A number of westernized Turkish thinkers and media figures, and experts in Arab affairs and Lebanon, call Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan the “Arabs' Abdel-Nasser.” It is a reference to the “orphans” of pan-Arabism, who see Erdogan's hard-line positions against Israel and its intransigence vis-à-vis the peace process as a reminder of the late Egyptian leader Jamal Abdel-Nasser. The Arab masses saw Abdel-Nasser as a leader who would protect their dignity in the face of Israel and the west. Erdogan smiles and does not comment when this comparison is made to him, since the comparison is symbolic more than realistic. The hard-line Turkish position on Israel has been greeted with approval from the Arab masses and elites, even if it is an emotional response representing a longing for an Arab leader who is bolder in confronting Israel's constant humiliation of the Palestinians and the Arabs. But there is an objective basis to this Turkish policy of solidarity with the Arabs and their confrontation with Israel that goes beyond the emotional. Turkish foreign policy is based on a new concept that has taken root since the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is characterized by its moderate Islamism, took power in a country that is very attached to the pioneering secularism of Ataturk. Ankara opted to change its regional and international role after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead of being the strong arm of the west, America and NATO during the cold war, Turkey saw a transition to the role of promoting stability in its neighborhood, from the Balkans to the Caucasus and Central Asia. This would preserve a leading and active regional and international role, after the earlier role of policeman for western interests became obsolete. It would be acceptable for Turkey to use its role as “the political and economic policeman” in its neighborhood, an extension of the Ottoman Empire, which collapsed at the beginning of the 20th century, and its historical relations with various regions. It is no coincidence that the author of the theory of striving for the stability and prosperity of the peoples of the region surrounding Turkey, whose objective is “zero conflict,” is Turkey's “neo-Ottoman” foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu. The team of Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul has been successful in defusing many of Turkey's conflicts, most prominently its historical problem with Armenia. However, we can take a quick look at the map of oil pipelines that run through Turkey, the projected pipelines for which agreements have been concluded, and those that are being negotiated, which run from eastern Europe to Central Asia and Iran, in the direction of western Europe, and the Turkish coastline on four seas and the Bosporus, in addition to the land borders with Iraq and Syria (the eastern Arab front). These allow one to discover the economic foundation of Turkish foreign policy. These countries have become a secure conduit for energy, which benefits European and some Arab consumers, and energy exporters. This economic foundation of Turkish policy is not limited to the role of secure oil pipeline; it extends to the bilateral relations with surrounding countries in terms of investments and trade for an economy that is steadily growing, and this is an incentive for the theory of “zero conflict.” In this scenario, the escalating defiance practiced by Israel, based on the green light from America to which it has become accustomed, is a key element that threatens the stability promoted by “zero conflict” foreign policy. This search for stability has prompted Turkey to play a mediating role in Syrian-Israeli negotiations, inter-Palestinian reconciliation, Syrian-Saudi rapprochement, and even Lebanese-Syrian reconciliation, extending to Turkey's efforts between Damascus and Baghdad, and Tehran and the west. Needless to say, the crisis in Turkish-Israeli relations does not mean that Ankara has abandoned its relations with Israel, as it supports peace between it and the Arabs. But the source of the confrontation lies in the threat that Israeli policies of arrogance, which only lead to more wars, at a time in which Turkey's economic interests are the pillar of its policy of promoting peace and stability. In addition to Israel's actions against Turkish hopes, there is Turkey's general's support of Palestine and Lebanon against Israeli barbarity. This support is popular in Turkey, where the AKP has cemented its strength, as Israel's image has deteriorated, not only in Turkey but in the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. The elements of Israeli-Turkish confrontation might not be new, but it certainly is new that Lebanon has become dear to Turkey's heart. The latest chapter arose with Erdogan's harshly critical remarks on Israel in response to a question about Lebanon, during Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri's visit to Ankara this week. This gave the visit itself added importance. Israel's constant threats against Lebanon are taking place with Turkey having, since 2006, a number of troops in the UNIFIL peacekeeping force in south Lebanon, to prevent any deterioration on this front. But Turkey's hard-line stance against Israeli intransigence has other consequences, which are no less important. Most significantly, it allows Ankara to achieve balance, with Iran holding on to strong cards in Lebanon and Palestine. This has another function as well, which happens to be a long story.
