The Constitutional Court of Turkey abided by Turkish law when it took the decision to ban the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP – Demokratik Toplum Partisi), a decision that will have tremendous consequences on the relationship of Turkish authorities with the country's Kurdish citizens, despite the unlikelihood of any role played by the government in the ban. Yet the court has at the same time placed the ruling Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) before a tremendous challenge, one represented by the parliamentary ability of that party to change the laws that allow banning political parties, especially that it almost fell victim to these laws and that it is exposed to danger despite its political legitimacy and parliamentary majority. It is well known that the law of banning political parties in Turkey is connected to the phase of direct rule by the military, and that it is part of the remnants of the military institution's influence and of the pockets of secular autocracy. It has been used several times to prohibit partisan and political activity, especially that of those who cast doubt on the nature of secular rule and call for changing it, among them Islamic trends. It should be mentioned that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is the successor of the banned Refah party. The law has also been used against those who call for cultural diversity, which was considered to threaten the nation's unity and weaken patriotic feeling, especially those originating from Kurdish elites. In other words, efforts to emerge from the autocratic phase, with its twin aspects of extremist secularism and of the hegemony of the military institution, becomes mixed with dealing with Kurdish cultural, social and political ambitions in Turkey. And that is the core of the challenge face by the AKP: not to clash directly with the military institution, which still clings to the banning laws, coupled with the desire to open up to Turkey's Kurdish citizens who reject violence, even repentant ones from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK – Partiya Karkerên Kusdistan). So far, it seems as if it is still unable to achieve progress in its plans to reconcile with the Kurds, which explains its inability to amend the banning laws through the parliament, in which it enjoys a comfortable majority. With the complications that the decision to ban will add to the relationship of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government with the Kurds and to the negotiations of Turkey joining the European Union, which assume accurate respect of political, democratic and equal rights, the new role which Ankara has chosen for itself in the region will find itself put to the test, especially that the AKP government has been mixing between Turkey opening up to countries in the region and seeking mediations between the governments of some of those countries and their opposition movements. The question that arises here is about how to be able to form good relations with the Iraqi government as well as with the government of Iraq's Kurdistan province, and to play a mediating role between them, at a time when Turkey's Kurds are being denied the right to political representation by force of law. Similarly, Turkey's arguments will be weakened regarding its dispute with Israel over the rights of Palestinians and over recognizing the Hamas movement, as its position will be weakened in playing the role of indirect mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as long as a segment of its population is unable to express itself politically. It is true that the AKP is not responsible for the decision taken by the Constitutional Court, and it is also true that it had not been keen on such a ban to begin with. Moreover, the meaning of such a decision being issued at this time in particular is no mystery to the party's leaders. In fact, some commentators have considered that the ruling Turkish party was being targeted by this decision, to the same extent as the political voice of Turkish Kurds was, especially as the AKP is suspected to have stood behind the prosecutions of the Ergenekon group, which includes members of the military as well as civilians belonging to the Atatürk school. Will Erdoğan then be able to quickly amend the laws in order to prevent the possibility of any other Kurdish political formation being banned, and to restore consideration to the leaders of the banned Democratic Society Party (DTP) and allow them to return to political activity, thereby winning a fundamental battle in strengthening civilian rule in his country?
