U.S. President Barack Obama has scored some notable successes -- at home, with healthcare reform; abroad, with a nuclear arms control treaty which will reduce U.S. and Russian arsenals by 30 per cent. This is a small but significant step towards his vision of a world free of ‘nukes.' Nuclear disarmament and nuclear security are evidently the next big foreign policy goals of the Obama presidency. Next week – on April 12-13 – Obama will host more than forty world leaders in Washington, including China's President Hu Jintao and Russia's President Dimitri Medvedev, at a summit on nuclear security. This will be followed in May, by a review conference in New York of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). At both the Washington and New York meetings, Iran will undoubtedly be a focus of attention. It has signed the NPT, but it is suspected of ignoring it by attempting to acquire nuclear weapons – or at least the ability to build such weapons in an emergency. Israel will also be on everyone's mind. Although it has a large nuclear arsenal, it has refused to sign the NPT or submit to any inspection. Indeed, to protect its Middle East nuclear monopoly – and the freedom of military action which this confers -- Israel has repeatedly threatened to attack Iran if the international community fails to put a stop to Tehran's nuclear programme. Obama is thus facing problems with both Iran and Israel. He is beginning to show some firmness towards Israel regarding its expanding settlements on the West Bank and in Arab East Jerusalem. He knows this firmness is necessary to restore America's credibility with the Arabs. But if he wants a deal with Iran, he must also show firmness regarding Israel's nuclear arsenal. There is no way Iran will be persuaded or pressured to give up enriching uranium so long as Israel remains militant, threatening and unchecked. The two are sides of the same coin. Iran feels – no doubt rightly from its point of view – that it needs a deterrent capability to ward off the danger of military attack by Israel, and even in a second stage by the United States itself. Although Obama is known to oppose the use of force against Iran – and has made his position clear to Israel -- he might, however reluctantly, be drawn into a war if Israel strikes first. In any event, his stress on the need for tough sanctions is hardly reassuring to Tehran. The U.S. recognises that there is as yet no international consensus for sanctions against Iran, but the administration is showing growing confidence that China will either support a UN Security Council resolution or let one pass by abstaining. ‘We think we can get sanctions within weeks,' Obama said last week. Certainly the U.S. is sparing no diplomatic effort to get its way. Although Hu Jintao had an hour's exchange with Obama on the phone the other day, there is no certainty that China, with its vast commercial and strategic interests in Iran, will agree to back tough sanctions. Together with Turkey, Brazil, Russia and other key states, it still favours a negotiated settlement. In the circumstances, is Obama's ‘pressure track' wise? Or is it doomed to failure? It is almost certainly counter-productive. The more Iran is bullied and threatened, the more defiant it becomes, and the more it will consider it needs a nuclear deterrent. ‘They say they have extended a hand to us, and that the Iranian government and nation declined to welcome that,' Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad exclaimed on 4 April. ‘What kind of hand did they extend toward the Iranian nation? What has changed? Did you lift sanctions? Did you stop propaganda? Did you reduce the pressure?' His message was clear. ‘The more you reveal your animosity,' he declared, ‘the more it will increase our people's motivation to double efforts for construction and the progress of Iran.' There is no sign whatsoever that sanctions, even tougher ones than at present, will cause Iran to change its policy or bring the regime down. The Green movement has been tamed, while the Revolutionary Guard Corps remains strong. It could become stronger still – and might even mount a coup – if it looked as if the regime were about to crumble. It is striking that Mohamed ElBaradei and Hans Blix, both former heads of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), strongly recommend negotiations with Iran rather than sanctions, still less the use of force. There is ‘no solution ... except through meaningful dialogue,' ElBaradei told The Guardian newspaper on 31 March. ‘I would hope,' he added, ‘that the lessons of Iraq, both in London and in the U.S., have started to sink in... Sure there are dictators, but are you ready every time you want to get rid of a dictator to sacrifice a million innocent civilians?' Hans Blix – who warned in 2003 against attacking Iraq – now gives the same advice. ‘Would it not be wiser,' he wrote in the International Herald Tribune on April 5, ‘to offer [Iran] diplomatic relations and guarantees against armed attacks/subversion as part of a nuclear deal? This was done in the case of North Korea. Why not in the case of Iran?' Undoubtedly, Obama approach to Iran is too narrowly focussed on the nuclear issue. He needs to recognise Iran's legitimate security concerns as well as its wish for recognition as a regional power. It is noteworthy that Amr Moussa, Arab League Secretary General, has urged the Arab states to take the initiative of engaging with Iran on security matters, rather than leaving the issue in the hands of the United States and other powers. Another important area where Obama is courting failure is in the AfPak theatre of war. In Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai is rebelling against his American sponsors, who made the mistake of insulting and lecturing him, while in Pakistan the CIA's repeated use of drones against the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province has triggered a ferocious Taliban response – most recently in the form of an assault on the U.S. consulate in Peshawar. The campaign against Helmand by General Stanley McChrystal, the NATO commander in Afghanistan, is alienating the population and driving it ito the arms of the Taliban. Sensing the trend, Karzai is asserting his independence from Washington and, in the interest of national reconciliation, has called a large Loya Jirga, or tribal council, of 13,000 chiefs, for 2 May. Obama's recent surprise visit to Kabul and his invitation to Karzai to visit Washington in May suggest that he may be dissatisfied with the advice he has been receiving from General McChrystal and from Richard Holbrook, his special envoy. One must hope that he recognises the need for fresh thinking. end
