It has been estimated that at least 6,000 people died in Syria in March, making it the bloodiest month since the conflict broke out two years ago. Indeed this terrible figure, put together from verified sources by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), is very unlikely to be the full number. In the whole course of the fighting, SOHR has so far recorded 62,554 deaths but the real death count is, it fears, more likely to be nearer 120,000. The United Nations meanwhile has been working on an estimate of 70,000 dead, which it will shortly be revising upwards. What is interesting about the SOHR research is that it is the only study that breaks down the figures into rebel, civilian and government casualties. Thus the March butcher's bill contains a significant insight: There were 1,486 killed on the rebel side while 1,164 government troops perished in fighting during the month. This means that blow for blow, Assad's army is now taking almost as many losses as the rebels and the figure is likely to continue to trend upwards, as the rebels become stronger and the regime weaker. The problem for Syrian commanders is that their armed forces are built on rigid unit structures for which recruits require detailed training and a proper sense of obedience and discipline. Not for nothing do armies around the world drill newly enlisted men hard in order to inculcate the right attitude that will permit the military machine to work efficiently. Assad's armies no longer have the time to train new intakes in this manner. As the regime rushes to fill the places of the fallen and injured, (of whom there are generally significantly more than the dead), its instructors are having to abandon the tried and tested methods and are pushing raw recruits out onto the battlefield with the minimum of training. This means that the military machine can no longer function effectively. Moreover, it is likely that a greater burden, in terms of combat, is being placed on veteran units which have been engaged since the start of the rebellion and are now probably close to exhaustion. By contrast the rebels are only becoming stronger. And since they began their fight with minimal military experience and, tragically, on occasion, all too little discipline, they have evolved their operations and tactics without the structures and operating procedures that are essential to a formally-constituted army. This education in the art of war has been earned at the cost of many needlessly wasted lives. However, grim determination and seething anger has carried the Free Syria Army to its rising string of victories. Whatever else its fighters may have lacked, their morale has always been high. By contrast, the regime's forces, even the bestial Shabbiha militias, are now seeing their power to crush and dominate and to intimidate and massacre slipping away from them. For the Syrian armed forces this declining morale together with poor training and discipline among thousands of new and probably mostly reluctant recruits represents a considerable danger. Assad's generals may have become used to seeing defections to the rebels, but now they face the prospect of entire badly-trained units throwing down their arms and fleeing in the face of the rebels. When this starts to happen, the game will be up for Assad and his brutal regime.
