Although Al-Shabab has been pushed out of most of the main towns it once controlled in Somalia, the massacre at Garissa University in Kenya shows that the group has not lost its destructive force in neighboring countries, especially Kenya. The Garissa assault, which left at least 147 people dead, was the deadliest attack yet by Al-Shabab, the death toll more than double that of the Al-Shabab attack on the Westgate shopping center in Nairobi in September 2013 that left 67 people dead. The way in which the Garissa attack was conducted, with the gunmen letting Muslims go free while executing the non-Muslims, also showed the continued lethal extremist madness of the group and its ilk, notably Al-Qaeda to which Al-Shabab has pledged allegiance, especially Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, based in the Sahara desert. Al-Shabab may also have formed some links with other Islamist groups in Africa, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria. So even though the group is believed to have no more than between 7,000 and 9,000 fighters, it obviously remains a potent threat. Al-Shabab said the attack was retaliation for Kenya's participation in African Union military operations in Somalia. When Kenyan troops entered Somalia in October 2011 in an effort to stop the Islamists from crossing the long, porous border between the two countries and kidnapping people, their presence actually had the opposite effect, provoking Al-Shabab to increase its activity in Kenya. So whereas African Union forces are trying to squeeze Al-Shabab further, the group is still able to carry out suicide attacks in Mogadishu and elsewhere. Al-Shabab has also set up a recruiting network in Kenya, especially around the port city of Mombasa, which has a large Muslim population. Working in Al-Shabab's favor are two key factors: Somalia has not had an effective national government for more than 20 years, during which time much of the country has been a war zone. This is just the kind of state system, or lack thereof, in which groups like Al-Shabab thrive. And there is a dangerously porous border between Somalia and Kenya which has made it easy for Al-Shabab militants to cross over and carry out attacks. It might also be added that foreigners are known to fight alongside the Somali militants. There are numerous reports of foreign jihadists going to Somalia to help Al-Shabab. The success of Al-Shabab is often attributed to the indignation felt by the Muslim community after years of government neglect. Muslim Kenyans who fought within the ranks of jihadists abroad are coming home to set up their own militant outfits. They often depict their conflict with the government as one between Islam and all other religions. Since 2011, the group has killed 400 people in Kenya and injured 1,000 others. After years of terrorist attacks by Al-Shabab, and growing calls to stop illegal immigration from Somalia, Kenyan authorities finally decided to fence off part of the country's eastern border. But this Israeli-styled wall, built along the lines of the 700-kilometer-long barrier in the West Bank to prevent suicide attacks, will probably not end Al-Shabab's war of terror. Such walls can at best offer a partial solution, and are costly to build, maintain and police. The best the wall can do is slow down attacks. As long as Al-Shabab continues to run footloose, a country like Kenya must brace itself for more mass murders.
