New York-Increasing talk, openly in international intellectual forums and in press articles, about the need to adapt to, coexist with and prepare for a nuclear Iran does not necessarily reflect official decisions by governments, but it indicates that the idea is growing or being grown in people's minds, either in anticipation of it or in preparation for accepting it at the official and popular levels. On the other hand, in capitals as at the United Nations headquarters, expectations are on the rise concerning the start of serious negotiations between the six countries over a draft resolution reinforcing sanctions against Tehran, this if China agrees in principle to engage in these negotiations, which it had previously rejected. However, the content of what the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France and Germany are likely to agree over will not do away with Iran's nuclear program nor undermine its regional ambitions. This is because China and Russia will not allow a resolution with the ability to harm it, and because the United States does not seem intent on confrontation, nor willing to place the military option on the table again in any serious way. Thus what is going on behind the scenes in several capitals is talk of the future of regional “coalitions”, of new security structures, of who will provide guarantees and of under which security umbrella will come the affiliations resulting from the imbalance produced by Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, or at least the ability to develop a nuclear arsenal. Such talk behind closed doors at a handful of open forums has not yet found its way to the Arab scene in an in-depth manner. Yet the fact of the matter is that Arab political and military leaderships should look deeply and seriously into scenarios of the map of region in the case of international silent agreement to a nuclear Iran. Similarly, American and European public opinion should closely examine what some classify as the “dangers” and others as the “benefits” of Iran possessing the nuclear bomb, this to truly be aware of the necessary strategic decisions that such a development would call for. Indeed, it is no longer sufficient to hide behind one's finger, and it is no longer convincing to pretend to understand the meaning of the international community submitting to the dictates of the nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran. The US's new nuclear doctrine is very encouraging, especially in terms of US-Russian understandings, of pledging not to develop new nuclear warheads, of not using nuclear weapons to respond to non-nuclear threats, and of directing messages to Iran and North Korea. Nevertheless, this will not replace the necessary question which the US Administration should answer transparently and sincerely, namely: is coexisting with a nuclear Iran an option? And what does this require in terms of reformulating regional security relations? Furthermore, the most urgent question must be asked by the Arab region, to know what lies before it today in terms of opportunities to contribute to shaping its future in light of the world's acceptance of a nuclear Iran. To begin with, the greatest loss if Iran were to acquire the nuclear bomb may well be suffered by Arab peoples. The reason is that Arab leaderships will dedicate, or tell their peoples that they are dedicating, budgets and funds to obtain nuclear capabilities, so as for the Arabs not to fall outside of the regional balance of power. Indeed, both Iran and Israel possessing nuclear weapons will lead to a nuclear arms race – or the pretense of one – which will take place at the expense of what the Arab region needs in terms of investments for the eradication of illiteracy, for economic and human growth, for higher education and for building state institutions and infrastructure for development. Ranking second in terms of loss would be the Iranian opposition, which is well aware that the regime in Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons would constitute a guarantee for the regime against any external attempts to topple it, as implicit international agreement to the Islamic republic of Iran possessing such capabilities would mean the complete abandonment of any Iranian opposition – whether it be popular, aesthetic, radical or corrective – to the ruling regime. This means that Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons would mean imposing the submission of the Iranian people to the ruling regime indefinitely. Ranking third would be small Arab countries that feel fragile, such as Bahrain, Kuwait and Lebanon, in addition to Palestine. Indeed, internationally accepted Iranian nuclear capabilities will strengthen the mullahs in Tehran and increase the arrogance of those charged with implementing the ambitions of regional hegemony by any means and at any cost. This in turn will make of Palestine an Iranian instrument and of Lebanon an Iranian base, and will leave countries like Bahrain and Kuwait wide open for Iranian dictates. Large Arab countries may be more or less protected, but their “fragility” is of a different nature. Thus in Iraq for instance, a nuclear Iran will not encroach very much because US troops remain there and will not leave at the present time. As for Egypt, its loss would be great as a result of any implicit international agreement to a nuclear Iran, because Egypt does not have the funds necessary to develop or purchase nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Egypt's regional weight will practically fade away when faced with the new regional balance of power which a nuclear Ian would impose. Ranking fourth in terms of loss would be Israel, which will no longer have the monopoly of nuclear weapons after Iran obtains them and after the start of the nuclear arms race by financially able Arab countries, most prominently the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Israel would be at a loss because it has made itself fall into international