The “political acquittal” offered by Saad Hariri to Syria was the natural closure for the introductions that preceded it, from the Saudi-Syrian reconciliation at the Kuwait summit two years ago to his visit to Damascus last year and the revival of the European and American track toward Damascus during the last three years. These transformations were and are still being dictated by interests, which do not recognize any political positions or “constant” rivalries. These are the same interests which prompted Walid Jumblatt to turn toward Damascus again, just like they prompted the Syrian command to forget all the pledges it made not to open its border before those who led the campaign to oust its troops from Lebanon and who cast all sorts of accusations against it following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. During the three years which followed the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, Syria was in the circle of fire and subjected to the Western, but also Arab, blockade. Hence it was forced to strengthen its relations with Iran to the point of identifying with all its political positions. This gave some the impression that Damascus had also become a “card” in the hands of the Islamic Republic, that it no longer enjoyed absolute freedom and was going to be a part of any deal that the Republic could seal with the West! On the other hand however, it was continuing to enhance its relations with Turkey which also seemed to need such relations in order to face the challenge posed by the Iranian expansion in the region. Moreover, Syria did not hesitate to meet King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz when he initiated reconciliation and gap-bridging, based on the latter's conviction that the dispute between the Kingdom and Syria harmed both countries on more than one regional arena - from Iraq to Palestine, going through Lebanon - in favor of the Arab neighboring states. Indeed, while the Arab states are aware of the fact that the Iranian expansion in the region was made at the expense of the Arab regime and interests, the Kingdom is aware of Syria's geographic and political position at the level of the balance of this regime, one which occasioned a long history of strategic relations and joint interests between the two. This position was also the reason why France and Europe in general, followed by the United States, changed their policy toward Damascus as the key for and passageway toward many solutions, as it is capable of acting as an obstruction tool in the face of most of these solutions. This reached a point where American officials recognized that their attempt to isolate Syria in the region almost generated the isolation of America itself. As for the justifications voiced by the “returnees” to the enhancement of communication with Syria, they were and are still headlined: the attempt to distance it from Iran and sever its relations with movements that are opposed to the American “projects” in the Middle East. This plan was referred to as the “improvement of the regime's behavior,” seeing how changing this regime would not serve their interests. Sooner or later however, they will discover that the disengagement between the two states is not on the agenda of any of them regardless of what happens. This is due to numerous reasons, the most prominent of which probably being the fact that Syria, which has not severed its relations with Iran since the Islamic Revolution, needs these relations to activate its regional role on more than one arena. Likewise, Tehran needs Damascus to maintain many roles, as well as its presence on these same arenas. In the meantime, Syria knows very well that the need for it on the American, European and Arab levels increases proportionally to the expansion of the Iranian role, and even further, whenever there is a need for a communication channel with Hezbollah and Hamas among other movements and powers standing alongside the Islamic Republic. Therefore, it never acted and will never act as though there were Arab or non-Arab doors which must be crossed to enter Washington to begin with, and has been and is still relying on the principle of “trade-offs” it could secure with any American administration without a mediator. Consequently, Syria has always tried to maintain its position by upholding its presence in two alliances with contradictory policies on the regional and international levels, just as is the case today. It is on one hand the ally of the Islamic Republic, which is publicly opposed to the peaceful settlement in the Middle East. It is heightening the sensitivities of a number of Arab countries that believe that the Iranian expansion in the region is being made at the expense of the Arab regime. On the other hand, it is the ally of Turkey, which is pushing the settlement forward and seeking a role that would compete and establish balance with that of its eastern neighbor, in order to restore some balance in favor of the moderate Arabs. Syria realizes that what it could get in Lebanon would be hard to get in Iraq where Iran has the upper hand through the Shiite parties and forces, and where the Republic does not need a crossing point governed by the Syrians as is the case with Hezbollah and the command of Hamas and the factions opposed to the Palestinian Authority. Despite this, Syria can play an obstructing role in regard to any political settlement in Baghdad going against its interests with its Eastern neighbor, in collaboration with the Arabs who are scared of Baghdad's final fall in Iran's hands. Therefore, there seemed to be some sort of assignment for it to protect what could be referred to as being “Iraq's Arab identity.” This is one of the reasons behind its rapprochement with Riyadh and other Gulf capitals and why it was forced to finally secure calm at the level of the relations with the leader of the State of Law Coalition, Nouri al-Maliki, to whom the premiership of the government might eventually be given, in some sort of concord induced by common concerns! However, this Syrian-Iranian standoff in Iraq cannot turn into a political “clash” threatening the strategic relations between them because they need each other. Still, Iran seems to be more in need of Syria due to its geographic position rendering it an inescapable passageway toward the shores of the Mediterranean Sea and Israel's border, in light of the non-recognition of the legitimacy of its role and presence in Baghdad on the American and Arab levels. Was Syria not the greatest ally of the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, and did it not remain the greatest ally even when Moscow became mad about its understanding with Washington to introduce its forces in Lebanon to contain the “National Movement” and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Soviets' main allies? Based on the game of interests and necessary balances, Syria, which needs a strong Arab supporter such as Saudi Arabia – due to the impossible restoration of normalcy with Egypt for political and personal reasons – cannot risk disregarding sectarian strife in Lebanon. Indeed, it forced all its troops into this country during its wars in fear that the fires would move to it, but also in order to seize an opportunity to enhance its regional role. Such strife could compel it to choose between two options, the sweetest of which is bitter. Indeed, it is neither willing to turn back the clock at the level of its relations with the Sunni sect in Lebanon via Saad Hariri, nor is it willing to show hostility toward Iran or the Shiite sect in Lebanon after this long history of relations, interests and mutual benefits – especially during the years that followed the assassination of Rafik Hariri. Therefore, Syria is extremely interested in witnessing its understanding with Hariri based on the fact that he is the primary if not the only leader in this sect, as is Jumblatt's case among the Druze. This is what it wants to save itself the trouble of pleasing leaderships here and there. Furthermore, its understanding with Hariri following its pullout from Lebanon and in light of the political accusations made against it of standing behind the crime, is considered an acquittal, which was only enhanced by the fact that it was announced by the “blood avenger.” And just like its dealings with the Shiites became easier after they unified behind the joint command of Hezbollah and Amal, the Sunnis' alignment behind Hariri allowed Syria to secure balance in regard to its relations with the old allies from Hezbollah, Amal and the Aounist movement, thus enhancing its ability to reactivate its role in Lebanon. On the other hand, Hariri's interest in seeing such balance is equal to that of Damascus, as he has been reading the same book as Jumblatt - like many did before him - despite what this means in terms of this small country's need for a game regulator to handle the imbalance on the military and political levels. Hariri – after Jumblatt – rearranged his cards to protect interests. What remains is for his rivals and some of his allies to rearrange their own cards in light of the new picture that is surfacing in the region and Lebanon by the day… Will they do that?
