The warning of US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates against Al-Qaeda's attempts to lure India and Pakistan into new wars whets the appetite of extremism networks. It also spreads fear over a nuclear war between two countries that have a long history of enmity. But the warning against the evil intentions of the organization cannot but raise questions about whether or not the alternative option to avoid this war is to make Pakistan implement the Afghan model to the end, including looking for solutions to avoid the fall of this country's nuclear arsenal “in the hands of the extremists.” While in New Delhi, Gates intentionally lauded its patience over Islamabad - since the Bombay explosions - his reference to the limits of this patience was not innocent, so as to practically intensify the pressures on Pakistan, even though Washington always finds verbal ways out to justify its announced concern over the destiny of a nuclear Muslim country. Did the secretary purposefully exaggerate the threat of Al-Qaeda? This question reminds of American warnings that preceded the opening of “fronts” in Yemen to fight the organization's militants and hound them with air raids. These scenes remind us of similar open fronts on the Pakistani territory in the face of the Taliban fighters, Al-Qaeda's ally. It is also important to remember the decline of the organization's strikes at the end of the second term of President Bush, and its sudden expansion since the outset of his successor's tenure Barack Obama. “Exaggerating” Al-Qaeda's threat might be considered an American attempt to shift the attention off the poor achievements of Obama's pragmatic policy during the first year of his tenure. But the price of the results – just as during Bush's tenure – is paid by a Muslim country. Yemen joined the list this year, as though the “global” American war on terrorism is still run by the mentality of the Neoconservatives…Perhaps Afghanistan is the best example, while the American support for the ruling power in Iraq does not encourage the project of rebuilding a united state, upon discrimination-free standards. Baghdad, just like Islamabad and Kabul, is Washington's ally, while Sana'a is ranked somewhere in the middle between a friend and an ally of an administration that still believes in quick solutions in the fields of armed confrontations, some of which portend with long civil wars once the United States focuses on its crises at home – this being likely. A rapid assessment reveals that Obama's administration's hesitation to deal with the international conflicts and the region's crises in particular could not but entail reversible results of the pledges of the American president who came to the White House with hopes to make a great change in order to get rid of a heavy legacy…and an unpleasant one too. Is it possible for instance to reduce the popularity of the Afghan Movement Taliban, while the opium of corruption is very prevalent in Kabul? Does Islamabad become more powerful against the extremists by Washington repeating the symphony of reprimand, one which Richard Holbrooke totally perfects, or by the reckless American air strikes that instigate the Pakistanis against their state? Are Iraq's neighbors reassured that its authority will not abandon Arabism, while Washington calls it to be only reassured about their close alliance? If the “old” American lesson in Iraq stirs up the doubts of its neighbors over the implicit motives to overlook the expansion of the Iranian hegemony in Mesopotamia, then the new lesson under Obama is that any easygoingness with Tehran when addressing its nuclear file amplifies the Arab Gulf doubts. Otherwise, what does it mean that Iran was given a deadline, which the White House overlooked without even bothering to give justification? It is clear that no one in the region wants an American or Israeli war on Iran, due to the nature of the prices. But it is also certain that political easygoingness or hesitation in intensifying the sanctions, will push Tehran to make use of its nuclear program and create more problems that destabilize Arab states…and always under the pretext of deterring the “arrogant powers” and the conflict with the United States. Obama's hesitation with Israel is no less dangerous than his “pragmatic” policy with Tehran, as he reinforces the extremists under the pretext of the American “collusion.” Once again, regardless of the number of Mitchell's tours, Washington's hesitation will lead to more blackmailing by Israel for the Palestinian Authority, and more determination to humiliate it. This strengthens no one but Hamas's extremism regardless of how “kind” the American pledges are. After one year of hesitation, the series of wars continues, and the spirit of extremism is renewed.
