proclaimed IS) is losing the last of its territory. Iraqi forces are on the brink of victory in Mosul. In Benghazi the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Hafter is closing in on Sabri the last part of the country's second city still held by Daesh and its allies. The Daesh "capital" in the Syrian city of Raqqa is coming under increasing pressure. No longer able to move by day, the terrorists are still attacking by night and efforts to disguise their movements generally fail. Reinforcements and weapons and supplies can only be sent with the greatest difficulty, if they can now be sent at all. So much for the so-called caliphate of Abu Bakr Baghdadi. But as victories on the battlefield edge toward complete annihilation of the terrorists' field forces, so the struggle will move to a far more difficult and challenging phase. The men of violence will slink back into the shadows and renew their forlorn struggle with classic hit and run terrorist tactics. Baghdadi made his killers targets by seeking to conquer and hold territory. But for all their boasting and the degrading and brutal manner in which they treated the populations of the towns and villages they captured, there was only ever one outcome to their tactic. Despite their IEDs and their fanatical resistance, they were always doomed to defeat, though it has cost many good lives to bring this about. The question now is how well the world is prepared for Daesh in the shadows. Of equal importance is how well the terrorist leaders have themselves prepared for life on the run. Have they organized weapons and explosives dumps? Have they already planted sleeper cells? Have they established what they hope are secure communications networks? It is worth remembering that this last is one of the weakest points for terrorism networks. Here in the Kingdom, Al-Qaeda cells were unmasked thanks in fair measure to communications intercepts. Osama Bin Laden appreciated the risks so relied largely on physical runners to bring him information and carry away his orders. But even this network was penetrated and the terror leader's downfall was triggered when one of his messengers was followed to his Pakistani hide-out in Abbottabad. Then there is the issue of finance. Terrorist funds are becoming increasingly hard to move around within the banking system. There are automated systems to flag up suspicious transactions. Moving suit-loads of cash around the world is hardly an option with airport security already so tight. Not only that, on at least one occasion, in Iraq, a courier decided that his greed was greater than his allegiance to Daesh and made off with a substantial quantity of banknotes. The Kingdom's already respected counter-terrorism expertise will become of even greater importance once the battle to destroy Daesh moves off the formal battlefield. Just as the terrorists never had a chance of prevailing against a resolute and infinitely better-armed international community, so they are sure to lose their war in shadows. But the individual defeats they will suffer will not appear catastrophic while they will claim each new terror bombing and slaughter as a victory. The truth however is that these ruthless and fanatical bigots cannot win, but in the course of being defeated they will inevitably cause great heartache.
