The warmth of the French reception for the beginning of the process of normalization between the Lebanese and Syrian States – which started with Prime Minister Sa'd al-Hariri's visit to Damascus – did not conform to the stance of Washington, which continues an intermittent dialogue with Syria over regional issues, including the Lebanese dossier. Despite the atmosphere of relief entailed by the visit, after the formation of a national unity government, a French-American consensus over raising the issue of Hezbollah's arms has surfaced once again, after the government referred this issue to the table of dialogue. All the Lebanese remember that the American Administration under George Bush, and the French Administration under Jacques Chirac, tightened the sanctions on Damascus and Tehran because they refused for Lebanon to remain an arena for the feuding regional interests, among other reasons. Today, President Barack Obama expressed to President Michel Suleiman in the White House the American concerns over the smuggling of arms into Lebanon, while French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said that Hezbollah's arms represent a "serious issue" that hinder negotiations between Syria and Israel. These two statements practically link the Lebanese issue with the regional dimensions. Although it has not been confirmed yet whether the complaint of the American president and the French minister is a mere attempt to respond to hints made about the need to cancel Resolution1559, Washington and Paris certainly sought to deliver a message to Al-Hariri's cabinet to the effect that the grace period given for the Lebanese State to address the issue of Hezbollah's arms will not be extended forever. The national unity government's desire to avoid the outbreak of the conflict over the arms of the resistance cannot be questioned, a conflict that mobilized the street after the July war, as well as its desire to fold the chapter of instability and lack of security, while Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki believes it was a chapter of stability and security, attributing it to his country "over the past years." After Al-Hariri's visit to Damascus and his meeting with President Bashar al-Asad, Mottaki opted to learn about the results of the major turnaround in the Lebanese-Syrian relations from Beirut, as he was keen on reminding about the efforts Tehran made with the political leaders in Lebanon, and with the "regional mechanism" it consolidated to make them reach an accord. Speaker Nabih Berri's assessment of the implications of this turnaround did not touch on the Iranian role. It seemed that Mottaki wanted to secure a seat for Tehran in the train of normalization between Beirut and Damascus. Prime Minister Sa'd al-Hariri's approach is of course difference, as he places his visit to Syria in the framework of the inter-Arab reconciliation channels and the realistic vision of the half-filled glass. Readings of the implications of the new chapter in the history of the Lebanese-Syrian relations which started in the last days of 2009 are different. Some sides are reassured that this step is an achievement that avoids a Sunni-Shiite sedition in Lebanon and are confident about "a settlement that consolidates the resistance." Most importantly, the beginning of 2010 will be a test to correct the relations between two states, after the recognition of "two nations in two states" reality was consolidated for the first time. Regardless of the results of linking the interests to the framework of seeking an economic integration between Syria and Lebanon, one that starts with amending the texts of the "Fraternal and Coordination and Cooperation Treaty," it is clear that the realistic aspect of the "half-filled glass" does not involve essential concessions. Al-Hariri's cabinet thus accepts that the demarcation of the border starts from the north, a step that will not take many weeks, only if Syria proves determined to draw lessons of lengthy years of crises and disappointments. Between politics and the interests of business and economics, the Lebanese should learn how not to entice Syria's interference in their affairs, and how not to empower themselves by Syria against their domestic political rivals. Only then, the relations among institutions are regulated, the concerns of power and custody and tutelage and the upper-hand fade away, and the ambitions of the opportunists and those who outbid nationalism and Arabism dwindle. The ambitions of those who trade with the spirits of the sects and their rights, with decent living with or without them, and those who burry the project of naturalization forever, most of whom practice a racist policy with the refugees and curse the darkness of the camps days and night also disappear. A state-to-state relation between Syria and Lebanon mean all of that, and perhaps much more. It means primarily that the Lebanese should learn how to protect their homeland by empowering their state, and should learn to adopt dialogue as a language for reform which is never bought from abroad…so they stop slaughtering their country whenever the ambitions of one party triumph… Syria has many obligations that are akin to "debts" it has to pay for Lebanon, some of which have already matured decades ago…It is time for the big test.
