In the context of the relationship between the Lebanese Druze Leader Walid Jumblatt and the government in Syria, something calls for pondering the possibility of the rise of a state in Lebanon. This means that the institutions of this state become the decision-maker when it comes to foreign policy in general and the Arab one in particular. Moreover, the invitation of Lebanon to attend the Arab Summit in Libya confirms the urgency of this question. The issue here does not pertain to assessing this or that step, but rather to summing up the entire state in a sect which believes that its interest at one point requires it to adopt this policy. The issue is also about the inability of the state's institutions to find a “state-like” formula to come up with such a policy, and before this, it is about defending its exclusive role in these issues and in assessing the national interest and any step it embarks on. This means that the sects have seized the “right” to determine the [state's] foreign policy, after they seized the “right” to armament and the decision to use these arms, regardless of the decision of the institutions in this regard – despite the verbal expressions included in the statements, including the policy statement of the current government. In any case, we notice that in the two above-mentioned cases, there is a common denominator in the Jumblatt-Syria relations and the Libyan-Lebanese relations: murder. In the first case, Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated, and his son succeeded him as the leader of the Druze. In the second case, Imam Musa al-Sadr was kidnapped, after whom the Amal Movement inherited his leadership of the Shiite Sect, before Hezbollah imposed itself instead. Regardless of the perpetrator and the motives, murder or assassination remain the main engine that primarily drives the sect, determines its interest and imposes its policies on the state's institutions whose role is limited to watching these developments. They are not able to interfere, nor do they dare do so without causing general tensions or perhaps threatening the country's stability. Hence, the danger lies in the fact that there is a national unity government which should at least manage political affairs, after the issue of Hezbollah's arms was sent to the table of dialogue, as a solution to the ongoing division, and as a mechanism to prevent the deterioration of the confrontations at this relatively calm period, which neither side has an interest in disrupting. The sect had to take the lead and take revenge on its own from the side that targeted its leader. This is because the state, in the two above-mentioned cases which coincided with the civil war, was dismantled and its institutions were inconsistent. Therefore, the assassination of any Lebanese leader was not a public national cause and the state's institutions were not responsible for following up on the issue, in terms of investigations and judicial prosecutions. Since the assassination was politically driven, and since it targeted the leader of a whole sect amid sectarian divisions that prevent considering this assassination a national cause, the state did not dare carry out its responsibility, whether because of the internal differences or out of fear of foreign revenge. Thus, the sect assumed the role of the institutions. Jumblatt's reconciliation with Syria, which will soon be consolidated, was not the result of efforts extended by the national unity government, which most probably was informed about it like the rest of the Lebanese. This reconciliation was a result of Hezbollah's efforts, as the party played a key role in convincing Damascus to accept it, after Jumblatt's televised interview with Al-Jazeera. The motive behind this reconciliation is to reinforce the Lebanese-Syrian relationship on the bases of “Jumblatt's emphasis on the main political constants, namely regarding the stand on Syria, the Resistance, and Palestine in the first place.” As such, a reconciliation which certainly has its sectarian dimension – as repeatedly affirmed by Jumblatt during his aforementioned interview – becomes a policy imposed on the state's institutions as well. Hence, a sect acts as mediator for another sect, and consequently determines the country's policy. The same applies to Lebanon's attendance of the Arab Summit in Libya, although this summit will be futile considering the nature of its host and the Libyan violation of the customs of invitations, and although Lebanese arrest warrants have been issued against the host [the Libyan president] on charges of kidnapping Al-Sadr. But the main issue here is that the state's institutions recanted from following up on the arrest warrants issued by its judicial authority, in a way that puts an end to the hearsay and accusations and clarifies the responsibilities and implements accountability. The Amal Movement, represented by its leader Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and backed by Hezbollah, forced the state to espouse the behavior it wants. Once again, the state retracted and the sect progressed.
