I was discussing with a group of friends the possibility of applying the secular Turkish experience to the Arab Spring. Almost all of us admire Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his party for their political and economic development plans. But one friend was angry over our sentiment and commented, “I don't like this country: Turkey.” Asked why, he answered: “It has a long and strong strategic alliance with Israel”. The answer provoked me. There has been a widespread belief that bilateral relationships and mutual interests between the Arab world and Israel do not have the support of their people. I suddenly found myself asking: Is that true? The Arab people have recognized the strategic and military relationship between Turkey and Israel. Despite this, Erdogan gets admiration and respect on the streets of Arab countries. During the Gaza massacre, he strongly denounced the Israeli aggression in the Gaza Strip. He traveled from one Arab capital to another in a bid to put an end to a terrible humanitarian crisis. In Davos, he faced Shimon Perez's arguments with dignity and with the full intention of protecting the interests of his country and preserving Turkey's regional role. The position of some Arab leaders was exactly the opposite. They took their position away from the real field of battle; they busied themselves justifying their efforts to protect their national security by silencing the voices of their own people and engaged in verbal attacks that fragmented their societies. Arab leaders were not interested in calling for summits or attending one and instead only devoted their efforts to discussing the Gaza crisis and ways to end the massacres when they knew that Israel was about to finish its bloody task. There have been trade agreements between some Arab countries and Israel. Deals on natural gas, textiles, tourism and cement have been expanding and diversifying. Most of the time, we do not feel that there has been firm opposition among the Arab people or much concern about the number and volume of such trade. True, there was some sort of anger when Egypt resumed its gas supplies to Israel after the fall of Mubarak's regime, but the issue was of less importance than the Egyptian revolt and domestic issues for government reforms. The Arab people were provoked by their governments' inability to act properly and not for their penchant to cooperate with Israel and preserve mutual interests. They were more interested in the dignity which Turkey has acquired for its courageous and skillful maneuvers. That brings us to two questions: Can the growing number of people discussing Turkish-Israeli relations reduce the Arab people's respect and admiration for Erdogan? Can limited or non-existent relationships between Arab countries and Israel increase the respect for Arabs and admiration for their rulers? I believe the answer is “no” to both questions. I argue that the ties between Arab countries and Israel are not the main reason for Arab anger, dissatisfaction and revolt — and probably never have been. The satisfaction of the Turkish people with their country's ruling party, which led the country to achieving one of the world's highest GDP growth rates last year (8.6 percent), strengthened the democratic experience in the country, while the disappointment and frustration of Tunisians, Egyptians and Libyans with their former rulers moved them to dismantle the dictatorial regimes. This is the reason why most Arabs admire the Turkish experience. They saw how a political party can use its Islamic values to set up a prosperous economy in comparison to Islamists in other countries who consumed their time and efforts to magnify tangential issues like sex segregation and the way women dress. Arab revolts are not likely to come again from the forces of religious extremism, ignorance and intolerance. Arab people now see in the Turkish experience a successful model that can attain economic growth and preserve political integrity at the same time. In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, “moderate” Islamists who are taking over will serve as a tough test. The people may accept their “ratification” of some secular policies which Turkey has implemented, but they will never accept justification for a lower standard of performance than what Turkey has achieved. __
