ReutersEITHER Iran could build a nuclear bomb in a matter of months or it is unlikely to get such a weapon any time soon — depending on which Western expert you talk to. The differing estimates show the difficulty in trying to assess how long it could take Iran to convert its growing uranium stockpile into weapons-grade material and how advanced it may be in other areas vital for any bomb bid. The answers to those questions could determine the major powers' room for maneuvre in trying to find a diplomatic solution to a dispute over Iran's nuclear ambitions which has the potential to spark a wider conflict in the Middle East. Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. Western-based analysts generally agree with their governments that Tehran is developing technology that could be used to make a bomb, but they disagree about just how close it is to success. US defense analyst Greg Jones gave one of the more urgent warnings this month, arguing that if Iran decides to make a bomb it could produce enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in about eight weeks. “The timeframe will shrink to only about four weeks by the end of next year as Iran's enriched uranium stockpiles and enrichment capacity continue to increase,” Jones, of the conservative Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, said. Iran “needs to be treated as a de facto nuclear power simply by virtue of being so close to having a weapon,” he added in an article in US political magazine New Republic. Other experts say such estimates are unrealistic, given the hurdles Iran must still overcome. “I think that we tend to overstate sometimes how close Iran is to being able to develop a nuclear weapon,” said senior researcher Shannon Kile at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a think-tank based in the Swedish capital. “I just don't see how you can credibly say they are going to be eight weeks away or even 18 months away.” Jones is not the only expert to suggest that Iran may be very close to producing the refined uranium material necessary for a weapon, should it decide to do so. But another Washington-based think-tank, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), said Jones's calculation method was “unreliable” and a breakout in such a short time at Iran's Natanz enrichment site was not realistic. __
