The events of the past decade have offered Iran golden opportunities; it was the greatest beneficiary from the September 11 attacks. George Bush's administration did not content itself with uprooting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, as the arrogance of power prompted it to uproot Saddam Hussein's regime as well. Iran saw its enemies fall without shooting a single bullet. Then it saw the US military squirm in the quagmire of its victories. It actively participated in depleting the machinery next to its borders. It saw a void that it hastened to try and fill. Iran employed the US involvement for its interests. It launched two simultaneous battles: the nuclear program and the grabbing of the role of leader in the region. The Iranian way of threatening, insinuating, menacing, postponing, negotiating, escalating, and shifting cards has led many to talk about the Iranian brilliance and its patience that stems from manufacturing carpets. The developments of the past year that started with the reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and what followed on both the domestic and foreign levels have led to the decrease of the level of admiration felt by observers towards Iranian brilliance. The observer has the right to ask some questions, in an attempt to comprehend rather than condemn. Was Iran mistaken when it did not meet Barack Obama's extended hand? Should it have grabbed the opportunity of having an American president who acknowledges its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to play a role in the region's affairs, and be a partner in building safety and stability in it? Moreover, Obama assured that his country has no wish to uproot the current Iranian regime and expressed his readiness to deal respectfully with that deep-rooted nation. In addition, Obama expressed a confident desire to withdraw from Iraq and an aspiration to reach a settlement in Afghanistan that would later facilitate withdrawal – in other words, the dismantlement of what Iran considers to be a US military encirclement around it. Refraining from grabbing the US offer prompts certain questions. Is Tehran in need of a high level of tension in the region in order to pass its nuclear ambitions and impose its role? Does it really dream of kicking out the Americans from the region so that it can play a decisive role in the security and stability arrangements? Does Iran want the role of leader in the region or does it also want to be the leader of the Islamic World despite the natural obstacles that hinder such ambition? Is the tension with the United States a factor of reassurance to the regime, since opening up to it would lead Iran to abandon policies and terms, and thus create a fissure in the unity that surrounds the regime, which was effectively fissured after the presidential elections? Are the threats to eliminate Israel from the map part of the battle to hold on to the cards of peace and war in the Arab-Israeli conflict and move them according to Iranian calculations? Questions lead to questions. Iran insists on the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. It declares that this type of manufacturing is legally prohibited. Why, then, did it fail in dissipating the doubts of the International Atomic Energy Agency? Why did it fail in convincing Russia and China? Why do the permanent members of the UN Security Council practically admit that the new sanctions are “inescapable”, even if their stances differ on the nature and repercussions of the sanctions? Iran acts as if it did not fear war; as if there will be no war. It says that this war exceeds Israel's abilities, and that the United States will not dare commit such a “stupid act”, as it realizes its cost on the region's stability, and the safety and price of oil. And yet, if war is excluded – at least for the time being – then what about sanctions? And what does it mean when Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov describes Iran to be “a difficult partner”? What does it mean when China accepts the principle of a new bunch of sanctions despite its great interests with Iran? It is obvious that Iran is moving towards some kind of international isolation and that the sanctions could lead to the escalation of tension in the region. In fact, Arabs have no interest in being hostile to Iran, having new wars in the region, or witnessing regional-international duels on Arab arenas. Arabs also believe that Iran is acting like a difficult partner, from Baghdad to Beirut. Who knows, the continued current Iranian policy could lead Damascus to feel that Tehran is indeed a difficult partner.
