On the surface, everything looks very promising. If there is no last-minute glitch, a new round of peace talks between the Afghan government and Taliban will take place in China on Thursday. Beijing and Islamabad have announced they are willing to be the “guarantors” of a possible peace deal. The inaugural dialogue between the two sides was held on July 7 in the Pakistani tourist town of Murree. This was the first direct interaction between the two antagonists in 14 years. The talks hosted by Pakistan were attended by US, China and Pakistan officials as observers. The meeting followed several informal contacts between the Taliban and Afghan government representatives, most recently in Qatar and Norway. Meanwhile, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has urged the insurgent group to bring its demands in writing to the table for the Thursday talks. What is more, the Taliban chief Mullah Omar has endorsed the peace talks as religiously “legitimate.” Omar has been in hiding with a $10 million bounty on his head after a US-led alliance invaded his country and toppled the Taliban regime headed by him in 2001. Until now, his Taliban group has refused to talk to the “American puppets” in Kabul. So to all intents and purposes, the stage is set for a major breakthrough. But once you delve deeper into the matter, the picture is not that rosy. Mullah Omar has said the goal of the negotiations is an "end to occupation" by foreign forces, leading to the reintroduction of an Islamic system of government in Afghanistan. Even if one dismisses such talk as an attempt to win the backing of the most extremist and intransigent elements in Taliban for a peace deal, there are other problems. The most important is that the Taliban, though divided and suffering heavy casualties recently, is still a formidable force. Even after the “longest war” in its history, the US has not been able to decimate the Taliban or force it to sue for peace. At the same time, the Afghan Army and the national police, who are in charge of security after the bulk of coalition troops left last year, are no match to the insurgents who attack them at will. Violence has sharply increased in most parts of the country with Afghan forces suffering record number of casualties. The casualty rate among the Afghan soldiers and police this year is up more than 50 percent compared with the first six months of 2014. Morale is as low as desertion is high. If battlefield success is what determines the outcome of negotiations, the Afghan government is not in a position to dictate a settlement. Even if the Taliban agree to share power with the government, reintegration of the group would threaten the advances the country has achieved since 2002, especially in women's education. While in New Delhi in March this year, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah who calls himself the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Afghanistan, used a Persian proverb to answer a question about his sharing power with President Ashraf Ghani. “Two kings can't remain in a territory,” he said. President Ghani is in a worse predicament. He has to think of sharing power with a group that is opposed to everything he and his Western backers stand for. According to the Afghan delegation to the July 7 talks, the Taliban side had raised the issues of foreign troops operating in Afghanistan, UN sanctions against its leaders and prisoners of war. They may also demand Mullah Omar be removed from United Nations' list of terrorists. All this argues against pinning too much hope on the next round of talks. The most one can expect is some kind of ceasefire and “mutual trust-building” steps. But even a temporary halt to the violence that has been blighting the lives of Afghans for more than three decades will be most welcome.
