THE US promise to send food and medical supplies — but not weapons — to Syrian rebels in the first such move since the conflict began two years ago is a half-hearted measure that will likely lead to an opposition that is harder to defeat but still lacking the strength to win the war. The Syrian opposition has become increasingly frustrated with the support, or lack of it, that it is getting. It wants arms, especially sophisticated anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems that it believes would even up the playing field on the ground. But the problem is that there are no simple answers in the arming debate. More weapons may even up the contest but equally could increase bloodshed in the long term. Arming the rebels is risky, especially if the weapons go to Jihadists, the last group in the world one would imagine the US administration would want to give arms to. The US has refrained from arming the rebels in part because of concerns the weapons could eventually fall into the hands of Islamist militants who might attack US interests. In the end, though, some sort of extremists will obtain the weapons, and the US would like to ensure that they go, not to bad Jihadists, but to the good ones, if there is such a category. There is also the real danger that aid to the opposition will only encourage further violence rather than a negotiated solution, and will directly encourage extremists to attempt a violent seizure of power. On the plus side, the aid could hem in radical groups vying for influence in Syria after the fall of Bashar Al-Assad. If the opposition coalition cannot improve the lives of Syrians in those places that have been freed, then extremists will step in and do it. Supplying aid will also boost American influence in any post-Assad Syria. Not giving the opposition weapons reinforces President Obama's refusal to arm it and the rejection of military intervention. But the US administration knows full well that what it has done so far has not worked. The Syrian conflict has claimed more than 60,000 lives, laid waste to large portions of the country and created an enormous humanitarian crisis as refugees flee the fighting. The war is taking longer than anyone expected. The longer it lasts, the more Syria is radicalized and the region is destabilized. The most convincing argument for more direct intervention has been that as perilous as intervention appears today, it will get more dangerous if there is no involvement at all. So assistance could presage greater involvement in the effort to oust Al-Assad precisely because there's so little prospect of a political settlement. Al-Assad and the pillars of his regime will never accept a political solution that will require their departure and perhaps later prosecution. The opposition, meanwhile, will never accept a solution that allows Al-Assad and his regime to stay in power. In practical terms, only one of two solutions is possible: Either the Security Council passes a binding resolution on all sides that results in regime change, or the West decides to arm the opposition in order to overthrow the regime. Until one or the other of these scenarios is chosen, the balance of power will teeter between the regime and the opposition and the conflict will become more violent, and more innocent Syrians will die.
