The “Sky Winds” that have blown on the Turkish ship “Marmara” were a gift from the skies to Turkey to finish building its strategy in the Middle East and lead a broad-scale international campaign to lift the blockade imposed on Gaza, at a time when a few days earlier, it had launched an initiative alongside Brazil in the context of the handling of the Iranian nuclear file. Indeed, the brutal Israeli attack on the Freedom Flotilla provided Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan with a rare opportunity to achieve a series of goals at once, as it is expected that the Flotilla will be able to accomplish what could have been accomplished by the Palestinian Intifada and was not seen for Palestinian and non-Palestinian reasons. The escalation affecting the new Turkish policy toward Israel has reached its peak after the clashes started between the two countries following the war waged on Gaza at the end of 2008, beginning of 2009. Back then, Ankara adopted a stringent position and continued to repeat – until this day – that it will not disregard the violation of the human rights of the Palestinians. Later on, we saw the severe reprimands addressed by Erdogan to Israeli President Shimon Peres during a televised seminar in Davos, followed by what was considered by Ankara as being an inappropriate reception of its ambassador in Tel Aviv in the office of Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon. Turkey's angry, harsh and radical position toward the Israeli attack went in line with the new course of its foreign policy and its attempts to establish balance between the two elements of Turkish identity: the European one and the Middle Eastern one. This forced it to become involved in many files, from the Balkans to Afghanistan going through Palestine and Iraq, to confirm its role as a key player in the region, hinder the Iranian momentum, enhance its negotiating position with Europe in the context of its attempts to join the European Union and present itself as an acceptable mediator in the resolution of the regional crises. This would be based on the moderate Islam of the Justice and Development Party, its ability to engage in dialogue with the extremist movements and parties, and consequently its ability to push them toward the positions and conditions of the international game. Therefore, Israel's opponents became Turkey's friends, from Iran to Syria to Hamas which Erdogan said a couple of day ago “was not a terrorist” as it is described by the Americans and most of the Europeans. This was all conducted by Ankara without risking the severance of relations with the Hebrew State, in order to keep Tel Aviv's doors opened before it along with the doors of the decision-making capitals that have not relinquished and will never relinquish the Hebrew State and its military superiority. The problem is that the Israeli right-wing government did not get the numerous signals sent by Turkey, as though it were not reading the transformations witnessed in the region and around the world. Early on, Ankara started changing its policies and the commercial, military and security relations imposed by the Cold War - since it is a member of the NATO - but also imposed by the overall Arab position toward the Cypriot issue and the support offered by Syria and Iran to the Kurdish opposition parties, namely the Kurdistan Workers Party. However, the transformations which followed the fall of the Soviet Camp, the domestic policy with which the Justice and Development Party approached the Kurdish issue, the development of the relations with Syria, then Iran and finally Iraq and the weakening of the grip of the military over politics due to the Europeans conditions, all gave Ankara a wider margin of maneuver and allowed it to amend its policy. Moreover, we would not be adding anything new if we were to say that the growing Iranian influence in the region while carrying the banner of the Palestinian cause, also motivated Ankara to engage in the race over the acquisition of this banner while assisted by the alleviation witnessed on its Eastern front with Iraq and the improvement of its relations with Damascus in particular and the Arab world in general. This is especially true since in the past, it could not point its finger at Israel for using force with the Palestinians, considering that the latter could have responded by saying that Ankara was using the same logic with the Kurds! So far, Turkey has managed to exploit the Israeli arrogance where many others have failed. It has thus advanced along the path of consecrating itself as a key player in the Middle East, at a time when the United States and the superpowers are trying to draw up the features of the regional order, from Afghanistan to Sudan going through Iraq, Palestine, the Gulf and Iran. Through the crisis it is managing with Israel, it was able to shift the international positions that were all reassured by the fact that the blockade imposed on Gaza was a blockade imposed on Iranian influence, while in light of this popular momentum in the Arab and Islamic world, it has become qualified to lead dialogue with Hamas and bring it closer to “peaceful Jihad” against the occupation. This step could achieve what the rockets and weapons smuggled into the Strip will never accomplish. On the other hand, Erdogan's refusal of the description attributed to the movement as being a “terrorist movement” carried a clear message to the world calling on it to recognize Hamas, a thing which may be followed by a call upon the latter to reconcile with the authority and uphold the international community's conditions for a settlement. Turkey cannot go far at the level of the Palestinian cause, i.e. it cannot accomplish what the hardliners on the Arab side are seeking. It must hold the stick in the middle since it cannot sever its relations with Israel or stand in the rejectionist camp while disregarding the moderate Arabs whom it has embarrassed. However, this centrism will grant its campaign to lift the blockade imposed on Gaza an impact and a content that are different than those called for by Iran and the hardliners. Indeed, as much as Iran militarized and isolated “Hamas's Intifada,” Marmara's peaceful action exposed the depth and bloodiness of Israeli brutality and forced all the major states – without an exception – to seek ways to change the painful reality. Therefore, those drawn to Turkey's positions should not be overly optimistic in their expectations, and should wait to see how it will manage the outcome of this new development and this likelihood in the region. This is due to the fact that Ankara knows that its role at the level of the Palestinian cause is limited, and that the settlement cards will remain – for the most part – in the hands of the United States, considering that there is nothing pointing to the fact that these cards have shifted to another location ever since President Al-Sadat announced that most of the solution cards were held by Washington. The Turkish-international campaign will increase the pressures on Netanyahu's government to force it to offer the concessions required by America and the international community in the negotiations with the Authority, i.e. help the initiative put forward by Washington which is sponsoring the talks. However, this goes against the Iranian policy that is calling for the rejection of the peace settlement in its entirety, and constitutes one of the elements of the conflict between the Islamic Republic on one hand, and the international community and the United States on the other. For their part, the hardliners in the ruling Coalition in Israel will find themselves much weaker in resisting a Likud leader if they are forced to take the pressures into consideration and respond to some conditions, especially since – on the long run – the Hebrew State cannot place Turkey in enemy ranks as it is the case with Iran because such a step would topple any Arab moderate policy toward the settlement and pose a major problem not only for Tel Aviv, but also for Washington. The Americans perceive Turkey as being an important element of communication with Iran over many files, in Iraq in particular and in Central Asia in general. Moreover, following the attack on Marmara, they are aware of the fact that it will become an important channel of communication with Hamas and the extremist Palestinian factions, while knowing in advance that Turkey is not the Islamic Republic and cannot be handled the same way. It is viewed as a key player in the context of “international legitimacy” and as a power that could counter and contain the Iranian momentum. They are also counting on its ability to encourage Syria to balance its regional relations, while aware of its importance for their strategic interests. On the other hand, they truly realize what the right-wing government in Israel has disregarded, i.e. that since the establishment of the Hebrew State Turkey has been a major Islamic partner in guaranteeing the security of this state, just like the peace accord with Egypt and the Wadi Araba accord distanced the ghost of comprehensive Arab-Israeli war. In the end, it is needless to say that Turkey's positions did not only reveal the absence of the Arab role, but also corroborated what some believed in regard to the fact that the entire Arab regime never truly existed, a thing which was exposed by the Cold War collapse. Moreover, the positions of Erdogan who has consecrated his overwhelming popular leadership in the Arab and Islamic worlds, might contribute to keeping his popularity afloat after it has started eroding in favor of the Republican People's Party which – according to opinion polls – has been taking the lead for quite some time, especially since its new leader has been calling for distancing the military from politics, as well as for more democracy and human rights.
