On the sidelines of the discussions of the policy statement in Lebanon, and perhaps based on it or as an echo of some of its ideas, the research focuses on concepts that establish the meaning of the state, its role, the country, the citizen, and the ruling apparatus. This research seems evident at the stage of national liberation during which the features of the future crystallize. But going back to this research in Lebanon - a country that completed its political independence more than 60 years ago and witnessed during these decades civil wars and agreements to regulate power, in light of semi-collective consensuses - means the absence of the ability to draw lessons from the tragedies in the best scenarios. It also implies the prevalence of a discontentment with this kind of agreements and the anticipation of a coup in the balance of powers to change these agreements in the worst scenarios. This is regardless of all the talk about coexistence, the unity of interests, and similar goodwill announcements. Currently, the Lebanese leaders reiterate what the national dialogue committee repeated on the eve of the civil war in 1975, which was the same they repeated in 1958. They discussed it at length to end the fighting in 1989 in the Saudi city Al-Taef. They wrote down the abstract of their agreement in the new constitution. Despite all that, the country did not survive the renewal of the conflict and fighting, and the interpretation of the Al-Taef Accord is no longer linked to everyone abiding by its texts, but is interpreted according to the side to which the domestic balance of powers is tipped, regardless of how to amend this balance. In other words, the country still lacks standards which everyone complies with and is committed to implement, despite temporary settlements that used to deal with situational interest of one side or more, regardless of how much it conforms to the standards that should be binding for everyone. In this context, the debate over the finality of the nation and the meaning of the state and political sectarianism and mechanism of governance is repeated. These issues had clearly been settled by the constitution of Al-Taef. But the current balance of powers, and perhaps temporary interests, push one side or more to reiterate this debate. Hence, the document announced by Hezbollah pointed out that the alternative to the "unattainable" proper democracy is "consensual democracy." Hezbollah thus considers it impossible to implement the rules of the current constitution which stipulates the adoption of the parliamentary republic system and elections as governance mechanisms by which everyone abides in words and deeds. The party suggests "consensual democracy", which means that all sides should agree over what they want from the state, the country, and the citizens. The 2005-2009 experience – during which tension prevailed and some sides resorted to arms – revealed that the meaning of consensus is restricted to what Hezbollah wants, not what the constitution wants. This also applies to the arms Hezbollah holds and its objectives, and also applies to the meaning of the country and its affiliation. Even if Hezbollah was forced to separate between the religious and political aspects of the velayat-e faqih [the rule of the supreme jurisconsult] which is based in the first place on the unity of religion and politics, and even if ambiguity engulfed the meaning of developing the country that was subject to changes, if the velayat-e faqih is a religious concept that cannot be questioned, then how could we agree over this meaning which is in contradiction with its core? And how can we reconcile the "consensual democracy" and the Lebanese Constitution on the one hand, and the essence of the velayat-e faqih that is nonnegotiable on the other hand? This explains the ambiguity that surrounds the national sense of belonging, in anticipation of the possibility of pushing Lebanon into a battle imposed by developments linked to Iranian files. This also raises questions about the meaning of the Lebanese homeland and its finality. "Consensus" here is not a solution to Lebanon's crises inasmuch as it is a fulfillment of a political interest for which one Lebanese side works, at the expense of the constitution which is supposed to be the ceiling that covers everyone. The same applies to the call to cancel political sectarianism, numerical democracy or rotation in presidencies. It ignores the constitution itself that determined how these issues should be solved, even though the post-Taef circumstances prevented the implementation of these clauses. The new proposal comes to fulfill a fleeting political purpose, on the occasion of the debate over the arms of Hezbollah in the policy statement. In this sense, "consensual democracy" merges with the direct political objectives, and paves the way for practices that contradict the constitution and thus generates new problems rather than solving the existing ones, unless Hezbollah considers that with power, it has the ability to convince whoever is unconvinced, as happened after the May 7 events in Beirut and the mountain.
