I have followed for years the course of Syrian-Turkish relations, both from Damascus and from Ankara. At first, I considered what I heard from the high officials in both countries to be some sort of wishful thinking. It is no strange thing for an Arab journalist to doubt the talk on relations between two neighboring countries based on stability and the search for prosperity – despite the different senses of belonging, languages, and regime foundations and mechanisms. Such doubts are due to the fact that the Middle East is not known for its friendly relations among neighbors, even if they belong to the same family. In fact, I have felt envious for the past three years. As a Lebanese, it is hard for me to acknowledge that the relations of Damascus with Ankara are better than its relations with Beirut, despite my awareness of the historical burdens – particularly those of the past decades. I felt envious as an Arab, as it is hard for me to comprehend that the relations of Damascus with Ankara are better than its relations with this or that Arab capital – despite my knowledge of yesterday's burdens, the clash of roles, and the divergence in calculations and interpretations. There is not enough space here for comparisons between the Syrian-Iranian relation and the Syrian-Turkish relation. The former saw the light around three decades ago, in a different world that has ceased to exist (the collapse of the Soviet Union) and in a regional situation that has changed (the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime and other developments). In the past two years, I felt that the relation between Damascus and Tehran is based on the calculations of the past and the present and that the relation between Damascus and Ankara is based on the calculations of the present and the future. As I write this, I call for steering clear of hasty conclusions and separation or divorce scenarios, even if a divergence between Syria and Iran appears in Iraq and in Lebanon. I write from Beirut, where it is thought that the page of the Syrian-Lebanese clash, or the clash between a large part of the Lebanese and Syria has been really turned, and that a new page has started. I do not have details on the four visits made by Saad Hariri to Damascus and his discussions with Bashar al Assad, but I have a feeling that the winds of realism blew on both sides of the border. Realism is the fruit of a reconsideration that keeps nothing from the past except its lessons. The winds of realism blew due to many factors: the Arab reconciliation launched by King Abdullah bin AbdulAziz, with the Saudi-Syrian reconciliation being its most important result; the keen Turkish efforts for containing the fires with words of stability and promises of prosperity; Syria's feeling that it is able to move from a phase of returning or preventing blows to a phase of presenting itself as a force of stability despite the increased tensions of the Iranian file and the blocked horizon in the peace file. Beirut, which is pleased with the winds of realism and the new page, has been sinking the past few days in fears of a tense autumn. This is due to the prognostics regarding the indictment in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: the accusation of the involvement of Hezbollah members in the assassination of Rafic Hariri and his companions. It is obvious that the internal steps to avoid the tense autumn are difficult and painful, and perhaps exceed the ability of local players to take them. However, if such a tense autumn were to take place, it would herald the opening of wounds that go beyond the Lebanese collapse and threaten the reconciliations and rapprochement that took place in the region during the past year. Hence, the tense autumn must be contained through the continued building of the Saudi-Syrian reconciliation; through the encouragement of the Turkish efforts in more than one direction; and through a more elaborate new page between Beirut and Damascus in emulation of the Damascus-Ankara model. The exploitation of these cards could offer an Arab and international umbrella for containing the tense autumn and preventing any risk that could make Beirut more dangerous than Baghdad. Beirut, drowning in pessimism, is wagering on the coming times for containing or preventing the tense autumn: the visit of King Abdullah bin AbdulAziz; the visit of President Bashar al Assad; the visit of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani. Hence, the coming few days are decisive in the race between the umbrella and the storm.
