It is not the first time that the US foreign policy makers ignore issues, developments, and regions that must be monitored, and then awaken suddenly – along with the deeply sleeping US media – to urgently formulate an ignorance-based foreign policy that leads to rash measures or a superficial treatment of explosive crises. Yemen could very well represent the most recent challenge that requires the formulation of a wise bilateral regional and international policy and strategy in order for stability to prevail in this country that is bleeding and being drained internally as well as in its immediate neighboring countries with a global dimension. The United States is not the only country to demand conscious measures and policies – it is supported in this by Russia, China, and the European Union. And yet, it is an Arab burden as much as it is an international one, as the implicit quasi-alliance between the Huthis and Al Qaeda that is taking place in Yemen undoubtedly targets the Arab Gulf region through the Saudi gateway. At their recent summit in Kuwait, the GCC countries distinguished between their full support of Saudi Arabia's right to defend its land and its sovereignty, and the necessity of establishing an internal Yemeni dialogue that would locally tackle the crisis. What these countries need now is to intensely search for the necessary measures to give a local push forward inside Yemen, be it for the new quality dialogue between the authority and the great tribal groups that disagree with the authority, or for pumping aids related to finance, development, and employment in order to prevent the Yemenis from falling in the trap of enlisting in the Huthi extremism or the Al Qaeda violence. Internationally speaking, the GCC countries must formulate and submit ideas, scenarios, and strategies at the London conference at the end of this month so that they become an enlightening partner in the international measures regarding Yemen and do not seek western measures, regardless of whether or not they are appropriate. This is not a second Iraqi war, as no side is keen on seeing its forces wage a war within the mountains of Yemen. It is an international partnership akin to the one that was and is still formulated for Afghanistan after the US, European, Russian, and Arab policy realized the possible transformation of Yemen into Somalia or Afghanistan. In other words, it would turn into a Yemen which is threatened to become a failed state that is torn apart by tribal, interest, and authority-related conflicts and that is used by Al Qaeda as an arena from which to launch terrorist acts around the world, destabilize major countries in the region such as Saudi Arabia, and control the vital oil passages through revived terrorism and terrorist piracy. For all these reasons, the poles of the partnership in Yemen must consider stability plans that would actually avoid the amplification of destabilization due to short-sightedness, misunderstanding, obstinacy, or blatant ignorance. The desired stability of Yemen is a long road that undoubtedly includes targeting Al Qaeda, but also necessarily includes adopting a different discourse with the partner President Ali Abdullah Saleh for a different approach inside and with Yemen. It also definitely includes dealing seriously with the economic crisis through immediate and long-term measures. Stability in this country requires a global strategy that must be adopted by the London conference with an active Gulf participation. Otherwise, Yemen would head for division and become one of the most dangerous countries that export instability and terrorism to the world. Some experts in Yemeni affairs consider that it is important to establish a US policy that distinguishes between apparatuses within Yemen that are involved with Al Qaeda, and apparatuses within Yemen that can be used to besiege Al Qaeda. They think it is important to adopt a strategy for separating Huthis from their tribes, especially tribal groups such as Bekyl and Hashed. What these experts are suggesting somehow resembles the suggestions that led US President Barack Obama to act on the basis of the existence of “Good Taliban” and “Evil Taliban” in Afghanistan and Pakistan with a view on attracting the “good” and containing the “bad”. Indeed, they call for taking note of the indicators issued by tribal groups on their readiness to separate themselves from the Huthi extremism and to prevent Al Qaeda from taking advantage of the special Yemeni environment. Many consider that military victory in Yemen is impossible at this turning point and that facts on the ground require taking advantage of the complicated old tribal structure and distinguishing between a land that is fertile for organizations such as Al Qaeda and the Iranian involvement in the Saada region. They also require being thorough in the battles against the authority. This opinion interferes with that of many officials in the Gulf countries and considers that Ali Abdullah Saleh's government must enter into a different dialogue with the leaders of the great tribal groups such as Bekyl and Hashed, in order to launch negotiations that would deal with the injustice from which these tribes complain and from which the Huthis derive their force. These negotiations would respect the rights of the Yazidi sect to have practical measures and would affirm that Bekyl and Hashed will not cooperate with the authority in Sanaa as