A WASHINGTON consensus is emerging about the necessity of talking to Iran – sooner rather than later. President Barack Obama has spoken of reaching out to the Islamic Republic, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has responded by expressing a readiness to talk. He has even written a letter to Obama congratulating him on his election. This must surely be taken as a signal of a coming thaw. Both sides recognize that, after 30 years of stubborn mutual hostility, the time for dialogue has arrived. It may still be premature to expect an early restoration of diplomatic relations, but the opening of a US-staffed interests section in Tehran seems a likely prospect. A relevant question is whether the US should seek immediate talks or wait until after Iran's June 12 elections. Some in America would prefer to wait until the outcome is known, perhaps in the hope that a more moderate figure, like former President Muhammad Khatami, might return to power. This is probably a miscalculation. Ahmadinejad would be better placed than Khatami to sell a rapprochement with the United States to his own hard-liners. Starting talks now would also provide necessary political cover for the talks to continue later, whoever won the elections. Several developments seem to be driving the US and Iran to the negotiating table. Of these, probably the most important is Iran's progress in enriching uranium. Although it denies any intention to manufacture nuclear weapons, Iran's scientific and technological achievement suggests that it is on the ‘threshold' of becoming a nuclear power. But it is by no means certain that it will choose to take that extra step. America's interest lies in persuading Iran to go no further, while Iran's interest is to go just far enough to deter any would-be attacker, but not so far as to arouse the fears of its neighbors, and incur the problems and responsibilities of actually becoming a nuclear power. What is clear is that US attempts to halt Iran's nuclear program by means of economic sanctions and military threats have failed. On the contrary, they have driven Iran to accelerate its program. A radically new approach is evidently called for. It must include recognition of Iran's legitimate concerns, an end to threats, and a readiness to embark on talks without preconditions. In any event, China, Russia, some Arab Gulf states like Dubai, and even some European states, have never subscribed to the American policy of seeking to halt Iran's nuclear activities by undermining its economy. Indeed, test operations at the Russian-built Busheher nuclear power station are due to start this week. Another development which has underlined the urgency of talks is a joint US and Iranian interest in stabilizing the regional environment – in Iraq, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in the arena of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The two rival powers do not exactly see eye to eye on all these questions – far from it – but they do appear to have both come round to the view that these problems are inter-connected and that some sort of a regional solution needs to be envisaged. Iran would like the US to remove its forces from its immediate vicinity – from Iraq and from the region as a whole. While some Americans recognize that an ‘over-the-horizon' presence, rather than boots on the ground in the Gulf, might actually be to America's advantage, a state like Bahrain and other American allies would be nervous without overt American protection. What demands might Iran make in a negotiation with the United States? It wants to protect its independence and its Islamic revolution against external attack. It wants to be recognized as a regional power. It wants a pacified Iraq on its border, one which will never again pose a lethal threat like that of Saddam Hussein; in practice this means an Iraq under friendly Shia leadership. It would like to see a pacified and friendly Afghanistan and Pakistan, two countries with which it shares a border. Iran would also like to be accepted as a member of a Gulf security structure, and to reassure its Gulf neighbors that it respects their sovereignty. Above all, Iran would like to ‘contain' Israel's aggressive militarism, prevent the recurrence of its violent assaults on Lebanon and Gaza, and contribute to the emergence of an independent Palestinian state – ambitions it shares with much of the Arab and Muslim world. If the US wants Iran to drop its guard, it will need to consider this range of demands very seriously. Some Americans seem to believe that Iran would give up uranium enrichment if sanctions were lifted. Others believe that Iran might accept the creation on its soil of a multinational enrichment facility owned jointly with European states and monitored internationally so as to prevent any military use. This proposal is put forward by Tom Pickering, a former senior US diplomat and two others, in the current issue of the New York Review of Books. But the proposal seems short of incentives for Iran. Having survived the last several years of US sanctions, Iran wants more than a mere lifting of sanctions. No doubt it feels the need for US guarantees against attack, which is hardly surprising in view of Israel's constant sabre-rattling. Iran is also committed to the Palestinian cause. Some of these ambitions would need to be satisfied if Iran were to consider halting its uranium enrichment at present levels. Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) goes further still. In an article in the International Herald Tribune on Feb. 17 he wrote: “The Middle East... will never be at peace until the Palestinian question is resolved. What compounds the problem is that the nuclear non-proliferation regime has lost its legitimacy in the eyes of Arab public opinion because of the perceived double-standards concerning Israel, the only state in the region outside the NPT and known to possess nuclear weapons... “Concerns about current and future nuclear programs in the region will persist until a lasting peace is achieved and all nuclear weapons in the area are eliminated as part of a regional security structure. The Obama administration's pledge to engage in direct diplomacy with Iran, without preconditions and on the basis of mutual respect, and to seek a grand bargain, is long overdue.” If ElBaradei is right – and he has a record of being right – it would seem that Barack Obama will need to embark on peace-making and reassurance on a wide front, from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Israel and Palestine, if his hopes of a breakthrough with Iran are to be realized.
