THE Turkish authorities are talking to the imprisoned Kurdish guerrilla leader Abdullah Ocalan who is serving a life sentence for treason. The aim is to have Ocalan convince the PKK rebels to disarm. It is a forlorn hope. In the summer of 2010 at Ocalan's bidding, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire. Though extended at the Kurdish leader's behest until after the June 2011 elections, the fighting resumed later in the year and reached a new level of intensity in 2012. For younger PKK leaders, the political agenda is changing and they no longer see a role for their captured head. They are increasingly inspired by the effective autonomy of Iraqi Kurds, their main source of arms and refuge from pursuit by the Turkish army, as well as by the increasing independence of Syria's Kurdish minority as a result of the uprising against the Assad dictatorship. Some see the chance for the creation of a single Kurdish state carved out of Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Thus any accommodation with Ankara would be counterproductive unless it served some short-term negotiating interest. Any break up of the Turkish state is of course anathema to most Turks. The moderate Islamic government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan was the first administration to roll back laws that proscribed the use of the Kurdish language. It encouraged the participation of Kurds in the political process. As a result there has been something of a cultural revival among Turkish Kurds, who by some estimates make up 20 percent of the population with a large concentration in Istanbul comprising in part those Kurds who have fled the fighting in the east of the country. However, it should not it be said that there is widespread support among Kurds for the PKK rebellion. Many communities in the war-torn east support the Turkish government and as a result have been targeted by the PKK. Nevertheless, Turkish nationalists, not least within the military, see Erdogan's moves to integrate Kurds as little more than appeasement. There is also frustration among military commanders that they have been unable to defeat the PKK, despite raids across the border into Iraq and a high death toll among the rebels who are branded by much of the international community as terrorists. The dilemma for Erdogan is that his policy of extending the hand of peace and reconciliation has not yet worked. The dilemma for the military is that with their traditional role as keepers of the Kemalist political inheritance circumscribed by Erdogan's adroit political and legal maneuvers (162 officers and former officers have been jailed for planning a coup), their failure to crush the PKK is a further humiliation. There remain dark ultra-nationalist groupings within the country who want Erdogan's efforts to bring about an inclusive and peaceful Turkey to collapse completely. That the government has turned again to Ocalan in the hope that he still has sufficient influence over the PKK to order them to disarm seems at first glance to be a sign of desperation. Many in the PKK think that they now hold the initiative. To quit fighting would be tantamount to surrender. Erdogan will have to do something with more impact. Could the release of Ocalan on a promise that he will pursue radical Kurdish demands through the political process alone be the next step?
