Pakistan's former diplomat One relationship where the potential for good that could be unlocked but has not been is between Pakistan and India where 20 percent of humanity resides uneasily in a nuclear weapons environment. The two foreign ministers will meet next month in New Delhi. Can progress toward better and more stable relations be expected by the peoples of both countries? The recently concluded June 23-24 Foreign Secretary talks and its precursors with their mixed bag of results gives limited grounds for optimism. The main stumbling block comes from the parameters that India's nationalistic and ambitious policymakers have circumscribed their attitude toward Pakistan. Having precipitated partition in 1947, earlier than the orderly transition wanted by the Muslims, in order to weaken the new state, and succeeded in 1971 in dismembering Pakistan, India's objective is to manage its nuclear neighbor, to make it compliant to Indian regional and international interests. The path of friendship, requiring large-heartedness and concessions leading to reciprocal concessions has not been on the Indian agenda beyond the well-meaning political statements of its prime minister who is widely respected in Pakistan. Talks on the Siachin glacier dispute, the Sir Creek sea boundary and between the Commerce and Interior Secretaries preceded the Foreign Secretary talks. On Siachin, despite a near agreement in 1989-92 to disengage from this highest flash point in the world, India, spurred by its military, has insisted on authentication of its existing position despite compromises offered by Pakistan. In the latest round if anything the Indian position became more aggressive, insisting that the entire boundary northwards left undemarcated on the ground by the Karachi ceasefire agreement of 1949 be demarcated before any disengagement be considered. The Indian Air Chief publicly stated that as India had the strategic advantage of the high ground there was no need to resolve this issue despite the unnecessary cost in lives and logistics. Talks on the Sir Creek sea boundary were equally fruitless. India suggested that the maritime boundary be agreed to with the horizontal and vertical lines which would define the extended economic sea zone to follow. As these two issues were closest for resolution, it was an inauspicious backdrop for the Foreign Secretaries talks . However, the Commerce and Interior Secretaries talks showed noteworthy forward movement. Pakistan signaled a willingness to give MFN status to India. The Pakistan Interior Secretary made a detailed presentation on the investigation and judicial process concerning suspects under trial for the Mumbai attack. India agreed in principle to permit a three-person judicial commission to come to India to move the process forward. Both sides entered the Foreign Secretary talks with limited expectations given resumption after a post-Mumbai two-and-a-half-year hiatus. India's assessment was that Pakistan had been weakened by political instability, economic difficulties, expanding threats from terrorists, continued spillover from Afghanistan and sustained pressure from America on Pakistan's armed forces and intelligence services the bulwark of its defense. The Pakistan objective was to keep India engaged, to soften the edge in the relationship and to reduce Indian pressure on various fronts including through India's traditional reliance on using Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan. While little of substance emerged, the main achievement was to give direction to a resumed process of multidimensional engagement. In the key peace and security segment the core dispute of Kashmir which continues to divide the two countries was raised without substantive discussion on avenues for its resolution. The separate experts groups on nuclear and conventional CBMs were reconstituted with a mandate to discuss implementation and strengthening of existing arrangements and to consider additional mutually acceptable measures to build trust and confidence and promote peace and security. Pakistan's suggestion that in the post-Fukushima disaster period, it would be useful to discuss nuclear safety issues, was turned down by India ostensibly on the grounds that this would be best addressed in the context of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, but probably because India feels that in the nuclear field it was playing in a bigger league. The inclination of India to delink itself in the nuclear field is indicative of a myopic approach toward strategic stability and restraint which should be prime motivating factors for both countries. In the conventional CBMs field which holds little interest for India with its expanding armed forces, the few Indian suggestions to exchange military bands and visits by the heads of the Defense Universities and Maritime/Coast Guards commanders had no substance or attraction for the Pakistani side. On terrorism India stressed that bringing the Mumbai accused to justice would be the biggest CBM. Pakistan responded that fighting terrorism was a priority for both countries on which they should cooperate. On inter-Kashmiri CBMs, India tried to include Baltistan in the disputed territory by suggesting two new meeting points outside Jammu and Kashmir which Pakistan turned down. However the joint working group would examine operationalizing two unused agreed meeting points. To promote people-to-people contacts the working group was tasked to finalize a new visa agreement. Probably the only concrete forward movement which will take place in New Delhi when the foreign ministers meet will be an agreement on cultural exchanges. On balance the talks so far have been asymmetrical in terms of results. On issues of interest to India on trade and interior ministry cooperation there has been movement. On peace and security issues of interest to Pakistan, Kashmir, Siachin, Sir Creek, the water issues, there has been no movement. Better relations between the two countries would unlock South Asia's economic and developmental potential and also that of Afghanistan. Pakistan has to surmount internal and external challenges to strengthen its negotiating position. If India's objective continues to be to deny Pakistan any space to do, sadly little bilateral progress can be foreseen. In the short term this may suit India which is riding high with its economic resurgence and American alliance, but in the long term it is a shortsighted policy which would rebound on India. __
