Al Qaeda's appearances on the Yemeni scene are nothing new. It has been there for a long time. 1992 recorded its first attack against a hotel in Aden which was used by the US forces on their way to Somalia. Ten years ago, it committed a devastating suicide attack at the Aden port against the US destroyer USS Cole, and then its successive appearances targeted western embassies or tourists. In the recent past, Yemen has gained importance for Osama bin Laden's organization for many reasons: the blows against the organization in Saudi Arabia; the relapses in Iraq; the feeling that Yemen, with its geographical relief, tribal structure, economic and regional troubles, can be a hosting environment; the desire to benefit from the opportunities offered by the continued absence of the State in Somalia; the desire to be close to the Saudi land. The issue went beyond infiltrating Yemen and reached the phase of it being a launching place. The Nigerian national who attempted to blow up an American plane before it reached Detroit confessed that he was trained in Yemen. This is not to mention Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki's fresh rise to stardom. A few weeks ago, I walked around the streets of San'aa. The city continues to live normally, but this does not negate the fact that the era of coexistence with Al Qaeda has ended – paving the way for the era of painful strikes. It was obvious that the organization would reappear soon, and this is what happened yesterday in the suicide bombing that targeted the British ambassador's convoy. Yesterday's operation failed. But its gravity resides in the fact that it confirmed that the war is open, and that local and mobile fighters have a special place in their program for Yemen as an arena for fighting and a launching place. It is not excluded that Al Qaeda's wager will increase on the Yemeni scene after the fall of the “Emirate” which it attempted to plant in Iraq and which was faced there with the realities of the Iraqi structure and the high level of coordination between the Iraqi and American forces. Suicide attacks in Yemen are a source of concern. What would be scary is for Yemen itself to commit suicide, as neither the country nor the region can stand such a slip. Indeed, the repercussions of the Yemeni suicide are much graver than the Somali suicide. By suicide, I mean the erosion of the status of the central government and its institutions, and the fall of parts of the country under the mercy of clashing militias or conflicting bloody choices. I write in light of my last visit to San'aa. During the past months, the authority seemed as if it were fighting on three fronts at the same time: against the Huthi rebellion, against the return of the independence or secession trend in the South, and against Al Qaeda. Such depletion is not simple in a country with initially limited abilities, whose structure draws difficult borders for coexistence between the State's authority and the effective tribal authorities. I felt in San'aa that what the South is witnessing could be more serious, and that the ability of the government to face the challenges of the Huthi rebellion and Al Qaeda depends in the coming phase on its ability to escape the trap that can be set by the wager on the military solution alone to deal with the current situation in the South. It can be said that any further collapse down South will give the Huthi rebellion an opportunity to re-emerge in the north and will give Al Qaeda an opportunity for entrenching itself, infiltrating itself, and growing roots. Such facts are always remembered by the excellent player on the complex Yemeni scene, President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In fact, he is the strongest and most capable party that can prevent the slip of the country towards suicide. Ali Saleh has managed for thirty-two years a difficult country, where ruling resembles “dancing on serpent heads”, in his own words. The game seems to be more complex today. Perhaps it needs new approaches that are different from the method of benefiting from the oppositions among serpents and using some of them against others then rectifying the balances and the alliances. They are approaches related to participation in politics and development and other things. Ali Abdullah Saleh's choices concern both his country and the region. What is more important than foiling a suicide attack is preventing Yemen from slipping towards suicide.
