Russia's support for Bashar Al-Assad's murderous Syrian regime was unequivocal until the start of this year when a senior foreign ministry figure in Moscow admitted for the first time that it was possible that Assad might be forced from power. Now, it would appear, the Russians are starting to put out feelers toward the Syrian opposition. Last Saturday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met Syrian National Council leader Moaz Al-Khatib in the corridors of a security conference in Munich. International commentators said that they were encouraged by reports that Lavrov had invited Khatib to Moscow for further talks. They spoke of opening up new channels between the two sides, although no one was predicting that there was anything like an imminent breakthrough toward peace. There is, however, almost certainly far more to the Lavrov invitation than a simple feeler for a negotiated peace. The Russians are perfectly well aware that it is far too late for them to save face and more particularly their own warm-water naval base at Tartus. The minute that Assad goes, whether through the final military triumph of the Free Syrian Army or through a deal that will see the dictator scuttling away into exile in Moscow, they know that they are finished in Syria for years to come. The one serious contribution that the Kremlin could make to allowing Assad to continue to cling to power would be to undermine the cohesion of the Syrian opposition. This is far from a difficult task. Indeed it could be argued that despite the agreement among disparate opposition groupings hammered out over days in Doha at the turn of the year, there is still not yet a united political platform. This was clearly demonstrated by the reaction to the news that Khatib had even looked in the Russian foreign minister's direction, let alone talked to him long enough to be issued an invitation to go to Moscow to talk some more. Senior members within the Syrian opposition are furious. There is talk of seeking to replace Khatib. And this of course is precisely the reaction for which the Kremlin was probably hoping. By offering to talk about peace, the Russians are almost guaranteeing that the political leaders of the opposition will fall out seriously. If the hard-won Doha deal collapses, then Khatib will possibly be ousted. Thus once again, all those who are intent on driving Assad from power will be speaking with many and contradictory voices. It can be no coincidence that at almost the same time that Lavrov put out his sugar-coated pill in Munich to lure Khatib to Moscow, Assad resumed his proposals for “concrete talks” with the opposition. From the outset, the Syrian dictator has wriggled out of all negotiations on the grounds that opposition leaders were incapable of unity. Therefore there was no one to whom his regime could talk. After the Doha accord between Syria's bickering opposition leaders, it seemed as if Assad's bluff was about to be called. It is certainly true that Khatib has shown signs of providing a unifying leadership. The fragile respect he has earned may have been fatally damaged, thanks to the meeting with Lavrov in Germany and the invitation to go on to Moscow. The Kremlin no doubt considers the encounter a diplomatic masterstroke. Given the rising protests within the deeply fractured opposition, it seems unfortunately that it may be right.
