution in Egypt launched this tide to regain dignity and freedom, and broke the barrier of fear which was transferred to the ruling regimes. Indeed, the Yemenis in Sana'a are demonstrating while calling for the changing of the regime, although President Ali Abdullah Saleh pledged to step down once his presidential term is over in 2013, promising not to be succeeded by his son Ahmad. In Algeria, over 30,000 police elements were deployed to prevent the demonstrators calling for the change of the regime from reaching Martyrs' Square in the heart of the capital, despite President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's promises to annul the state of emergency. Moreover, the Arab world is not the only one aware of Egypt's pivotal character, historical role and geostrategic position in its surrounding, from Iraq to the Gulf, to Northern Africa and the Horn of Africa. The major regional states, i.e. Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia (and its sisters among the Nile upstream and basin countries) will sooner or later reconsider their expansionist roles which were permitted by Egypt's absence from the region, but also by other reasons related to these countries, their demographic and economic growth and the development of their interests. However, it might not be useful for these states to rush into defining the location which will be occupied by Egypt, considering that the Egyptians undoubtedly know their place and will fill it. The entire Middle East is changing and President Barack Obama's administration will not be able to turn its back and focus on the domestic renewal battle. The strategic interests of the United States are at the heart of the storm from the Gulf to the Ocean, from Iraq to Tunisia going through Sudan, Palestine, Lebanon and of course Egypt. Consequently, it will find itself forced to become more engaged, which is what is it doing in Egypt and has done in Tunisia, while there are no guarantees for the consequences of its interference in either case. It must bear in mind Egyptian patriotism and might not benefit from the reliance on the relations between the two military institutions in both countries, seeing how the military on Tahrir Square sided with the crowds carrying the national flag. In this context, Washington's advice and experience in building democracy in Afghanistan and then in Iraq are not an example to be followed. What remains to be said at this level is that its strategic ally in the region – which never dealt with neighboring democratic regimes ever since its establishment – still believes that “stability in the Middle East is better than democracy,” as it was stressed by Israeli Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi. So, is Washington capable of convincing this ally that the East is changing and regaining its national dignity and that it has no other solution but to quickly decide how it will coexist with the people of the region?
