There are high hopes that Nouri al-Maliki will succeed in resolving the Iraqi crisis during his second term, which officially started yesterday with his assignment to form the government. More than eight months have passed since the legislative elections. During this period, hundreds of victims fell in acts of violence. American combat troops withdrew from the country, and the political scene in Washington changed in the aftermath of the Congressional midterm elections. Then after intensive interference from Iraq's neighboring states, the Iraqis finally managed to stop stalling and moved a step forward towards handling their innumerable problems themselves. Or so they should. The settlement which led to the reassignment of Al-Maliki reveals numerous indications regarding the upcoming stage of Iraqi politics. For instance, those who believe they achieved political gains during the past years will insist on maintaining their stances, and will refuse to relinquish the most important posts in the state regardless of the cost. Meanwhile, the subject of the implicit agreement between the Americans and the Iranians, over the reappointment of Al-Maliki to the office of Prime Minister, was the focus of much writing and analysis. This is useful to understand the way Washington and Tehran each perceives Iraq in the context of their respective grand strategies. However, it would be hard to speculate about the method which will be adopted by Al-Maliki to manage the situation in Iraq during the coming years, and whether or not his call yesterday on the parliamentary blocs participating in the cabinet to nominate those who are most competent to handle the ministerial portfolios, was merely rhetoric. None of the accumulating facts in Iraq since the end of the rule of Saddam Hussein indicate that competence and integrity have been the criteria for appointments to sensitive positions. The New Iraq, just like the old Iraq, is a traditional Arab state where factionalism and nepotism govern appointments to the most prominent posts. Democracy and electoral and political alliances do not extend beyond the tribal sectarian interpretation, which Lebanon had pioneered prior to Iraq, striding down the path of ceremonial sectarian agreements with no direction or purpose. Sooner or later, the Iraqis will discover – just like the Lebanese did – the dead end they have gotten themselves into, and allowed the others to lead them to. Sooner or later, they will discover that this road will only lead to more civil conflicts, with both swords and pens, which in turn can only beget more conflicts. Still, these developments which have been the subject of much discussion for years do not quite capture the Iraqi reality. Other issues need to be included, such as the flagrant corruption, the poor performance of the administration and of public services, and the collapse of the infrastructure of the educational institutions. This is not to mention the discovery of “terrorist infiltration” in security services following each massacre perpetrated against Iraqi civilians and interests. All these problems seem to be likely to persist in the foreseeable future. Considering that the last four years of Al-Maliki's rule are the model by which he will abide during his second term – with some improvements at the level of public services – it will be hard to imagine Iraq's recovery from its current predicament. What was revealed by the settlement that led to the designation of Al-Maliki and the lengthy consultations which preceded it, is that it will be difficult to reach true political reconciliation that would heal the wounds of the past and allow the concerns of the future to be addressed. Slogans such as “Refusing the return of the Baathists” and “They will not take through elections, what they failed to take through tyranny and terrorism”, which are pitted against other slogans of Arab nationalism, betray the nature of the real and concealed backdrop – under the cover of pompous words: Namely, that of sectarian division in Iraq. It is not farfetched to say that the sharpness of Iraqi stances has found nothing to alleviate it, save for the needs of certain foreign powers. At present, these are seeking to instate a period of calm, in order to reassess the situation – and remobilize their capabilities - in preparation for a new round in which Iraq or other countries will be an arena.
