Nine years after getting involved in Afghanistan, the United States has realized what was experienced by this country's past invaders, from the British in the nineteenth century to the Soviets in the twentieth, if one does not wish to go back to the days of Alexander of Macedon: victory is impossible in this country. This explains President Barack Obama's decision to begin withdrawing his troops next July, and to prepare for this by increasing the number of troops and beginning to contact the Taliban movement, or one of its wings, in order to ensure an “honorable” withdrawal and to keep Hamid Karzai, or another of those loyal to Washington, in the seat of power. The US Administration has chosen Jalaluddin Haqqani to begin its talks with the Taliban. The man is known for being the movement's most extremist and most powerful leader. Washington knows him very well, as he had been its strong ally during the Soviet occupation, and it used to consider him to be a hero of liberation at that stage. He was responsible for the Taliban movement coming to power in 1996, with the support of Pakistani intelligence, which offered him the seat of power in Kabul after the “invasions” of New York and Washington on September 11th. He refused for many reasons, among them his commitment to the Taliban and their leader Mullah Omar, his friendship with Osama Bin Laden, as well as the fact that he did not want to confront the Afghan tribes, especially the Pashtun tribe, to which most of the movement's leaders belong. The first US condition for reconciliation with the Taliban will be for them to abandon Al-Qaeda, i.e. to separate foreign fighters from their protectors in order to facilitate eradicating them – exactly the same condition the US dictated upon the Iraqi resistance before forming out of it the “Awakening” movements which fought the Al-Qaeda organization and expelled it from their areas. US negotiations with Haqqani will not be as easy as the Americans imagine. Yet there is no alternative in order to contain military and financial losses, and to prepare the climate for giving a role to play to Pakistan, which so far is interested in supporting the Taliban, if the talks are allowed to succeed. This explains the tension in relations between Islamabad and Washington at this stage. The Americans have, after these past five years of madness, realized that they will not be able to impose their will on the world by force of arms, and have thus begun to retreat from the “Greater Middle East”. But the problem is that they are leaving behind them governments and regimes of which the least that can be said is that they are backward and corrupt, relying on the US to remain in power, as well as on its domestic supporters – supporters who have not yet realized that Bush's era has ended. That is what is happening in Iraq. The American will withdraw, leaving behind them a regime eaten away by corruption, in which and over which sects, religious denominations and ethnic groups are struggling, all of them seeking to increase their share of power and wealth. This is what they will leave behind in Afghanistan, where the tribes are waiting for the opportunity to assail the central government – which is what they seek after in any country in which they find supporters, without invading it. Soon the Taliban will become partners in rule in Afghanistan. They will enjoy the support of donors, as well as Washington's blessings, turning in the latter's view from an obscurantist movement to a progressive democratic one, which could help it besiege the Iranian “Satan” – and to Hell with human rights.
