First of all, we would like to congratulate you on assuming your new post, and extend our wishes of every success for you and for Iraq. The responsibilities assigned to you are indeed difficult, in a country that is depleted by conflicting policies. It is the manner in which the challenges you face will be dealt with that shall decide the future of the Iraqi oil industry, and the country's economy for decades to come. First and foremost, one must be honest with the Iraqi people regarding the 12 agreements signed with the international oil companies. Is it true, for instance, that the decision to enter into these agreements all at once was done to accomplish at least one political “achievement” for the former government, shortly before the legislative elections – instead of entering into gradual agreements with these companies, especially in light of the deteriorating administrative and technical situation in the country? Is it also true that instead of increasing production capacity to approximately 12 million barrels per day by 2017, Iraq's production capacity will not attain more than seven million barrels per day by 2035? This is according to the official reports of the U.S. Department of Energy – which means that near term forecasts for Iraq are extremely pessimistic (both at the security and petroleum production levels). Is it also true that, as predicted by senior Iraqi oil experts, these agreements – should they be implemented comprehensively – will lead to reducing Iraq's oil reserves by 50 percent in 20 years? Where does the truth lie then, about the future of the most important Iraqi economic resource? Can this be elaborated to the public opinion, and in the parliament, if possible? There is also the issue of the relationship with the parliament and its role in evaluating the agreements with the international companies. The Council of Ministers had approved the service agreements with international oil companies, despite the fact that the duration of these contracts exceeds two whole decades in many instances. So, will you ask the parliament to study these agreements and vote on them? Will you approve some technical amendments on these agreements, such as entrusting the powers of signature, partnership and follow-up to the national oil company, instead of keeping these powers with the Oil Ministry, as has been the case with these agreements? What is the future of the Petroleum Law which the government referred to the parliament in February, 2007? What is the legal reference point that you will adopt in the course of your work? Will it be the same mixture of the regulations of both former and present regimes, where you would choose what is appropriate according to circumstances? Or will you be able to secure the approval of parliament for a new law that defines the purviews of the Ministry of Oil and its responsibilities? Who will draft the country's oil policies? What are the jurisdictions of the Ministry of Oil and what is the nature of its relationship with the National Oil Company planned to be established? What about the domestic oil distribution policy? Will the Ministry entrust this responsibility to specialized departments, instead of direct handling by the minister? Will petroleum products be provided to the Iraqi people in a normal and reliable manner, as is the case in other countries in the world, and as was the case prior to 2003? Or will the people continue to be denied basic and necessary services, such as electricity and gasoline? There are many difficulties faced by the Oil Ministry, including some that are pertaining to its core functions, even if they are outside of the scope of its direct purviews. This is because the constitution has been deliberately drafted in a vague and ambiguous manner, especially in what regards defining the relationship between the jurisdictions of the Oil Ministry on one hand, and those of the regions and governorates on the other hand. This was exploited to usurp the ministry's federal powers. As you are aware, the problem then began to be amplified, with various implications that are no longer limited to Kurdistan, but went beyond it to Al-Anbar, where the government was unable to sign gas contracts awarded to international companies because of the objections of the Council of Al-Anbar. Similar problems also persist in the southern governorates. There is also the issue of joint oil fields with neighboring countries. This is in fact a chronic problem as borders are yet to be demarcated in a final and official manner with a number of these countries. But the absence of official borders does not fall within the jurisdictions of the Ministry of Oil, but rather those of the Iraqi government. Since there are more than 25 joint fields with neighboring countries, oil is a priority issue with these countries, and hence the need for the Ministry of Oil to play a vital role in settling the border issue by engaging in joint oil field development projects before Iraq's rights are squandered, or the problems with neighboring countries escalate into conflicts. There is also the rampant corruption in various state institutions. Here, too, the issue goes beyond the Ministry of Oil. The epidemic spread of corruption is part and parcel of the moral laxity and loose administration in the country, which took on tragic proportions after 2003. However, there is major responsibility borne here by the Ministry of Oil, because corruption in the petroleum industry involves tens of millions of dollars in kickbacks to corrupt individuals, and this is beyond the scope of corruption present in any other economic sector in the country. Last but not least, there is the issue of smuggling. Although smuggled amounts have been on the decline as of late, several gangs continue to smuggle petroleum products from the Salah al-Din refinery to Iran. So who is the primary beneficiary of these smuggling operations, and who are the political parties that are protecting the smugglers? *. Mr. Khadduri is an energy expert
