An Afghan assembly touted by President Hamid Karzai as a home-grown peace initiative is unlikely to produce a blueprint for reconciliation because the drafters do not include regional power Pakistan's Taliban clients. Heavyweights such as Pakistan's key asset, the Haqqani group, are not attending the June 2-4 “jirga”, although Taliban sympathizers may take part. Islamabad sees the powerful anti-American network as leverage against the influence of rival India in Afghanistan, and is unlikely to help broker peace as long as leader Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sarajuddin are excluded from the process. Islamabad is playing the long game, hoping to persuade both Karzai and the White House that peace will not be possible without the participation of the Haqqani network, the most potent force in Afghanistan, analysts say. “Pakistan is hedging its bets that sooner or later ‘if we can hold out on the Haqqani factor', the US will be ready to include the Haqqani faction on the peace train,” said Simbal Khan, Director of Eurasian Studies at Pakistan's Institute of Strategic Studies. But there is little chance the White House will change its position anytime soon and it would prefer to see the Haqqanis dead. The US is pushing Islamabad to dismantle Haqqani's network in Pakistan's North Waziristan, but Islamabad is resisting because members of its powerful security establishment says that could trigger a full-scale tribal revolt that would be catastrophic for the country. A history of ties and influence may not translate into control of Haqqani's seasoned fighters, who could easily turn on Pakistan's forces, and call on extra support from thousands of Pashtun tribesmen along the forbidding border with Afghanistan. Government troops are already exhausted from drawn-out efforts to contain insurgents, and can ill-afford to open another front. “The Pakistanis are very pragmatically aware that it would be a difficult task for (the Pakistani military),” said Khan. “We would have to take them on for 15 to 20 years.” Unpredictable ally Although getting Haqqani's name on a peace settlement would officially remove one of the biggest threat to US troops and stability in Afghanistan, the militant leader's history suggests he would be a highly unpredictable participant. He has a track record of lining up with whoever can fund or support him. He was believed to have received money and arms from the CIA when he was fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Then Haqqani pledged his support for the Taliban, while maintaining his own fiefdoms in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and ties to Pakistani intelligence. So he could be a spoiler in any peace process. Kamran Bokhari, Middle East and South Asia director at STRATFOR global intelligence firm, says that despite Haqqani's past, Washington must abandon its notion that talking with his network would be like “doing business with the devil.” “That's the kind of thing that prevents any movement and it's frustrating the Pakistanis and they know it's an uphill path,” he said. Out of all the militant groups in Afghanistan, Haqqani is Islamabad's best bet for continuing influence in future. Pakistan forged close ties with Afghan mujahideen when they fought Soviet occupiers in the 1980s, but the internecine fighting that followed Moscow's defeat fractured many resistance groups. The triumph of the Taliban, their subsequent ouster by US-backed Afghan forces and a renewed insurgency caused further fragmentation and realignment of loyalties. That's why Pakistan will keep pushing Washington to give Haqqani – with whom ties have remained fairly steady – a chance. Time to wait While Islambad believes only wide political reconciliation that includes the US's Taliban enemies can bring peace, Washington is pursuing an entirely different strategy. It aims to undermine the Taliban by offering foot soldiers economic incentives to lay down their arms, while pursuing leaders to kill or capture them. The US hopes that strategy will start stabilizing Afghanistan before a gradual troop withdrawal next year. Karzai, hoping to regain credibility after corruption charges tarnished his reputation, has put forward a proposal offering insurgent leaders exile in third countries in an effort to end the war. Analysts say this strategy could backfire – and unless Western forces turn the tide on the battlefield, the Taliban will be in a position of strength and will see no need to negotiate. “By placing Taliban in exile, all you do is give them the opportunity to plan their return and continue to help, at a minimum, plan disruptions, and at worst, plan the overthrow of the government,” said Lt. Col Tony Shaffer, a former US intelligence officer in Afghanistan now at the Center for Advanced Defence Studies in Washington. “The process must be inclusive of all.” Pakistan's trump card is that it is in no rush – and influential enough that any deal without it is unlikely to stick.
