There are some who threaten with a series of measures that will be adopted by the opposition in Lebanon and will undermine the parliamentary consultations on Monday. However, all eyes are not turned toward the required goal behind obstructing these consultations as much as the doubts of the March 14 team are enhanced regarding the existence of a “coup” being gradually implemented by the opposition along the tracks of the government and the international tribunal. And while there is little hope in seeing the Qatari-Turkish action revive the track of the Syrian-Saudi understanding to save Lebanon from comprehensive security-political mayhem in the “post indictment phase,” one can understand the warning issued by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal before the departure of his Qatari counterpart Hamad Bin Jassem Bin Jabr al-Thani and his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoğlu from Beirut, as an attempt to give momentum to the new action before it is too late. True, Saud al-Faisal's warning against the end of the state of coexistence in Lebanon among the different religions and factions, was accompanied by a “what if” the crisis were to reach the point of “separating and dividing” the country. However, he still appeared to be exerting pressures to bring the concerned sides back on the rails of dialogue and calm, based on the recognition of the facts and the dissociation between the government and the tribunal. But as the opposition – at the head of which is Hezbollah – annulled any chance of seeing this dissociation (with the toppling of the government of Saad al-Hariri), everyone is awaiting the unknown after their return to square one, i.e. that which existed before the Saudi-Syrian effort. The point behind the Saudi “message” is to encourage all the Lebanese, both the loyalists and the opposition, to search for an alternative for all the settlements that were put forward and that remained confidential for months, if such an alternative can distance Lebanon from the bitter division between its two camps and tear down the walls between its factions to allow the deterrence of the external winds. It is not an exaggeration or a sign of pessimism to see the chances of a solution stooping to levels never before known by the Lebanese, even during their civil wars after 1975. So far, and while the S-S equation was toppled due to factors, some of which were external - as it is also believed by pro-March 14 figures who are questioning the extent of the impact of or harmony with Tehran's interests at the level of Hezbollah's inclinations – the Iranian command did not send encouraging signs toward the French attempt to form a “contact group” for Lebanon. Indeed, it was not easy to ignore the Iranian escalation seen yesterday on the front of the negotiations over the nuclear file, at a time when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad angrily talked about the American-Israeli-European role in “instigating strife” in Lebanon and threatened the West to sever “the hand of conspiracy.” He seemed to be addressing a message to Paris that feels very strongly about defending the international tribunal and is very stringent in regard to the nuclear file! The majority of the Lebanese are now feeling their way, considering that if the confrontation were to erupt, its arena will be known along with the identity of those who will pay the price. The predicament is resurfacing because the impossible equation remains unchanged with an opposition that toppled Saad al-Hariri's government and thinks it can also topple the international tribunal on the domestic arena to avoid the consequences of “strife,” and a group loyal to March 14 and the tribunal and insisting on the fact that the relinquishing of the tribunal will mark an extension of the projects of an even greater strife. The first is comforted by the post-May 7 experience and the second is relying on the just character of the exposure of the killer. Consequently, the priority for both the loyalists and the opposition is the tribunal and not the government, while what changed following the indictment is the increase of the conditions of Hezbollah and its allies. So is a settlement possible? It is a fateful battle for the two sides, and between the ceiling of ambitions and the collapse of all the walls of trust, the language of “conspiracy” and betrayal is returning to its golden age as though confrontation was indubitable. Some are thus offering the muscles of the defiance, and others are putting forward “what is worse is yet to come” scenarios. In the meantime, doubts surrounding the intentions of the others are prevailing, along with the assassination of the future each single day. The nightmare of the Lebanese has become the “impossible” settlement, while the hope of seeing concessions has left political life. As for those reassured about the ability of the Lebanese to “reach an understanding” - as is Ahmadinejad's case - they may be forgetting the earthquake which toppled all the understandings, i.e. the assassination of Rafik al-Hariri in 2005. Today, as the Lebanese are living behind walls of fear over the hour of confrontation, they are still incapable of coming up with a settlement equation under the ceiling of justice, security and the state. The “conspiracy” concern is prevailing, as no one will relinquish its fate to save the small country from the major fire.
