Iran welcomed Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with excessive warmth. It did not ask for his country to stop being a NATO member, cut its ties with the “cancerous tumor” that must be removed, or put an end to its close relation with the Great Satan. Erdoğan had sent meaningful messages before his visit: the cancellation of the Israeli participation in air maneuvers and closing off Turkish air passageways to the Israeli fighters; his support of Iran's right to have nuclear technology for peace purposes and his criticism of the “biased” Arab stance in this issue; his consideration that any military action against Iran would be “an act of madness”. Iran welcomed the visitor with excessive warmth. It is aware that Turkey is the greatest competitor in the region and that the Turkish dictionary which is based on the terminology of interests, stability, and prosperity is more attractive than the Iranian dictionary which is based on breaking in, confrontation, and opposition. It is more attractive regionally and internationally and more respective of the borders between countries and their right to be different. It is based on changing perceptions through conviction and numbers rather than through rockets and accusations. Iran is also aware that Erdoğan was the godfather of the indirect negotiations between Syria and Israel; that the Turkish-Syrian borders have turned into an opportunity for cooperation and exchange while it used to be ridden with sensitivities and mines; that the Syrian-Turkish relations have become an envied model in the region. Despite all of the above, Iran has celebrated the visit of Erdoğan, who comes from Muslim roots and brilliantly lives in the institutions of a secular state. This ovation includes a note of realism, interests, trade exchanges, and gas pipes so that Europe would not be stung by cold should the Kremlin master feel angry. What is most important is what was said by Ahmadinejad, the former head of the Tehran municipality to his guest the former head of the Istanbul municipality. He said that Turkey and Iran can formulate a “new regional order”, considering that their collaboration “reduces the void (in the region) and puts a stop to the plans of enemies” outside. It would be obvious here for the reader to think about the United States, which is getting ready to leave Iraq and is currently sinking in a hopeless war in Afghanistan; and about Pakistan, which is sliding even more towards the abyss of violence and is thus spurring fears on its arsenal and the danger of its disintegration or the shrinking of its central authority. Iran offers Turkey cooperation in order to fill the void. The fate of such ambition cannot be separated from the future of the Iranian nuclear file and the bickering over it between Iran and the West, and Iran and Israel. However, it is noteworthy that the region's future is discussed on the Iranian-Turkish table in the absence of the majority of the region's inhabitants, i.e. the Arabs, and in light of their divisions over their issues and the pending issues in the region. What can Arabs do to face the void and the calls for a new regional order? The first thing that comes to mind is to hasten and boost the Arab reconciliation that was launched by King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz; then build on the Saudi-Syrian summit that was held in Damascus and consider it to be a stage for restoring normal relations within the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian triangle. Arabs can also benefit from Syria's position and relations with Iran and Turkey. Without Syria, Iran loses its position on the Mediterranean and on the demarcation line with Israel through the South of Lebanon. Such loss would be felt heavily in the region. Without Syria, Turkey loses its gateway to the heart of the Arab world. Such loss would be felt heavily in the region. This position gives Syria power and opportunity. Indeed, it has the power to contribute in shaping up an Arab atmosphere that guarantees the participation of Arabs in the formulation of the new regional order. It also has the opportunity to play a regional role whose pillars are closer to the Turkish dictionary than to the Iranian one. This practically implies the contribution in hastening the government formation in Lebanon; reviving the Palestinian reconciliation; participating with the Arabs in formulating a unified perspective that would preserve Iraq's unity and Arabism. This would lead to “problem-free relations” among Arabs, at least with regard to the great pending issues. Damascus, which is able to address itself to Tehran and Istanbul, is able to play a crucial role in this phase if it arms itself with the returned warmth to the relations inside the guaranteeing Arab triangle.
