Air strikes can make everyone, except of course the targets on the ground, feel good. Ghostly green video footage taken from a war plane as it moves into position, locks onto a target and unleashes a missile or smart bomb, makes for outstanding viewing for Americans sitting in front of their TV sets back home. The accompanying scratchy audio of laconic voices, speaking in often impenetrable military shorthand, adds to the sense of drama. There in the crosshairs is a building or a moving vehicle, then seconds later it disappears in an explosive cloud. With accuracy like that directing weapons of such awesome power, the US aerial assault on the so-called Islamic State may appear to be the overdue answer to the terrorist assaults. Doubters are warning, however, that the combined might of the airpower of the US and other NATO countries in Afghanistan did not degrade the Taliban. But the situation in Iraq, not least in terms of the terrain, is very different. There are none of the mountain ranges and deep valleys in which the enemy can move and which provide cover during attacks. Much of the ground overrun by IS in central Iraq is monotonously flat. After the terrorists and their Sunni tribal allies swept the Iraqi army aside like chaff in the first aggressive advance right across the country, it seemed that their boast that they would soon take Baghdad, was all too likely. However, after the capture of Saddam Hussein's hometown Tikrit, the IS advance paused, apparently regrouping for the attack on the capital. In fact it is now clear that there was more to this halt. IS commanders discovered that they had outrun their supply lines stretching back some four or five hundred kilometers to their bases across the border in Syria. Establishing forward supply points to shorten the logistical links was a prime necessity. This has probably now been achieved but, in US military jargon, in doing so, IS has created a “target-rich environment”. The terrorists are now going to find themselves in the same position as Gaddafi's forces when NATO war planes flew to the support of Libyan rebels. In relatively rapid succession, once Libya's air force and air defenses had been destroyed - not a consideration with IS - Gaddafi's tanks, artillery and weapons dumps were hit. Convoys seeking to resupply his front line positions were destroyed, leaving his men hungry, and low on both ammunition and morale. It remained up to the Libyan revolutionaries, as it is now up to the Iraqi army and Shia militias, to take advantage of the enemy's weakness and actually advance into their territory. There are, however, two crucial caveats to the coming waves of US airstrikes. The first is that they must not hit civilians in crowded Sunni communities in which IS has undoubtedly set up supply bases. There ought to be enough opportunities to interdict men and supplies passing through largely uninhabited country. The second is that Iraq's new premier Haider Al-Abadi must rein in Shia militias who, as they take back territory, will very probably want to exact revenge on Sunni communities. There must be no repeat of the IS savagery. Iraq's future depends on the way Sunnis currently within IS control are treated. And Washington must not lose sight of this danger. These air strikes are not just about doing maximum damage to terrorists; they are also about giving Iraq a second chance to rebuild itself.
