Sooner or later, the parties involved in the Western Sahara conflict will return to the negotiations table, because there is no alternative to it for settling a regional tension that has lasted for more than three decades. The current debate over the likelihood of resuming negotiations under the sponsorship of UN Envoy Christopher Ross only means that the crisis has stopped at the phase of negotiations. Will it be with the aim of forming real resolve to put an end to the problem or merely a few rounds to clear one's conscience with regard to the demands of the international community? Since the start of the Manhattan negotiations in the summer of 2007, it clearly appeared that the game of parties concerned would take up a large part of concerns, exactly as the situation had been when the Western Sahara conflict first erupted and the formula of parties concerned attracted neighboring countries to the scene, although the conflict had originally been an open confrontation only between Morocco and Spain, as indicated by the documents of the UN archives since the end of the 1950s. Regional developments after the 1969 Nouadhibou Summit – which included the now deceased heads of state Hassan II, Houari Boudemiene and Mokhtar Ould Daddah – had the parties take diverging paths, and the Polisario Front was on no one's mind. And while Morocco and Mauritania at the time followed the same track, Algeria chose as its ally the Polisario. Assessing the factors and background of the origins and development of the conflict will be left to history. More importantly, the formula of negotiations between parties concerned will face real difficulties, not the least of which being the fact that the secret negotiations that have taken place between Morocco and Algeria in European capitals have not succeeded at separating the issue of the Western Sahara from its negative impact on bilateral relations between the two neighboring countries. Even when they got the inspiration to extend working in accordance with the agreement to demarcate the borders and the Treaty of Good Neighborliness, which were considered a historical achievement, the years of détente between the two did not last very long. It is no longer a secret that Algeria is wagering on reestablishing positive normalization in its relations with its western neighbor by settling the Western Sahara conflict, to such an extent that it has replaced the political characterization of building the Maghreb Union with an economic approach, one which Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci frankly expressed at the meeting of Maghreb Foreign Ministers in Libya. The response of the Moroccans, on the other hand, is that no economic coalition within the framework of the Maghreb can survive when faced with the changing developments of political disputes, the nearest being the continued sealing of the land border between the two neighboring countries. To the same extent as the divergence of stances reflects the fact that no negotiations between Morocco and Algeria can achieve the progress sought after without opening a deep rift in the wall of the Western Sahara predicament, it has become unlikely for negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front to head in the right direction without clear Algerian support. And it seems that when the UN Security Council, in its latest resolutions concerned with the Western Sahara conflict, wished for the countries of the regional neighborhood to support these efforts, it was well aware that, without achieving a minimum of regional détente, the Western Sahara negotiations could not be destined to achieve their goals. The game of parties concerned has become so intertwined that it is now completely entangled and that its thin threads cannot be distinguished without the help of a magnifying glass or microscope. Former UN mediator James Baker was able to reach the areas of shade in the Western Sahara conflict the day he classified the parties as direct (Morocco and the Polisario) and indirect (Algeria and Mauritania). At the time, such a classification had been acceptable within the framework of the settlement plan that had resolved to organize the referendum on the fate of the Western Sahara. Moreover, Algeria and Mauritania had accepted such characterization because of the presence of citizens of Sahrawi origin on their soil. Nonetheless, stances have changed as a result of the collapse of the settlement plan. Perhaps foremost in imposing such a change is the fact that the positions of the parties concerned in the methodology of the negotiations have become clear in terms of powers and responsibilities. On this and other bases, Envoy Ross has made sure to include the participation of neighboring countries in encouraging negotiations. And when it seemed difficult for him to stir up the stagnating situation without an initiative to remove the psychological and political obstacles, he called for unofficial negotiations of a smaller size. Ross's initiative is most likely still required, even if it is to face additional difficulties. Yet disconnecting the concerned parties by making them bear direct responsibilities remains a central wager for resuming negotiations that would be different from how it had been before.
