Between seeking possible solutions or clinging to the thorny crises, the new international mediator in the Sahara conflict Christopher Ross seems to face real challenges. At the very least, negotiations can not take place amidst threats of return to arms. Regardless of the underlying motives, such a threat does not help create circumstances conducive to building trust and easing tension. Last year's suspension of the Manhasset negotiations was an enough indication of the impasse and the absence of the objective requirements that ensure some progress. The psychological barrier that once hindered the direct negotiations between the concerned sides was indeed eliminated. But most importantly is that another barrier is about to frustrate the hopes. Holding a fifth session of negotiations is unlikely under threats. Since 1991, the choice of war in the Sahara heralded the end of a period. Political wisdom seemed to succeed where canons failed, not only because the United Nations ratified a mutually accepted peace settlement, but also because winning the wager of war is unparalleled to the wager of peace. Since the Sahara war itself was different from the regular or guerrilla wars, the prospects of peace remained open to different settlements that do not directly ensue the ceasefire, but the appraisal of the political and economic losses as well as human suffering. It is true that the efforts of a peace settlement passed by periods that did not suit the desires of all parties – as there is a winner and a loser in any deal. But returning to the pre-1991 situation is not only unacceptable, but also impossible for various geo-political, field and realistic considerations. In this sense, the Polisario Front's threat to hold arms once again is a mere balloon of pressure. However, experience has shown that making a specific selection necessarily cancels other options and that there is no magic recipe that groups war and peace at the same time. War breaks out when dialogue becomes impossible and fades away when the choice of peace becomes inevitable. The characteristic of the Sahara conflict – in case wars have characteristics – is that it ended once and for all and if the concerned sides want to push for another war, it will be more tragic and catastrophic on the entire North African region. Furthermore, the peace settlement which is today called the peaceful solution to the conflict, has a different effect than the results of the traditional wars, because it is formed upon a win-win solution. Such logic indeed sums up present-absent aspects of the conflict between the brothers-enemies, one that is no longer taking place on the dunes of the Sahara, but in the decision-making circles affiliated to the political willpower. The chance of success for the American mediator seems to be more like a doctor who knows the diseases and its remedies, but prefers to give the body – exhausted by chemical drugs – other humanitarian drugs. He is like a referee who knows in advance the result of a game but wishes victory would be mutual. Minor and informal meetings between the concerned sides will not be an end per se, but they will help play down tension to facilitate an agreement over resuming negotiations. Certainly, reaching an agreement over such a formula eliminates any threats of escalation, unless the decision to return to arms is a final one. Then, all positions and facts will change, although the region is unable to contain an extremely deteriorating tension.
