Preparations have begun in Sudan for the referendum to decide the fate of the South, which is to take place in a mere six months. This will be in implementation of the Naivasha Agreement ratified in 2005 between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in the North, led by President Omar Al-Bashir, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) led by Vice President Salva Kiir. The agreement states, until the referendum, that the transitional period stretching from 2005 to 2011 should be one of testing Sudan's ability to remain unified by sharing power and wealth between the two sides of the agreement, as well as one of testing the fledgling Sudanese democracy, which would appeal to all segments of Sudan's population, in the North and in the South. In assessing the transitional period, one could say that the agreement has permanently put an end to the civil war between North and South, which lasted for around 20 years and led to the death of hundreds of thousands and the displacement of millions of people, in addition to wasting billions of dollars. Moreover, this agreement has involved the conviction, in the North and the South, that continuing to wage this war would not be useful for either side. The two sides had thus become convinced that peacefully heading towards unity or secession would be of common benefit for both of them. It is true that the Naivasha Agreement is one of the factors behind the eruption of the Darfur crisis, and that it has not laid down the bases of a balanced relationship between the central government and the parties that have continued to complain of marginalization and neglect. Nevertheless, the new balance in the coalition government has served to contain crises between the center and the periphery, especially as the SPLM, which before the agreement was allied with every form of Sudanese opposition, has after the agreement played the role of absorbing crises through its influence with Al-Bashir's party. Yet more important than either issue is the fact that, for the first time since Al-Bashir's coup against the democratic government in 1989, a pluralist government has been formed in Khartoum through the coalition between Al-Bashir's party and the SPLM. It is true that this coalition has not allowed for broader participation in government and decision-making, but it has put an end to the hegemony of the single party, re-legalized the activity of Northern opposition parties and allowed for the return of their leaders from exile. Finally, the balance in the central government, even if fragile, has imposed pluralism and the representation of different ethnic, religious and political groups. In other words, the transitional period, which was based on unity between North and South and on political coalition between the country's constituents, could have provided a solid basis for the establishment of a pluralistic and democratic central government, without this meaning the disappearance of the reasons and motives behind disagreements between the two sides in power. However, their mere presence together in power during the transitional period has forced each of them to take the concerns and demands of the other side into consideration. In this sense, the country's political unity could have represented a guarantee of pluralism and of excluding violence. Observers are nearly unanimous about the fact that the result of the referendum will be in favor of the South's self-determination, in other words independence and secession. And it seems that there is an international drive and momentum in this direction, as well as a pledge by Al-Bashir to respect the result of the referendum and to organize the secession peacefully, which raises many questions regarding the establishment of a new country in Southern Sudan, its identity, the directions it will take, etc. Yet secession in itself will leave the North in the hands of Al-Bashir's party and the South in the hands of Salva Kiir's. In other words, the immediate and direct result of secession will be the end of pluralistic government in Sudan, in its two countries, Northern and Southern. And if we were to base ourselves on the experience of the parliamentary and presidential elections that took place last April, we could say that the two parties made use of all possible means to monopolize power and to exclude rivals and competitors, whether through fraud or threats. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) organization, in its detailed report on these elections, reported testimonies that show that there were harassments, random arrests and a targeting of figures from the opposition and the press, both in the North and in the South. As a result, Al-Bashir party has achieved absolute hegemony over elected bodies in the North, while Salva Kiir's party has alone achieved control of their counterparts in the South. And the two governments that were formed in the North and in the South have not diverged from the rule of single-party hegemony. Nothing indicates that this practice by the two ruling parties will disappear upon the establishment of the two countries after the referendum. In fact, one can expect that the two parties that will rule in the North and in the South will be liberated from the burden of the pluralistic transitional period, its considerations and its particularities, and will turn the current pluralistic form of government into one of monopoly, oppression and tyranny.