HOWEVER one looks at it, it is hard to feel optimistic about Afghanistan's future. NATO forces are preparing to withdraw by 2014. Alongside their military actions against the Taliban, they are launching a major publicity assault, the principle message of which is that, by the time the last foreign combat soldier leaves Afghan soil, local police and army will be fully prepared to take on the security role. This campaign to convince a doubting world that NATO's operations over the last 11 years, since the ouster of the Taliban regime and their Al-Qaeda terrorist guests, have been a resounding success, seems as doomed to failure as the actual fight against the Talibs. Afghans may reflect that at least under the Taliban, after 22 years of conflict, they enjoyed a period of relative peace and stability, albeit that for many citizens, their rulers' strict and uncompromising policies were unacceptable. It may well be that when Afghanistan is once again left to the Afghans, that accommodations will be made and that some, but not all of the current fighting will stop. It is certain that among the Taliban ranks are Afghans for whom the presence of foreign troops is an outrage that must be ended. Once the NATO soldiers have gone, so too will the reason for their further assault on the Karzai regime. However, a hardcore of insurgents with their Al-Qaeda allies looks set to continue the fight. Thus it may be a considerable time before peace and stability return to this riven and ethnically-diverse country. The bloody chaos into which Afghanistan has been tipped, is in large measure because of George W. Bush and his determination to complete his daddy's unfinished business with Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. In the wake of the 9/11 slaughter, the overthrow of the Taliban and the terrorist bases they harbored, was inevitable and generally welcome around the world. If only international attention had continued to be focused exclusively on the rebuilding of the shattered Afghan economy and its infrastructure, the picture today might have been so very different. The first international donor conference held in December 2001 pledged billions to help the country recover. Had that money and those projects been implemented quickly, even at the risk of local corruption, then a bigger difference could have been made more quickly. But donors held back, often for ‘logistical reasons'. Then the almost two-year window of peaceful opportunity started to close, as the Taliban began to strike back. Suddenly donor projects could not go ahead, because of the ‘security situation'. In years to come, history will undoubtedly show that George Bush became so entangled in his disastrous Iraqi adventure that the US military had not the time, nor the opportunity, nor indeed the resources, to complete the defeat of the Taliban. The White House thus laid the groundwork for the continuation of Afghanistan's agony. And perhaps the most stupid act was Bush's refusal to back the Taliban being part of the rebuilding process from the very beginning. When the last US combat soldier leaves, Afghans will continue to pay in blood, the price for this ignorant presidential decision.
