Saudi Gazette Pakistan's uneasy relationship with India explains its acquisition of nuclear weapons. Initially Pakistan seemed to have been seeking only civilian nuclear capabilities. Its civilian nuclear program began with participation in the US Atoms for Peace initiative. In 1955, the Pakistani government formed a 12-member Atomic Energy Committee to advise the government on the peaceful uses of atomic energy and signed an agreement on nuclear cooperation with the United States, under which Pakistan was offered $350,000 in aid to procure a pool type reactor. Civil Nuclear In Pakistan, nuclear power makes a small contribution to total energy production and requirements, supplying less than 4 percent of the country's electricity overall demand. Total generating capacity is 20 GWe; in 2006, 98 billion kWh gross was produced, 37 percent of it from gas, 29 percent from oil. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) is responsible for all nuclear energy and research applications in the country. Its first nuclear power reactor is a small 137 MWe (125 MWe net) Canadian pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) which started up in 1971 and which is under international safeguards – KANUPP near Karachi, which is operated at reduced power. In 2005 an Energy Security Plan was adopted by the government, calling for a huge increase in generating capacity to more than 160,000 MWe by 2030. It included intention of lifting nuclear capacity to 8800 MWe; 900 MWe of this by 2015 and a further 1500 MWe by 2020. In June 2008 the government announced plans to build units 3 and 4 at Chashma, each 320 MWe gross and largely financed by China. A further agreement for China's help with the project was signed in October 2008, and given prominence as a counter to the US-India agreement shortly preceding it. In August 2011 it was reported that Pakistan aimed for 8000 MWe nuclear at 10 sites by 2030. Military Nuclear As the relationship with India deteriorated, however, a clandestine nuclear weapons program was launched to offset the country's conventional inferiority against India and to earn it the “prestige” of being the first Muslim nation acquire the atomic bomb. A turning point in Pakistani decision-making was the 1965 war with India, which showed the disparity between the two countries' military capabilities and endangered, as was perceived then, Pakistan's security alliances with the West. India's first nuclear test in 1974 strengthened Pakistan's determination to acquire its own nuclear arsenal. Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regarded India's nuclear program as a vehicle for intimidating Pakistan and establishing “hegemony in the subcontinent.” He vowed that Pakistanis would “eat grass” to keep up with India. In September 1974, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) predicted that Pakistan would require at least 10 years to develop a nuclear weapon. The same month, in a somewhat befuddling move, the head of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Dr. Munir Ahmad Khan, in his address at the IAEA conference, said that Pakistan would ask the United Nations General Assembly to declare the South Asian subcontinent to be a nuclear weapon-free zone. Two months later, the UN General Assembly approved the Pakistani proposal by a vote of 82-2, with India and Bhutan voting against it. The Pakistani nuclear program received a boost in 1975 when Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a German-trained metallurgist, returned to his home country with centrifuge designs taken from his former employer, a contractor at the European URENCO enrichment consortium ; Khan used the knowledge acquired in the West to develop a large, unsafeguarded centrifuge plant at Kahuta, which infused new energy into the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. In 1979, alarmed by Pakistan's nuclear ambiguity and quick technological progress, the United States stopped its military and economic aid to Pakistan. Only three years later, the embargo on aid was lifted, however, as Pakistan remained US staunchest ally against communism in the region. In 1985, in a second attempt to slow down Pakistan's nuclear development, the US Congress passed the Pressler Amendment, prohibiting all US foreign aid to Pakistan until the state proved that it possessed no nuclear explosive devices. Instead, in a 1987 interview with an Indian journalist, A.Q. Khan shocked the international community by admitting that Pakistan had the ability to produce nuclear weapons. His honesty was confirmed in 1990 as the United States concluded that with China's nuclear-related materials, scientific expertise, and technical assistance, Islamabad had acquired the capability to assemble a first-generation nuclear device. As a result, in 1990 US economic and military aid was cut off and sanctions were enacted to deter the country from developing nuclear weapons. Despite sanctions and international disapproval, only two weeks after India again tested nuclear devices in May 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced that Pakistan had successfully conducted five nuclear tests and later declared that whether the country was “recognized as a nuclear weapons power or not” it was, in fact, a nuclear power.” Under military supervision, the scientists working on the nuclear program were allowed great latitude. Unfortunately, nonproliferation concerns hardly ever stopped members of the Pakistani nuclear team from making a profit. Reports of a Pakistan-Libya nuclear connection appeared as early as 1979, and it was later discovered that in 1974 the two states had signed a 10-year nuclear agreement. The nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran was signed in 1986, and in 1988, reports of Pakistanis helping Iran with nuclear enrichment technology emerged. Pakistani nuclear scientists were also alleged to have met with Al-Qaeda, and to have offered assistance with building nuclear centrifuges to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The puzzle was finally put together when A.Q. Khan admitted in February 2004 on Pakistani television that he had set up a proliferation network supplying nuclear materials, knowledge, and technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. The scientist took full responsibility for the transfers, of which Pakistan's government denied any knowledge. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is estimated to contain approximately 60 warheads. The country continues fissile material production and is adding to its weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles “even while racked by insurgency.” Having initially chosen the uranium enrichment route, in 1998 Pakistan began producing plutonium for more advanced nuclear weapons. Its Khushab research reactor is now capable of yielding 10-15-kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually – enough for 2-3 nuclear weapons, assuming five kilograms of plutonium per nuclear weapon. A second plutonium production plant at New Labs, Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology and a third plutonium production reactor are being constructed. In the aftermath of the US-India civil nuclear agreement, China agreed to build two nuclear power plants in Pakistan. However, in the first half of 2009 the country's nuclear program underwent major financial cuts as a result of global economic crisis. Islamabad's nuclear doctrine is centered on a minimum deterrent and primarily aimed at deterring a conventional Indian attack. Pakistan is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nor the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and is opposed to the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). However, Pakistan joined some multilateral nonproliferation and anti-terrorism efforts such as the Global Initiative on Combating Nuclear Terrorism and the US Secure Freight Initiative. Pakistan frequently links its position on nuclear disarmament as well as its accession to the NPT and the CTBT to that of India. It has been highly critical of the Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement. However, Pakistan itself pursued a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States as well as the eventual exemption from Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) regulations (along the lines of India's exemption in 2008). Islamabad's overtures were turned down by Washington. The National Command Authority (NCA), headed by the President of Pakistan, is the main nuclear decision-making body in the country. Additionally, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) controls the country's nuclear weapons and facilities, acting as the secretariat of the NCA. In recent years, Pakistan has sought to strengthen export control of sensitive nuclear technologies and to improve nuclear safety by passing the 2004 Export Control Act, establishing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV), and adopting measures to strengthen physical security of nuclear weapons and installations. Washington has also provided various levels of assistance to secure Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Since Sept. 2001, the Bush administration has spent almost $100 million on a highly classified program to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal, according to a Nov. 2007 New York Times report. __