long as this authority prevents them from participating in the power and the wealth. These are smart negotiations that take into account the division inside Hashed, which is the second largest tribal group in Yemen after Bekyl. This would aim to exploit the division in a quality operation for mobilizing the allies of the regime in Sanaa after taking a serious decision that the country's interest is above that of family members, and that fighting Al Qaeda or the Huthis undoubtedly requires a new partnership. Moreover, Yemen's neighboring countries should stop burying their heads in the sand and must admit that what is taking place in Yemen is not merely a sectarian war, regardless of the external exploitation of the Huthis and Al Qaeda, and must deal with Yemen on this basis. Thwarting Al Qaeda's ability to attract the deprived Yemeni youth requires actual measures regarding the issue of Yemeni workers in the Gulf countries as well as the pumping of funds into the infrastructure away from sectarian polarization. Weakening the Huthi extremism requires stopping the development and encouragement of Salafi extremism. It is important to create a rupture in this implicit “alliance” between the Huthi extremism and Al Qaeda, but this undeniably necessitates the approval and participation of the tribal environment and its popular base. Hence, this would require a smart policy based on investing in people. What a Yemeni pundit has dubbed “security slackness” due to the government's war with the Huthis in the North and the tensions in the separation-seeking South is what has contributed to find a mobilization environment for Al Qaeda's network. Moreover, it seems to Al Qaeda that this tribal and geographical environment in Yemen allows it to “reproduce” its experience in the Pakistani tribal regions and in Afghanistan. Pundits now use the term “reproduction” whenever they see it fit, whether regarding the extremist groups, the concerned governments, or on behalf of the United States and its partners in the war against “violent extremism” in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is obvious that the US military institution and the civil authority in the US administration have rapidly acted in Yemen last month after President Barack Obama officially accused Al Qaeda to be behind the attempt to blow up a US airplane bound for Detroit from Amsterdam, after it turned out that the Nigerian young man who executed the operation has links to Al Qaeda in Yemen. Indicators show that the US military institution might consider that international partnership in curbing Al Qaeda in Yemen will considerably help in the strategy for thwarting the abilities of Al Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Somalia. In other words, Yemen's developments and events could represent an “opportunity” for curbing Al Qaeda and foiling the plans it has for Yemen and beyond. Al Qaeda's ambitions include the reproduction of the Afghanistan experience in Yemen for funding an alternate base that would be a launch pad for its destructive strategy in the East, West, North, and South. Its ambitions undoubtedly include the destabilization of Saudi Arabia – which it had previously failed to achieve – so that it would become the gateway of instability in the Gulf and the Middle East. As for the tactics for attaining this objective, they imply the implicit alliance between Al Qaeda and the Huthis as well as taking advantage of the security shortcomings and the effects of the regional and international disregard of Yemen. On the military level, the Al Qaeda poles will attempt to baffle the US military institution as well as the local security apparatuses, and the United States will have to examine the viability of applying the military strategy model used in Afghanistan on the military strategy for Yemen, even if the two environments are similar on the geographical and tribal level. Yemen is not Afghanistan, and the US strategy must be aware of this. The US and British military strategy in Yemen might be supported by the reproduction of the international partnership for curbing the “extremist violence” in Afghanistan with the direct and concrete contribution and participation of Russia, China, and the neighboring countries. All the great countries fear that Al Qaeda's extremism might prevail or destroy vital interests in the region such as the strategic Bab el Mandeb strait and the oil sources and passageways. Hence, China has encouraged the establishment of a naval base in the region for protecting navigation. Consequently, the great countries might be considering the need for a naval base in Yemen in order to deal a blow to Al Qaeda. Those who are preparing for the London conference that is expected to be held on January 28, and those discussing ideas for preventing the division and disintegration of Yemen should be aware that fighting Al Qaeda and putting an end to the Huthi attacks within Yemen and on the border with Saudi Arabia is an extremely important issue – but it is not enough. There is talk about the Yemeni government's intention to perhaps cool down the tensions in the South, stop the war in Saada, and establish a dialogue with the opposition parties in view of regaining control of things before it is too late. Hence, the US, European, and Arab pressure is as important as the joint efforts against Al Qaeda or extremist Huthis and the investment in Yemen's popular infrastructure.