isolation, as a result of its obstinacy and its patent rejection of the two-state solution and of the requirements of making peace with 22 Arab countries and 58 Muslim countries, and because the military option against Iran is not available to Israel by a strict international decision, and is not possible for Israel for practical military reasons. Thus Israel today is besieged and its hands are tied vis-à-vis Iran, the nuclear program of which most of the world believes not to be peaceful. And Israel's siege will increase after Iran obtains nuclear weapons and other Arab countries seek to purchase them from the numerous “shelves” available to them. This does not mean that Iran will dare to use its nuclear weapons against Israel under any circumstances, as this would signify inviting a nuclear response and bringing down utter death and destruction on both. Nor does it mean that Israel will bomb Iran with nuclear weapons. Indeed, despite what is being said about the “existential” danger Iran acquiring nuclear weapons would represent for Israel, the fact of the matter is that the historical relationship between the two countries and the two peoples is one of truce, and it has never happened for it to reach the point of confrontation. Verbal exaggerations will most likely increase, but Tehran will not resort to defending its “satellites” in the Arab region by using its nuclear weapons against Israel. Indeed, it has never resorted to actually participating in wars it had encouraged, but rather left its allies alone in the arena against Israel, as it did in the July War in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel, and as it did when it left Hamas alone under Israeli fire in the Gaza war. Indeed, what Tehran wants of nuclear weapons is for the sake of the Islamic Republic of Iran alone, and not at all to liberate Palestine. It is for the sake of the regime remaining in power and of obtaining guarantees that it will remain, not in order to use such weapons against the United States of America on its home soil or against its troops in the region. The goals of Iranian nuclear weapons are numerous, yet most of them fall within the category of bullying its neighbors and the Iranian interior, and are focused on dictating a regional and international oil agenda. All of these reasons must awaken Arab leaderships to what they should be thinking of in terms of strategy and tactics in order to be in a position that would secure them against the consequences and the surprises of Iranian nuclear developments. And this means more than simply rushing to beg to join an American security umbrella, the costs of which will be tremendous by any standard. The strategic and security relationship with the United States remains essential for most countries in the Arab region, and especially in the Gulf. That is a sovereign and positive decision for many reasons, most prominently because the US is the only superpower in the world today and because relations with it are historical. However, and because of the US policies imposed by its organic relationship with Israel, there is restlessness and in fact calls for turning away from traditional Arab relations with the United States, calls which have multiplied as a result of the US war in Iraq, which in turn has given Iran superiority in the Middle East and given Israel the removal of Iraq from the strategic equation in the region. The time today is one of multiple friendships and of interests branching out of strong relations with countries in competition against each other, opposite to what the situation was during the Cold War. It is therefore necessary for Arab countries to make use of their special relationships with the likes of China and Russia for more than bilateral trade objectives. Indeed, those two countries are very important in the balance of international relations both with Iran and Israel, as well as with Turkey. And it would be useful for the Arabs first to organize relations on the basis of emphasizing common interests that could be ruptured in case China for instance fails to pay attention to strategic Arab priorities. Moreover, with relations reinforced with China and Russia in security issues and not just in the fields of oil and trade, the Arab relationship with the United States would take on a different perspective, other than that based on the reliance on security guarantees and on absolute affiliation to the dictates of the security umbrella. Indeed, positioning oneself in the new regional security structure particularly at this stage is of the utmost necessity, and might perhaps lead active countries such as the five permanent members of the Security Council to reconsider policies that encourage Iran to believe that it will obtain the blessing of these countries for becoming a nuclear state, because these countries do not have a military option, and that obstinacy and defiance will thus be fruitful instead of doing away with Iran's ambitions. China's relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an advanced and intricate one at the levels of oil and trade, and even in the field of purchasing missiles and diversifying arsenals. A quarter of the oil imported by China is Saudi oil. This important relationship should of course have an impact on China's stances on the issue of strengthening sanctions against Iran, instead of encouraging Iran to be obstinate, procrastinate and stall until it can impose its possessing nuclear weapons as a de facto situation. Those benefiting from a nuclear Iran are nuclear arms traders, who want a nuclear arms race in the Middle East in order to make massive profits, and in order to turn Arab funds away from human growth, which frightens some countries, as Arab competences are abundant. Such profiteers are not from one continent but are of the same kind of governments, sectors and military industries, whose shared interest is to ration the oil and weapons funds in their treasuries and to permanently pacify the Arab region.
