Qaeda's Yemen-based branch as a security worry after its claim of a failed Dec. 25 bid to blow up a US airliner has stirred concern about its ties to like-minded militants in nearby Somalia. Here are questions and answers about links between Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Somalia's Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda-inspired insurgency in the failed Horn of Africa state. u Why worry now? On Jan. 1, an Al-Shabaab official, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Abu Mansur, said the group was ready to send reinforcements to AQAP should the United States attack its bases in Yemen. The United States is stepping up security cooperation with Yemen following the Dec. 25 incident, involving a Nigerian who is reported to have said the plot was hatched in Yemen. Robow caused concern because Al-Shabaab is an effective force that has seized large areas of south and central Somalia. Its successes, like those of AQAP, have helped to inspire a small but enthusiastic global community of Al-Qaeda supporters. Getting to Yemen is unlikely to be difficult. While an international anti-piracy flotilla patrols the Gulf of Aden, hundreds of dhows carrying contraband shuttle between the two countries undetected every week, and Somalia's pirates continue to roam the seas and seize vessels for ransom. Regional concerns increased on Jan. 2 when Somali defense minister Sheikh Yusuf Mohammad Siad accused AQAP of sending two boatloads of weaponry to Al-Shabaab fighters in the rebel-held southern port of Kismayu in recent days. While Yemen has for years been an important source of arms for Somalia, the trade is normally operated by well-established arms brokers and shippers, not by militants themselves. u So is the link-up rhetorical, or real? For propaganda purposes the groups have tended to proclaim more of a relationship than really exists in practice. But the Dec. 25 incident shows AQAP has ambitions beyond its immediate region. And while there are tensions over cultural and language differences between Arabs and Somalis in Al-Shabaab, to date the demands of the insurgency have overridden these. AQAP military commander Qasim Al-Raymi has fought in Somalia and has written on the need to back Somalia's revolt. He was one of a 23-strong group of Al-Qaeda militants who escaped from prison in Yemen in 2006 and went on to form AQAP. Some others in that founding group had also fought in Somalia. Security experts say Yemenis make up a sizeable part of a foreign contingent that fights with Al-Shabaab's Somali rank and file and supplies bomb-making and communications expertise. By one estimate there are about 500 or more foreigners in Shabaab's ranks, which experts say may number 5,000 or more. u Who else is shuttling between Yemen and Somalia? Militants do not figure heavily in the traffic across the Gulf of Aden. For now, that remains dominated by organized crime – arms traders and people and drug smugglers backed by powerful local and regional vested interests. There is also illicit trade in fuel, cement and food to remote natural ports in Somalia via routes that are adjusted rapidly to respond to new markets or government countermeasures. Regional experts say there have been sporadic reports of Somali fighters in Yemen. Some observers say it is unlikely AQAP would take up Robow's offer in any substantial way, unless it was truly desperate. AQAP has other resources, they argue. Its close links to Al-Qaeda's Arab-dominated leadership in south Asia suggests it would be able to obtain more recruits and financing than other Al-Qaeda affiliates could expect in similar circumstances. u Is Robow's offer sincere? At least three interpretations of Robow's offer are circulating among Somalia watchers. One is that it genuinely reflects the intention of Al-Shabaab to send fighters, if AQAP is hit by the United States. A second is that it is mere bluster: Shabaab's overwhelming priority is to hold the ground it has gained and if possible gain more. It cannot afford to lose any fighters right now. A third is that this is a unilateral attempt by Robow, seen by many as one of the more nationalist of Al-Shabaab's top men, to ingratiate himself with hardline colleagues in the leadership after he was sidelined in a falling out over policy.
