The “Revolutionary Guard” has just completed a new round of maneuvers in the Strait of Hormuz. This round was conducted in parallel to the reiteration of the intention to force the Americans to bow before the “legitimate rights” of the Iranians by the Guide of the Islamic Revolution, Ali Khamenei, and the order given to the American troops to exit the region by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in his own name and on behalf of the people of the region! For its part, the “Guard” indicated that the latter maneuvers aimed at showcasing the country's defensive capabilities and its “ability to protect the security of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz as the two main passageways for global economy and energy.” However, these old and renewed positions will not change the reality of the situation in the Gulf, considering that they were launched and repeated by the Iranian leaders for years since the disappearance of Imam Al-Khomeini under the presidential term of Hashemi Rafsanjani and then again during the term of his successor Muhammad al-Khatami. Indeed, neither the United States has bowed nor its troops have retreated or are about to surrender the security of the region to Tehran. Quite the contrary, it has gained more presence on the military and political levels in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Gulf while its last reinforcements were seen with the spread of the missile shields in the region by land and sea. No one can deny Iran's right to conduct military maneuvers in the Gulf waters which constitute the main pillar of its national interests, its vital channel of communication with the world, the main vein for its oil and all its commercial export and import activities and the cornerstone of its factories operating in the oil and oil products sector. It thus enjoys the right the uphold the security of the region and to play an efficient role in this area, as it enjoys the right to ask the Americans to leave the region but only in its own name and not on behalf of its neighbors. The latter - although they have always reiterated their refusal to see their lands or waters used in a war on the Republic - are not reassured by the ambitions of their Eastern neighbor and the expansion of its influence in the region and beyond it. For its part, the latter neighbor and without any tyranny or arrogance, must also recognize their right to protect their vital interests in the Gulf because it knows that their only choice since the “Islamic revolution” and throughout the wars which followed it in the region, was to resort to pacts and agreements with the Americans among other superpowers to protect their national security and interests. Moreover, they are seeking to build their own capabilities in order to guarantee the minimum level of balance with Iran which was never a cause for concern back when it was part of the American system in the region. On the other hand, the major industrial states are also entitled to see Tehran recognizing their right to protect the lifelines of their economies and their factories. The absence of an understanding over a regional system that would guarantee the legitimate rights of these three sides does not eliminate the rights of the three equal parties. In this context, one must not disregard historical facts which accompanied the “Islamic Revolution.” Mr. Khamenei, Ahmadinejad and the leaders of the “Revolutionary Guard” know very well that the flow of foreign armies into the region started following the fall of the Shah. At the time, former US President Jimmy Carter had ordered in 1977 the establishment of an intervention force to protect the oil sources and passageways in the Gulf region in particular, as part of the protection of the strategic interests of the United States. This force never saw the light until after Al-Khomeini's revolution succeeded. It was enhanced after the Soviet Union moved toward the warm waters by occupying Afghanistan and before that with the signing of a cooperation and friendship agreement between Baghdad and Moscow in the mid-seventies of last century. These major turning points were a good enough reason for the prompt deployment of the American forces in certain Gulf states and countries in North and Eastern Africa through an agreement with the people of these regions. The goal behind this deployment was to prevent the “exportation of the revolution” and to block the Soviet progress toward the oil sources and passageways. When the first Gulf War erupted, “the Carter doctrine” earned a quasi “legitimacy” at the level of Europe which sided with Baghdad to keep Tehran from monopolizing the oil and military decisions in the entire region. Europe maintained this support until Al-Khomeini agreed to a ceasefire forcibly or by drinking the cup of poison as he said. However, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait following the collapse of the Communist camp, the doctrine was internationalized. There is not one country in the East and the West that did not partake in the armies which ousted the Iraqi president from this oil state. The international community did not show tolerance or reluctance as it seemed clear it will not allow any local regime or regional power to control the oil sources and passageways. In this context, the three Gulf wars proved that the oil belonged to the international community as much as it belonged to the owners of the wells and that it should be taken out from any equation, compromise or commercial tradeoffs in terms of supply and demand. Some circles even said it was likely that the Security Council would resort to an “international management” to directly interfere and protect this vital lifeline for the global economies in the event of an emergency which might prompt such a measure! The United States' attempts to keep the Gulf and Central Asian oil under its cloak, calls for some sort of stability which is neither provided by military power nor aircraft carriers and blockades. In the end, it must reach an agreement with the Islamic Republic and the two sides must draw up a balance formula between their interests and the other regional and international interests in the area. Tehran cannot get an international recognition of its interests and rights and cannot earn legitimacy in regard to its role in the Gulf without recognizing the American presence, influence and interests. As for Washington, it must learn from its previous experiences, since while the “policy of containment of Iran” has failed in the nineties of last century, there is nothing pointing to the success of the upcoming sanctions in forcing Tehran to succumb. Quite the contrary, more stringency toward it will enhance the position of the hard-liners and may push toward the prevalence of the military - whether the Guard or the army - over the political decisions. On the other hand, the Republic's showcasing of its muscles and strength, its adoption of a missile or maybe a nuclear armament policy and its “exportation of the revolution” by supporting movements and parties from Iraq to Gaza - these measures - are not bringing it closer to its neighbors. They are actually heightening their fears, pushing them into the lap of foreign security providers and dragging them toward a missile and nuclear armament race! Therefore, the area will not become stable in the absence of a regional system recognizing all the facts and the rights. The American presence in the oil fields preceded the surfacing of the Islamic Republic's regime, while the Iran of the Shah was part of the arrangements made to ensure this presence. Moreover, Iran's representation on Israel's Northern and Southern borders through its allies Hezbollah and Hamas will not force the Americans to offer concessions since superpowers cannot accept a dialogue as though between equals. The Iranians cannot sit around the table with regional “weapons” and a nuclear program with dubious goals. They must engage in the negotiations without these cards because they are well aware of the fact that these cards did not chance the balance of powers. True, the resistance in South Lebanon thwarted the goals of the Israeli war in July of 2006, but what is also true is that Resolution 1701 embodied an international will to defuse the effects of this card, even if temporarily. The biggest proof for that is probably the participation of over thirty countries in the protection of Israel's Northern border. Moreover, although the war on Gaza over a year ago did not end “the state of Hamas,” it increased the suffering of the people of the Strip in light of the harsh blockade and rendered the launching of missiles not an “easy resistance” act anymore. Both of these examples are similar to the fate of the “Houthi rebellion” in Yemen. Today, that same international will is heading toward a quasi consensus between the major states to ratify a new basket of sanctions to be imposed on the Islamic Republic against the backdrop of its nuclear dossier. Hence, it is not enough for Tehran to showcase its troops and missiles to ensure a balance of power or a balance of terror that would make the others listen to its words and succumb to its ambitions. The balance of power is not based on military or economic strength alone. What tilts the balance is a wide spectrum of efficient international relations and unless Iran realizes that, it will not be able to impose its will, get its rights or change the rules of the game. Therefore, the “Carter Doctrine” is still suitable for navigation in the Gulf waters but with international sails and not just American ones.
