From Gaza to Kandahar, the new Obama administration is confronted with two kinds of Islamist movements: the ones with a global agenda (Al-Qaeda and its local subsidiaries) and the others with a territorial and national agenda (Taleban, Hamas, most of its Iraqi opponents). There is nothing to negotiate with the global terrorists, but the Islamo-nationalist movements simply cannot be ignored or suppressed. Hamas is nothing else than the traditional Palestinian nationalism. The Taleban express more a Pashtu identity than a global movement. The Iraqi factions are competing over sharing (or monopolizing) the power in Iraq. The “war on terror” during the Bush years has blurred this essential distinction by merging all the armed opponents to US-supported governments under the label of terrorism. The concept of a “war on terror” has thwarted any political approach to the conflicts in favor of an elusive military victory. Where a political approach has been tried, it has worked. The relative success of the surge in Iraq is based on the implicit rejection of the official doctrine of the “war on terror”: Local armed insurgents were recognized as political actors with more or less a legitimate agenda, thus separating them from the foreign-based global militants who did not give a damn about Iraqi national interests. Could the same approach be applied to the Taleban and Hamas? The appointment of Gen. David Petraeus as CENTCOM chief suggests that this is the idea for Afghanistan. As far as Hamas is concerned, the issue rests with the leaders of Israel, not those in Washington. (Forget about US pressure on Israel. Such pressure could force a temporary agreement but not a long-term solution.) Nevertheless, for both Afghanistan and Palestine, the issue is the same: If the nationalist dimension supersedes the global terrorism movement – which I think it does – how can a solution be found based on recognizing the legitimacy of nationalist aspirations? For Palestine, the Oslo agreement defined the framework that still guides the common policy of the West: the two-state solution. A positive side effect of such a solution, which makes it even more desirable for Washington, is that it could open the space for a new strategic alignment against Iran. For all the Arab states, except Syria, the greatest threat today comes from Iran, not Israel. The problem is the political reality on the ground. No Arab state can impose such an open strategic shift on its public as long as there is no agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. In short, the two-state solution is dead on the ground even if it remains on the diplomatic agenda. Beyond this reality, the expanded settlements and the security requirements of Israel imply that a Palestinian state will never be viable. By making security a prerequisite for any political move, Israel plays against its potential ally, Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah (who are deprived of the wherewithal to deliver), and in favor of the radicals, who consider negotiations useless. Adding even further to the conundrum, Israel and the West have tried to impose on the Palestinians both elections and the outcome of the elections. In the view of the West, the Palestinian people should not have chosen Hamas by democratic means, but rather the Palestinian Authority – even though the PA has been systematically deprived of concrete means of governing. The option of negotiating with Hamas has never been really taken into consideration. It is time to consider that option. Whatever the justification of the Gaza military operations (to punish the inhabitants for supporting Hamas or to free them from the control of Hamas), it will not work. Dismantling Hamas' military capacity can only buy time, not solve the issue. Palestine is thus doomed, in the best case, to be either under a permanent Israeli occupation or under some sort of an international mandate. The suggestion that Gaza could be handed over to Egypt and what remains of the West Bank to Jordan will just contribute to extending the conflict. Such an eventuality would nullify the only positive result of the Oslo negotiations, which is to have transformed an Israeli-Arab conflict into an Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The issue is also complex for the Taleban. The Taleban do not embody “Afghan” nationalism but Pashtu identity. There are almost no Taleban in the center and the north of Afghanistan. During the last 40 years, Pashtu identity has been expressed through non-nationalist ideological movements (the Khalq faction of the Afghan communist party, the numerous mujahideen movements and now the Taleban). Thus, if the Obama administration truly seeks to change the equation in the Middle East and Afghanistan, it must recognize the real motives and aspirations, not imagined ones, that actually drive groups like Hamas and the Taleban. Such a recognition would lead the US to talk to the Taleban in Afghanistan and look for a political instead of military solution that responds to legitimate Pashtu aspirations. It would lead the US to refrain from endorsing the Israeli delusion that it can eliminate Hamas by force while frustrating Palestinian statehood. Closing Guantanamo, as Obama has promised to do as soon as he takes office, is a powerful symbolic act that signals the US has changed course. But a new departure that leaves behind the wrong-headed mindset that casts Hamas and the Taleban with the wholly different phenomenon of Al-Qaeda in the “war on terror” would do far more to enhance security for the US and peace and stability in the region stretching from Gaza to Kandahar. – Global Viewpoint Olivier Roy is a research director at the French National Center for Scientific Research and a lecturer for the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences. Roy is author of “Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah” and “The Failure of Political Islam,” a standard text for students of political Islam. His most recent work is “Secularism Confronts Islam.” __
