Which government will Prime Minister-designate Najib Mikati be able to form in light of the March 14 forces' refusal to participate in it? How will Mikati's government constitute an opportunity for the prevalence of the “No winner, no loser” formula in Lebanon – as it was stated by Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah – despite the exclusion of Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri by use of dupery according to his belief and that of many Lebanese? How can it be a national salvation government, as it is wanted by Nasrallah and Mikati, after the schism has reached its deepest levels, and after the March 14 team whose ranks are eroding with the completion of Jumblatt's “coup” and Al-Hariri's exit from the premiership, was left to face its own fate? Most importantly - if one were to consider the international tribunal as being the March 14 team's last card – the insistence of the former opposition on seeing the ministerial statement of any government which succeeds that of Saad al-Hariri featuring an official Lebanese relinquishing of the tribunal and its obligations, then this will constitute the most difficult obstacle in the face of Mikati's ambitions. Indeed, if Hezbollah's demand is met, there can be no reconciliation or salvation. It would be useless to say that the leader of the Future Movement will not accept the relinquishing of the tribunal or the logic of “neutralizing Lebanon” after all that has happened even since Riyadh discontinued its mediation in the context of the Saudi-Syrian effort. This is true not only because the last card is in the hands of the supporters of the Future Movement to respond to what they perceive as being a “Syrian-Iranian attack” to topple the tribunal once and for all - following the attempts to undermine its credibility. Indeed, it is also to respond to the “dupery” with which the table was turned on the parliamentary majority that was guaranteed in favor of Al-Hariri before President Michel Suleiman postponed the consultations. The key priority in the ranks of the two conflicting sides will remain the tribunal that will proceed regardless of what is ratified by Prime Minister Mikati's government. Indeed, it is just like it appeared in the heated Iranian race to address messages to all those concerned in the region, in America and in the West in general, that Tehran is capable of responding whenever the pressures on it are increased. As for the fateful battle in which Hezbollah has been engaged with the tribunal ever since the party launched the campaign to undermine its credibility, it has moved to an advanced stage of the race to topple it on the Lebanese level. It is now positioned between the issuance of a ministerial statement (if it were to relinquish it) and granting the vote of confidence to Mikati's government in parliament, and the tribunal's announcement of the names of those accused of being implicated in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and his companions. The pre-indictment stage is one thing and the post-indictment stage is another, as everyone knows that the repercussions of the latter will be similar to that of a Lebanese and regional September 11. The “Day of Anger” took place on the street and Saad al-Hariri could not conceal his shock vis-à-vis the “deceit” despite previous bitterness with those who one day were leading the one-million people demonstrations of the March 14 forces. Hence, the smoke of the anger could not absorb the sectarian uproar in Lebanon, regardless of what is said about the “democratic game.” And it is on the beat of that same uproar that Prime Minister Mikati will undertake his mission to “nip strife in the bud” – as he says. However, this will take place without the team that reaped the disappointment of deceit, knowing how the prime minister-designate will be able to thwart strife if his government's ministerial statement lifts the Lebanese official cover off the international tribunal. Consequently, the question revolves around whether Mikati, with the centrism he flaunted, is not only able to “round the corners” as it is wanted by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah or to justify the “no winner, no loser” slogan following Al-Hariri's exclusion. It is also about coming up with the impossible formula to avoid the statement's proclamation of divorce with an international decision that secured the formation of the tribunal. Was this divorce not the weapon of the battle which was fiercely waged by the opposition in the past, ever since the opening of the “false witnesses” file and until the toppling of Al-Hariri's government and the Doha Accord along with it? When Najib Mikati says that his priority will be reconciliation and concord, none of the Lebanese powers can question the legitimacy of this ambition which was not accomplished by the Saudi-Syrian effort or the Qatari-Turkish action for reasons that have become known – as these are the same reasons that froze Paris' project to establish a “contact group.” But with the failure of Arabization and the continuous prohibition of internationalization, what are the chances for the Lebanonization of a solution which will remain – to Al-Hariri and the March 14 forces – imposed by the power of the arms of the opposition and its reliance on Tehran? The Day of Anger smoke did not conceal the fire of strife, and no matter how honest Mikati's intentions and promises may be, the supporters of March 14 among others are entitled to be equal between the toppling of the tribunal on the Lebanese level and the toppling of the “no winner, no loser” formula. In this context, they are also entitled to consider that Al-Hariri's exclusion in a game that was referred to as being democratic is the strongest blow addressed by the March 8 forces on the last minute, in order to undermine the Justice + Stability equation on the domestic arena. As for the major powers, at the head of which is Washington, their preoccupation with much more important international issues – as it was said – allowed the former minority to surprise Al-Hariri with a fiercer May 7 staged through those who were his first allies in the Cedars Revolution and the course of justice.
