In April, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi sat at a conference table in his Baghdad office with almost two dozen men in combat fatigues. The men were not officers in the Iraqi Army, but representatives of the Shiite paramilitary groups that have led the fight against Daesh (the so-called IS). Hadi Al-Amiri, one of the most senior militia leaders, delivered a long and forceful monologue on his fighters' recent victories. Abadi, in a blazer and tie, listened, occasionally jotting down notes, a video of the meeting shows. A few minutes later, Abadi himself praised the fighters. The event was a sign of the delicate power balance in Iraq. Abadi, a Shiite, came to office just over a year ago backed by both the United States and Iran. He promised to rebuild the fragmented country he inherited from his predecessor, Nouri Al-Maliki, who was widely accused of fueling sectarian divisions. Since then, though, even more power has shifted from the government to the militia leaders. Those leaders are friendly with Abadi. But the most influential describe themselves as loyal not only to Iraq but also to Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Three big militias — Amiri's Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah — use the Iranian Shiite cleric's image on either their posters or websites. Badr officials describe their relationship with Iran as good for Iraq's national interests. Initially, Abadi had little choice but to lean on the Shiite paramilitary forces. They grew in power after Daesh captured large parts of northern Iraq in June last year and Iraq's top Shiite cleric, Ali Al-Sistani, called for volunteers to fight the militia, which soon declared a caliphate straddling the border with neighboring Syria. As the Shiite militias' popularity surged, Abadi publicly lamented the lack of Western support. He made plain his desperate desire for help earlier this month after Iran and Russia opened offensives against the group in Syria. The prime minister said he would welcome Russian airstrikes in Iraq as well. Abadi is looking not just to hurt Daesh but to bolster his own position in Iraq. Over the past few months he has attempted to impose his authority on the militia commanders and their political allies, and remind Iraqis he is the country's legitimate leader. That is stoking tensions around who controls Iraq. Abadi's resources remain limited. Iraq's regular military has not recovered from last year's defeat by Daesh. Most young Iraqi Shiites now prefer to join the paramilitary groups, which are seen as braver and less corrupt. One army division is now under informal militia command, according to US and other Western military officers. Shi'ite paramilitary elements have taken at least partial control of the Interior Ministry, according to security officers, Iraqi politicians and US military officials. The Iraqi government rejects that claim. The Shiite militias, which dominate most frontlines, say they support the government and pose no threat to Iraq's minority Sunni sect. The Popular Mobilization Committee, or Hashid Shaabi, as the militias are collectively known, belongs "to the Iraqi government," said Naim Al-Aboudi, a spokesman for the Asaib Ahl Al-Haq militia. "The Hashid doesn't represent a sect. It represents all Iraqis." But the militias make no secret of their independence from Baghdad. Militia leader Amiri warned in a televised interview last month that if the Shiite groups did not approve of US military operations in Iraq, "We can go to Abadi and the government and ... pressure them: ‘Either you will do this, or we will do that.'" Amiri did not specify what action his group would take. A senior Iraqi government official close to the prime minister said the militias operate independently. He said their objectives only sometimes align with Abadi's: They concentrate on defending areas that are strategically important for their sect. "If they are not paid by the prime minister," this official said, "they can do what they want." Abadi came to power in September 2014, promising to heal the Sunni-Shiite rift and end graft. But those early ambitions soon ran out of steam. After public protests broke out in late July over electricity and water supply problems, he launched a new anti-corruption campaign. He also said he would prune his government, cutting his three deputy prime ministers and the three vice presidents, one of whom is his predecessor Al-Maliki. Amiri and fellow militia leader Abu Mehdi Mohandis, a close ally of Iran's Revolutionary Guards, have warned that the outcry for reform threatens Iraq's democracy. The prime minister's three deputies have defied him, questioning the legality of his decisions. Whose army? Abadi took office facing many challenges. He inherited a military that had all but collapsed. Three months before he became prime minister, Daesh overran the army in Mosul, the largest city in the north. At its height, the militant group, which has used rape as a weapon of terror and executed Iraqi Shiites and Christians, controlled nearly a third of Iraq. Abadi also faced a budget crunch because of his predecessor's heavy spending and the plummeting oil price. His backers lamented that a decent man, with little leadership experience, had been dealt an impossible hand. Early on, Abadi struggled to work out what was left of the army and federal police. "There wasn't really a good picture of how many soldiers, how many police he really had, and who the hell is really on the rolls," said Lt. Ge. Mick Bednarek, the senior US military officer in Iraq from 2013 until July. Bednarek said Abadi and his defense minister worked hard on the issue and by November last year recognized the military was "ill prepared and lacking in leadership." Abadi announced he had identified 50,000 "ghost soldiers" — fighters who don't exist but whose salaries are collected — and scrapped their positions. Critics believe there are many more ghost soldiers. Abadi also turned to the militias for support. "He doesn't like it," said Bednarek, who retired in late August. "But he has to, because Iraqi security forces can't do it alone." The Hashid Shaabi now commands more than 100,000 fighters. On paper, it receives over $1 billion from Iraq's state budget. Two Iraqi officials said the militias get additional funding from other sources, including Iran, religious clerics and political figures, but declined to give details. US military officials believe large amounts of funding come from Iran. Aboudi, the spokesman for the Asaib Ahl Al-Haq militia, and Muen Al-Kadhimi, a senior Badr official, said Iran provided money to Shiite armed groups before 2011. They said the payments stopped because of Iran's economic troubles and the withdrawal of US soldiers from Iraq. Kadhimi said Iran still sends advisers and weapons to the militias via the Iraqi government. But Baghdad pays for all such equipment, he said. Iraqi security officers, politicians and US and Western military officers say the Interior Ministry has become another militia domain. The ministry came under the influence of Shiite militias previously, in 2005, and was accused of running death squads. Today it is run by Mohammed Ghabban, a senior member of the Badr militia. Badr fighters fought alongside Iranian soldiers in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. Ghabban once worked as an aide to Badr chief Amiri. One security officer in the Interior Ministry estimated that more than 70 percent of those working there are now loyal to militias — in particular Badr. The ministry also trains paramilitary fighters, the first security officer said, including special operations forces. The Interior Ministry does not inform Abadi of all its activities and won't account for all the men on its rosters, according to a senior Iraqi government official. Abadi spokesman Saad Hadithi said that rogue officers, loyal to different parties, had been working inside both the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry. But he said Abadi has started firing them. "Some sides are trying to exploit this situation in order to achieve some political privileges, and we are confronting those people," said Hadithi. The Interior Ministry declined to comment on that for this story. As Daesh's bloody campaign grinds on, the Iraqi state is struggling to regulate the militias' response. On Aug. 10, a Daesh suicide bomber attacked a Shiite wedding party in the eastern city of Baquba, killing 58. Shiite militia fighters responded by killing local Sunnis and dumping 25 or more bodies in the city's river, according to local officials. In Tikrit, where thousands of residents returned after the defeat of Daesh in April, people say they now live in fear of militias. Kidnappings and robberies by men in security uniforms have also risen in Baghdad. Alarmed, Abadi addressed the issue at a gathering of police, warning "there was a challenge against the state." "These groups don't represent the security forces, nor the Hashid," he said. "They are outlaws and we must fight them." — Reuters
