The indirect negotiations may not be worthy of all this commotion seen on the Palestinian and Arab fronts. The Palestinians, more than anyone else, know that the latter talks will not secure their goals unless the American intentions and guarantees are truthful this time around and unless the pressures exerted by it do not aim at freeing Washington's time to tend to other dossiers in the region, recognizing there are so many of them. Moreover, the negotiations do not deserve all these disputes considering that any international side can handle the conveyance of the messages between the two parties, each in its home, while no harm can come out from their success or failure. Nonetheless, they remain better than stalemate as long as the regional and international conditions and circumstances for the revival of the resistance or the uprising are not available. Let the Palestinians give the administration of Barack Obama the opportunity to try its luck, in the hope that it will succeed where the previous administrations have failed. Let them repeat the experience for the thousandth time, and maybe they will restore their national unity which alone kept their cause alive, allowed the adoption of the two-state plan by the international community and the United States and may just be their only way out of the current predicament that is facing their cause. In light of this dangerous division, it will not do them any good to rely on foreign support, regardless of the side providing this support, or the exchange of accusations of betrayal and collaboration. Moreover, in light of this American attempt, it will not do the Palestinian Authority any good to request a non-unifying Arab legitimacy or a cover from the Arab League to engage in indirect talks, even if with American guarantees, knowing that throughout two decades the direct negotiations did not offer anything to stop the bleeding in Gaza and the West Bank and did not ensure the minimum level of rights. This Authority knows in advance how dangerous it would be to sign new agreements that would force the Palestinian people to adopt its vision and policy while disregarding the positions of the remaining factions. It also knows that by resorting to the Arab follow-up committee, it is trying to compensate for a feeling of "inferiority" at the level of its legitimacy, one which was earned by Hamas in the elections and then in the bloody coup in the Strip. Hence, after the Palestine Liberation Organization engaged in wars from Jordan to Lebanon - and through the latter in Syria as well - under the slogan "the independent national Palestinian decision," this decision has become quasi divided between the four corners of the globe. Does this not represent the content of the accusations being cast by the Palestinians against one another? On the other hand, the same goes for Hamas which should not be barricading itself in the bleeding Gaza as though this was the end goal and should not be marginalizing the Authority both politically and on the field on every occasion by resorting to all sorts of accusations and media mudslinging. It cannot bully the Authority while relying on a foreign stand, whether it is Arab or non-Arab, just like it cannot adopt two positions, i.e. the position of one that is against the negotiations and the position of one which can no longer tolerate the consequences of the resistance following the last war on Gaza and the tragedies it entailed in the ranks of the people. Moreover, Hamas cannot raise its voice against the practices of the Authority while its "own authority" is disregarding the voices condemning its behavior In the Strip. It cannot ask the international community to recognize it while it is still rejecting some of its conditions, at the head of which are the recognition of Israel and the agreements signed by the PLO with Tel Aviv since the Madrid conference two decades ago. It cannot ignore Egypt's status in the settlement of the Gaza issue since there is no solution in the Strip without Cairo. In this context, what would Hamas do if President Bashar al-Assad's imminent visit to Cairo were to entail cooperation and an understanding over the ending of Palestinian division? How would it behave if the American-Syrian contacts were to produce some sort of an understanding over the affairs of the region, if the nuclear dossier were to be resolved diplomatically and if everyone became engaged in the arrangement of the new regional order? Both the Authority and Hamas know that when Ariel Sharon decided to pull out from Gaza, his goal was not to get rid of Al-Qassam's missiles, rather to topple the roadmap and the settlement process, as well as the massive population bloc in the Strip. In that same view, Benjamin Netanyahu is raising the slogan of "security" solely in regard to any negotiations and Shimon Peres is raising the issue of the Gaza missiles as the focal point of the negotiations which will soon be launched. Furthermore, Israel is mentioning the existential threat posed by Iran's nuclear ambitions to avoid additional American and international pressures, and is raising and will continue to raise the issue of the Syrian and Iranian rockets provided to Hezbollah and how they are destabilizing the balance of power in the region on a daily basis. The reason behind that is clear: to elude the discussion of the final status issues and the requirements of the establishment of a Palestinian state. The political course adopted by Netanyahu is the same one that was adopted by Sharon before he entered his coma, i.e. the undermining of the project to establish a Palestinian state - whether on paper or on the ground - by changing the geography and demography with the settlements monster than is proceeding and will not stop. In light of this Palestinian inability to launch the resistance due to the current international balance of power and the inability to assume the additional consequences of a new Intifada, the Palestinian Authority cannot neglect the negotiations as it is watching the settlements monster eating up more land. However, disregarding reconciliation, even if temporarily, to focus on the American guarantees, will not achieve the desired goal. Indeed, the best solution was and still is the engagement in indirect talks based on a strong reconciliation that will ensure a unified Palestinian position. However, the absence of this position forced the Authority to rely on the Arab follow-up committee in every step that is faced with the opposition of Hamas and some other factions. Although there is nothing wrong with relying on the support of the Arab League which is indispensible, this support cannot replace Palestinian consensus or constitute an alternative for the legitimacy granted by the unification of most of the factions to the negotiators. For his part, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu whose country is playing a major role in helping the Saudis restore concord between Egypt and Syria in the hope that this will lead dialogue between the Palestinian factions toward a happy ending, called on the head of the Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, and Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal, to think about the future of Palestine and the interests of the people instead of their political goals. He assured: "Disregarding reconciliation and focusing on the negotiations will not help, just like the postponement of reconciliation and the disregarding of the negotiations will not help. The focus needs to be on both goals!" What remains is for the Palestinian side to come up with a new dynamic that would restore national unity, regardless of the partisan sacrifices. In any case, the launching of the negotiations - whichever form they may take - under American pressures here and with guarantees there, will give the administration of President Barack Obama a chance to address the Iranian nuclear dossier and then the issues of Iraq, Afghanistan and terrorism. For his part, the Palestinian negotiator should use the opportunity not to settle for calling for the temporary discontinuation of the settlement activities. Since day one, the latter should insist on the final freezing of these activities to achieve progress. In this context, Abu Mazen remembers very well what former American Secretary of State James Baker used to say to the Palestinians following the departure of the Madrid train in the early nineties of last century. He used to stress the necessity to engage in any negotiations to put an end to the settlements and urge the PLO to reach an agreement because the absence or pointless postponement of the negotiations will entail the loss of more territories! As for the Authority, it should not settle for the freezing of the settlements and stand in the face of the new policy to vacate the West Bank population. A couple of months ago, Haaretz talked about what it referred to as being "the depletion of the warehouses of Jewish migration" and the government's inclination to head toward the alternative solution by "diminishing the number of Palestinian inhabitants." Therefore, Israel is pushing the inhabitants to migrate from the prohibited Area C to Area A, i.e. from Qalqilya, Jennin and Jerusalem to Ramallah, and from Ramallah and Jerusalem to migrate abroad. This policy which is especially targeting the youth, intellectuals and property-owners is being implemented step by step in a well-studied plan to vacate the West Bank and consecrate the "purity" of Jerusalem, and later on the "purity" of the Jewish state. Israel is also demanding the blocking of the road before the one state for two people slogan that was raised by Abu Mazen in the event of the failure of the two-state project.
