Those concerned with Sudan's affairs are nearly unanimous about the fact that secession will be the choice made by the Southerners when they vote in the referendum to determine the fate of the South on the 9th of January 2011, as per the Naivasha Agreement ratified in 2005 between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the government in Khartoum. The clause on determining the fate of Southern Sudan is considered to be the cornerstone of this agreement, which had allowed for putting an end to Africa's longest civil war, and then for the formal sharing of power between the SPLM and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), which has in turn allowed for ensuring relative stability in the South since 2005. The two sides have coexisted over the past few years, in spite of the numerous and complex issues pending between them, on the background of the wager of both on the result of the referendum being in their favor – i.e. unity for the central Sudanese government and secession for the SPLM. Ever since the Naivasha Agreement was ratified, the Sudanese government has not ceased its repeated efforts to adopt a political and developmental method in the South that would make unity attractive, one that would convince Southerners on the day they are to vote in the referendum that it is in their best interest to remain within a unified Sudan. Within such a framework, the Sudanese government bears responsibility for the outcome of such a method, whether negative or positive, by virtue of its being the decision-maker in terms of facilitating either consensus or mutual opposition. Yet the size of the problems which the two partners in the agreement have been unable to resolve has made such unity repulsive, to the point where the general conviction has taken shape that secession will be the choice the Southerners will make. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the government of President Omar Al-Bashir, who was recently reelected for a new presidential term, has been purposely complicating the necessary negotiations with the SPLM – negotiations concerned with affording the bases for holding the referendum, particularly forming the referendum commission which will be in charge of setting down the lists of voters in the South as well as in the North, and a final agreement over the border between North and South, with the exception of the Abyei district which is supposed to hold its own referendum to determine its affiliation, knowing that these border areas hold within them the majority of Sudan's oil wealth. Considering the time pressure and the timeframe needed for the work of the committees in charge of resolving these two issues, it is feared that the date of the referendum will be reached before an agreement can, which would threaten the possibility of holding such a referendum. It is perhaps for these reasons that the SPLM is warning against postponing the referendum, as it considers that such delay may have been intentional and meant to elude this fundamental clause of the Naivasha Agreement. It also seems that the SPLM has come to deal with the situation as if the central government seeks to both weaken its influence and obstruct the referendum. Moreover, the accusation recently leveled against Al-Bashir's government of sending military aid to the SPLM's adversaries in the South has come only to reinforce such a conviction. Such a method does not fall far from the strategy of Al-Bashir's government, which has exercised, ever since it took power in a military coup in June 1989, the policy of splitting the ranks of domestic rivals in order to weaken them. This is what took place in the past period, when it sponsored the schism within two large political parties: the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), representing the Khatmiya Sufi order and led by Muhammad Al-Mirghani, and the Umma Party, representing the Ansar and led by Sadiq Al-Mahdi. This is also what it is currently doing in facing the rebels in Darfur, by encouraging schisms within rebel factions and engaging in dialogue with other factions of lesser popular representation. In other words, the Sudanese government has adopted the policy of “divide and conquer”. Yet such a policy, which has witnessed some immediate success sometimes, places the country's unity before a tremendous test, not just in the South, but also in Darfur, where voices have begun to rise demanding the right to determine their own fate.
